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PART I: DISSERTATION OVERVIEW
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1. Introduction 
This dissertation investigates the role of board as an intermediate actor in 
corporate governance.  In any complex situation involving a large number of 
interested parties with diverse interests, an intermediate actor is necessary 
to channel the multitude of preferences into unitary decision-making 
structure that is capable of action (Rehfeld 2006, 2009, Mansbridge 2003, 
2011).  Besides companies, such actors can be found in state, church or other 
large non-governmental organizations (Pitkin 1967).  However, this 
dissertation in accounting focuses on corporate boards and specifically their 
roles in large, publicly listed companies in Europe.   
There are four essays in this dissertation.  The dissertation begins with a 
conceptual and descriptive analysis on materiality, which is investigated 
from ex ante decision-making perspective in corporate governance, in 
contrast to audit and legal literature focusing on ex post assessment of 
materiality of misstatements. The second essay focuses on the relationship 
between shareholders and board, applying theory of representation, asking 
in what kind of circumstances boards act as trustees and when as delegates 
of shareholders.  The third essay investigates the boundaries of decision-
making power between board and management, questioning what 
determines how boards sets limits of power.  In the final essay, the impact of 
financial distress on governance is analyzed, asking what happens to the role 
of board in decision control when major part of financial risk shifts from 
shareholders to creditors.   
This dissertation is based on a refined agency model of governance, where 
governance is seen as a triangle, consisting of two closely related but 
separate relationships, one between shareholders and board, based on 
representation and accountability, forming the basis of second essay, and 
another between board and management, characterized by delegation and 
control, being the framework for the third essay.  The third side of the 
 12 
triangle is the relationship between management and shareholders, which is 
primarily one-directional, consisting of economic outcomes of actual 
business operations belonging to shareholders.  This model can be called 
principal-representative-delegate model of governance.  It complements 
existing agency theory by demonstrating that the simplified dualistic owner-
manager model lacks the sophistication required to understand the distinct 
role of the board and separate characteristics of its two main governance 
relationships, between directors and shareholders and between directors 
and management.  It does not argue, though, that principal-agent model is 
irrelevant, rather it argues that it benefits from further refinements, such as 
presented in this study. 
Analysis of the three core actors of the governance triangle build up on 
extensive past work on shareholders, boards and management, well 
described in fundamental works on corporate governance, such as Monks 
and Minow (2011) or, in the case of boards, being the main subject of this 
dissertation, extensively presented in Huse (2007).  The challenge of 
corporate governance is how the actors in the triangle lead to value creation 
for a corporation (Huse 2007).  Although shareholders have the legal rights 
of control, in the case of large publicly held companies being the focus of this 
study, expression of property rights is complicated by co-determination 
problem (Huse 2007).  Property rights theory separates ownership rights 
from control rights, which is essentially the basis of governance triangle, 
where shareholders have ultimate ownership rights, but they have delegated 
the vast majority of their control rights to their elected representatives, the 
board, which further delegates decision rights to management in order to be 
able to carry out the daily tasks of managing a company.  Solving a co-
determination problem between various interests, risk preferences and time 
horizons of shareholders requires a mechanism of creating a unitary 
decision-making structure, which is capable of action.   
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Chart 1     Governance triangle 
 
The triangular concepts are presented in the essays in the following way:  
The first essay establishes the concept of materiality in decision-making, 
which forms the basis of the empirical analysis in the following three essays.  
The second essay discusses the relationship between shareholders and 
management, utilizing the concepts of representation and accountability 
and the third essay investigates the second main leg of the triangle, 
delegation of decision rights from the board to the management.  The final 
essay analyzes the specific situation of the triangle where creditors assume 
the role of risk bearers, in situations of financial distress, and where board 
increasingly becomes a representative of debt holders rather than 
shareholders. 
Even though the central actor of this study, the board, seems like a self-
evident concept, it has different forms in various national institutional 
settings.  Governance scholars regularly separate US and UK board 
structures from the rest of the world (see e.g. Monks and Minow 2011, 
Aguilera and Jackson 2003), being based on dispersed ownership and 
independent majorities of boards, although these two also have major 
differences.  In US, board election is dominated by existing board and 
shareholders have restricted legal rights in nominating board candidates 
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(Bainbridge 2010, Bebchuck 2013) and duality of leadership (CEO and 
Chairman of the Board) is still common in US.  In UK, however, boards have 
separated the two roles, and a distinct feature is that management 
commonly has several seats, constituting on average 26 % of board seats in 
the 180 UK companies being a part of this study.   In continental Europe 
separation of management and board is more strict, although duality of 
leadership still exists, even if recommendations advice against it, in some 
countries.  Legal scholars also differentiate between one-tier and two-tier 
board structures (Hopt 2011), one-tier being the prevalent form in most 
legislations.  In one-tier system shareholders directly elect the board, which 
has the task of representing shareholder interests and controlling the 
management.    In dual board structures, shareholders elect a supervisory 
board which further elects a management board.  This structure is 
mandatory in Germany and allowed in many other European countries 
(Hopt 2011).  However, the difference is more formal than real, supervisory 
boards having similar powers to regular boards of directors and 
management boards having a role closely in line with normal management 
teams.   The German governance model also includes a legally defined 
executive board, which has a role similar to management teams.    
In order to add for confusion, structures including both supervisory board 
and board of directors in the same company exist, such as at Gjensidige 
Forsikring in Norway, which has a 21 member supervisory board elected by 
shareholders, further electing a board of directors which has most of the 
standard board powers.  These structures often have roots in mutual or co-
operative ownership arrangements that have transformed themselves into 
listed companies.  In addition there are other types of entities call boards 
with limited or specific governance roles, such as board of representatives 
with a role of supervising board of directors in Sturebrand AS in Norway, or 
shareholders’ nominating boards with a formal role for to assess board 
performance and propose board members for election in shareholders’ 
meeting.   For example, BE Group in Sweden has a nominating board 
consisting of representatives of three largest shareholders and chairman of 
the board, who have the task of proposing board members, their 
compensation and statutory auditor for the annual shareholders meeting, 
and in addition they publish their assessment of directors prior to such 
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meeting1.    However, despite technical differences between one-tier and two-
tier board structures, between supervisory boards and boards of directors, 
between executive boards and management teams, what is called as board 
in this dissertation essentially is a representative body elected by 
shareholders that has wide delegated powers and a hierarchal position 
over the management.   
It can be questioned if institutional differences between various legal forms 
of corporate governance impact the reliability of the results of this study.  It 
is evident that a legally required executive board may be more powerful than 
a normal management team, and an elected body between shareholders and 
board of directors, such as supervisory board or shareholder nomination 
board may impact the relationship between boards and shareholders.   It is 
also evident that a German board structure with mandated employee 
representation or UK board with a strong management influence may have 
a different dynamics from what can be considered a standard representative 
European model of unitary board with a majority of independent directors.  
However, boards as defined above have the essential task of decision control, 
being bodies that determine what kind of powers  management has, and 
which decisions need to be subject to shareholder representative 
assessment.   Thus from corporate governance perspective, the various other 
entities called boards in European circumstances have only a 
complementary role over the key issues of governance, decision control and 
accountability, as discussed throughout this dissertation. 
This dissertation discusses two most important axis of the triangle, the 
relationship between shareholders and board and the relationship between 
board and management.  The third axis is basically one-directional, the 
outcome of management actions belonging to shareholders as the residual 
beneficiaries.  Although in certain situations a bi-directional link between 
shareholders and management also exits (see e.g. Becht et al. 2010), the 
regular route is through the board.  In addition, this dissertation also 
discusses a specific case of board relationship towards an external party, 
creditors, which primarily arises in a situation of distress. 
                                                          
1 http://investors.begroup.com/?p=cg&s=election_committee&afw_lang=en, accessed 
24.8.2015.  Shareholders nominating board would require further research, as it contributes 
to representation and accountability by formalizing board search and assessment processes. 
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The fundamental rationale for existence of a board structure arises from 
economies of decision-making (Hansman and Kraakman 2004).  It would 
be impractical and costly for a large number of shareholders to participate 
in corporate decision-making, so some kind of delegation to a smaller group 
of actors is necessary (Fama and Jensen 1983).  Directors can be seen as 
decision experts, who should have suitable knowledge to act on behalf of 
shareholders in complex decision-making situations, avoiding what Arendt 
(1973) calls the rule of mob, decisions by the most vocal shareholders.    
Moreover, in order for boards to efficient decision-making bodies, they need 
to have a proper governance process.   
This dissertation follows Pettigrew (1992) and Forbes and Milliken (1999), 
who urged researchers to focus on what board does rather than attempting 
to find a connection between board structure and firm performance.     A 
large body of literature has focused on board’s influence on financial results 
(see e.g. Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998, 
Minichilli et al., 2012), however, this study considers corporate performance 
such a complex phenomenon with a very large number of determinants that 
establishment of an empirical link between board characteristics and 
financial results is tentative at best, and might be even misleading at worst.  
Instead, in line with Forbes & Milliken (1999), and Ees, Gabrielson and Huse 
(2009),  this research contributes to the literature attempting to 
understanding what board actually does and how directors advance 
corporate goals to their best understanding.    
The empirical material for all four essays consists of large publicly listed 
companies in Europe.  International corporate governance research is 
mainly based on comparisons across countries (e.g. LaPorta et al 2002, 
Faccio and Lang 2002, for a survey, see Dennis and McConnell 2003), but 
considering the high level of integration of financial markets, and more 
specifically, free movement of capital in European Union2, the relevance of 
country-based studies can be challenged.  Large publicly listed companies 
may have a legal domicile, but due to their international ownership, 
multinational operations and multicultural leadership, their real domicile is 
                                                          
2 The empirical material actually includes two countries that are not members of European 
Union, Switzerland and Norway, but which belong to European Economic Area, the rules of 
which de-facto harmonize their regulatory environment with EU.  EU and EEA are used 
concurrently throughout the dissertation. 
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not tied to a single country.  This observation is the basis of methodological 
choice for the empirical part of this work, focusing on companies at the 
European Union level, with little consideration for their legal domicile or 
place of primary stock market listing.  Country-based legal or regulatory 
environments are not irrelevant, but separating real decision-making from 
formal legalistic structures requires elevating the level of analysis from 
territorial entities called nation-states to an European level, where 
integrated accounting rules based on IFRS and common regulatory 
framework established by European Union provide a reasonably level 
playing field for companies fighting for investor attention in financial 
markets.   
This is the first research systematically investigating board rules in corporate 
governance.   Although the responsibility for drafting and/or approving rules is 
not always explicitly expressed in rules, there was no evidence in any of the 
material of investigated 600 companies that such rules would be subject to 
shareholder acceptance or even presentation in shareholder meetings.  Rather, 
several rules included even a specific date when boards had approved them.  The 
majority of investigated European companies disclose either their full 
internal board rules or essential parts thereof, which provides unique 
information for empirical analysis which is not available in any databases. 
The empirical material is based on 600 largest European publicly listed 
companies by market capitalization as of 25.8.20123.  This creates two major 
limitations to the results; they may not be globally applicable, nor may they 
be relevant for smaller or private companies.  However, the sample is 
economically significant.  The total turnover of these companies in 2011/12 
was over 8 trillion Euros, and their market capitalization was in excess of 6 
trillion Euros.  These companies originate from 17 countries and represent 
19 industries, and thus provide a reasonable image of European corporate 
sector.  As all of them are publicly listed and widely held, they reflect well 
firms’ ownership structure in Europe.  The shares of these companies are 
listed in countries belonging to European Union, and thus follow the 
relevant directives4, creating a reasonably uniform institutional framework 
                                                          
3 EuroSTOXX 600 as of 25.8.2012 
4 Such as Directive 2007/36/EC, which sets certain rights for shareholders in listed companies 
and Recommendation 2005/162/EC, which deals with the role of non-executive or 
supervisory directors in listed companies as adopted by national authorities or Directive 
2004/109/EC and its amendment 2013/50/EU 
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for the analysis.  Essentially, this is a study of governance and role of board 
in European circumstances. 
 
2.  Objectives 
 
This section summarizes the research objectives of the dissertation. The primary 
objective of this dissertation is to contribute to the literature by separating the 
dualistic agency model of governance into a more refined model which sees 
governance as a triangle, consisting of separate and distinct relationships 
between shareholders and the board and board and the management.  The 
conceptual analysis is supported by empirical work on 600 largest European 
companies by market capitalization, which investigates the role of board in 
corporate governance not only in relation to other two key internal actors, 
shareholders and, management, but also in relation to creditors, in situations of 
distress.  This dissertation presents the first systematic research on board rules, 
which provide rich data on how corporate governance and decision-making 
related thereto is organized in companies.  In addition, this material opens up a 
novel approach to one of the key concepts in accounting, materiality, studying 
it from ex ante perspective of what determines a material decision. 
A second objective of this dissertation is to clarify existing concepts and 
introduce new concepts into literature on corporate governance.   The first of 
such concepts is materiality, introduced in the first essay, and focusing on a 
previously unexplored ex ante measurement of what constitutes a material 
decision.  The second is representation, discussed in the second essay, and 
several useful concepts from the political theory of representation are 
introduced into the analysis of relationship between shareholders and boards.  
The third chapter builds up on a formal definition of power in corporations, a 
concept commonly used but seldom rigorously defined in literature.  In the final 
essay no new concepts as such are introduced, but it extends the concept of 
representation by considering the abnormal situations of financial distress and 
what happens to the role of the board when most of the financial risk lies with 
the creditors. 
The research objectives of each of the four essays constituting this dissertation 
will be summarized in the following:  
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Essay 1 seeks to advance our understanding on concept of materiality by 
investigating what constitutes a material decision in corporate governance.   It 
lays the basis for the dissertation as board decision thresholds are instrumental 
tools of analysis in the three following essays, forming the core of the 
dissertation.  Materiality is analyzed from two perspectives, depth and width, 
depth referring to levels of decision thresholds as determined by boards while 
width refers to the scope of matters subject to hierarchical decision control.  This 
ex ante approach complements extant literature in audit and legal (Eilifsen and 
Messier 2015, Booth 2013, Chong and Vienten 1994, Messier and Eilifsen 2005), 
which has an ex post perspective and which asks what constitutes a material 
misstatement or omission of fact in financial disclosures.    
Essay 2 seeks to provide new insights to the relationship between shareholders 
and board, arguing that boards act as an intermediate actor with a distinct role 
in governance, and that postulates of classical agency theory do not fit well the 
relationship between owners and directors.   In order to better understand the 
relationship, this essay introduces theory of representation (Pitkin 1967, 
Mansbridge 2003 and 2011 and Rehfeld 2006 and 2009) into literature of 
corporate governance.   In addition, the essay integrates theory of 
representation with theories of accountability (Tetlock 1983, Tetlock et al. 2013, 
Roberts 1991, Roberts, McNulty and Stiles 2005) and theories of disclosure 
(Verrecchia 1983, 2001, Leuz and Wysocki 2008) into governance research. 
Essay 3 seeks to contribute to the literature on corporate governance by 
investigating the relationship between board and management through 
concepts of power, decision control and delegation.    Although direct 
mechanisms of shareholder influence exist, the most regular route in large 
publicly listed companies is through elected representatives of shareholders, the 
board.  Through empirical analysis this essay investigates the determinants of 
decision control, how power over material decisions is split between board and 
management.  It provides new insights into classical horizontal (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976) and vertical (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) agency problems by 
studying the role of the board in mitigating these issues.  
Finally, Essay 4 seeks to contribute to governance literature by investigating the 
third agency problem, the one between the company and its creditors.  It 
integrates concepts from financial contracting theories into corporate 
governance, and the essay seeks to establish how governance mechanisms and 
more specifically decision control changes in situations of distress, and how 
board limits the potential moral hazard of shareholders, transforming itself 
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from representatives of shareholders to representatives of creditors.  This paper 
also attempts to contribute to literature on covenants, formalizing the 
conflicting risk preferences of shareholders and creditors, and how covenants 
are set in order to safeguard creditors from the moral hazard of shareholders. 
 
3. Theoretical underpinnings 
 
3.1  Definition of corporate governance 
 
Corporate governance is a subject that excites researchers from various 
fields.  Contributions arise from literature in accounting, finance, 
management and law, and there are links to research on organizations, 
behavioral decision-making and economics.  It can also be argued that 
corporate governance is only a subset of a general concept of governance, 
how people arrange decision-making in entities consisting of a large number 
of interested parties, managed by a few, based on delegated authority.  This 
literature opens avenues to the long tradition of political science and even 
political philosophy.    From researcher’s perspective, multitude of 
approaches provides a rich basis of ideas how to approach his problem, 
however, this same multitude provides a muddy field, where it is a must to 
choose the conceptual environment, at the same time confessing that 
numerous fruitful avenues will not be considered.  
The lack of a clear single theoretical basis for this work is somewhat 
problematic for the dissertation. However, this is not uncommon in 
accounting research, as discussed in chapter 3.2. below.  This dissertation 
attempts to combine two large traditions of social research, the well-
established representation theory from political science with the agency 
theory, which is still the dominant, although frequently attacked theory of 
corporate governance.  This being a dissertation in accounting, a natural 
reference point is to position this work in relation to agency theory, and thus 
the main theoretical underpinning is to see this work as a refinement of 
classical agency theory and not as an attempt to replace it with a more 
general theory of representation.  Various other alternatives to theoretical 
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underpinnings could also be explored, such as behavioral theories of 
management (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Huse et al 2011), 
institutional theories of action (e.g. Ocasio 1999), decision-making theories 
in organizations (Forbes and Milliken 1999, Fama and Jensen 1983, Simon 
1955) or alternatives to agency theory such as stewardship theory (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson 1997), stakeholder theory (Hill and Jones 1992) 
or resource dependency theory (Hillman and Daziel 2003).  These 
theoretical approaches are further discussed later in this chapter. 
There are numerous definitions of corporate governance, reflecting the 
academic background or research focus of the authors.  Probably the most 
widely used is Shleifer and Vishny’s (1997) definition, according to which 
“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”.  
Their approach sees governance as essentially guaranteeing the premises for 
well-functioning financial markets, and it does not differentiate 
shareholders from creditors.  More formalistic is Gillan and Stark’s (1998) 
definition of governance as “A system of laws, rules, and factors that control 
operations at a company”,  which considers governance as a structure 
separate from its economic significance.  Armstrong et al. (2010) have a 
procedural view, seeing governance as “the set of contracts that help align 
the actions of managers with the interests of shareholders”.  Their definition 
is in line with the classical agency-theoretic work by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), which considers a company as a nexus of contracts and where 
governance is a mechanism of controlling agency problems of stealing and 
shirking by the management.  Moreover, Armstrong et al (2010) further 
specify governance in a way that resembles the triangular approach of this 
dissertation:   “Corporate governance consists of the mechanisms by which 
the shareholders ensure that the board of directors, in turn, sees to it that 
managers’ interests are aligned with those of shareholders.”   Huse (2007, 
p.4 ) takes a behavioral perspective and sees value creation as the overall aim 
of governance, defining corporate governance as “the interactions between 
coalitions of internal actors, external actors and the board members in 
directing a corporation for value creation”. Definitions from political science 
are also relevant, as governance can be seen as a problem encountered by all 
human entities consisting of a large number of interested parties, 
represented by a few.  Accordingly, Keohane and Nye (2002, p 202) define 
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governance as “the process and institutions, both formal and informal, that 
guide and restrain the collective activities of a group”.    
For the purposes of this dissertation, corporate governance (in large 
publicly listed companies) is defined as a mechanism of translating an 
unorganized multitude of shareholder preferences into an organized 
decision-making structure, which is capable of action.    Benefits of this 
definition arise from realization that the starting point of governance is 
complex – publicly listed companies are owned by a large number of 
different types of shareholders, whose risk preferences and time horizons 
are diverse (Becht Bolton Röell 2005, Thomsen and Pedersen 2000, Sur, 
Lvina and Magnan 2013, Fama and Jensen 1985, Anderson et al. 2003).  
Most of the aforementioned definitions assume a unitary goal of shareholder 
value maximization as the target of governance, without consideration what 
is the process to determine how to reach this mythical goal.   In reality, 
shareholders hold the ultimate power in corporations, but in order to solve 
their collective action problem they delegate the vast majority of their 
powers to their elected representatives, board of directors.   Directors further 
determine which issues are material enough requiring board involvement 
and which can be further delegated to the operative management.  This two-
step mechanism of representation and delegation is the essence of 
governance.  A board bypassing material decisions or using resources for 
matters irrelevant to shareholders misuses its powers.  Thus the question of 
materiality arises as a core determinant of board efficiency – the time and 
resources available to board work are restricted, and if boards are not able 
to focus on material issues, their ability to represent shareholder interests is 
limited.  
A clear limitation of this study is that while focusing on governance as a 
decision-making process, it does not attempt to enter into the behavioral 
traits of corporate bodies. The theoretical bridge linking rules of decision-
making to actual board behavior is still missing, and this dissertation does 
not answer the question if and how frameworks of control impact actual 
decisions or their outcomes.  If we see companies as entities targeting long 
term value creation and governance as a system of determining “who and 
what really counts” (Huse 2007), decision rules are a means of approaching 
this target, although they do not imply that quality of decision-making 
processes would lead to better outcomes. 
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3.2   What is a theory? 
 
Philosophy, Socrates, is a pleasant pastime, if one engages in it 
with moderation, at the right time of life; but if one pursues it 
further than one should it will bring ruin. However naturally 
gifted a person may be, if he studies philosophy beyond a suitable 
age he will not have acquired the necessary experience to be 
thought a gentleman and a person worthy of respect. People of 
this sort have no knowledge of the laws of their city, and of the 
language to be employed in dealings with men in private or 
public business, or of the human pleasures and passions; in a 
word, they have no idea at all how others behave. So when they 
are involved in any public or private matter they are as ridiculous 
as I imagine men of affairs to be when they meddle with your 
pursuits and discussions (Gorgias, Callicles speaking). 
 
The quote from Plato’s Gorgias, Callicles arguing with Sokrates (Plato 380 
BC/2004) on the relationship between science (“philosophy”) and practice, 
beautifully summarizes the basic dilemma of applied social sciences.  Is 
science just a “pleasant pastime” with little impact on reality, of “how others 
behave”, or can it provide us with real knowledge of people and societies?  
Although pompous, Callicles’s argument is a good reminder of relevance of 
practical value of research in social sciences. 
A  discussion of the theoretical foundations of this dissertation requires 
taking a stand on definition on what actually is a theory, specifically what 
concerns corporate governance and the board.  Being a work within 
accounting research, primary reference point arises from this field.   The 
mainstream of research in financial and management accounting, seems to 
take a practical view on theories.  Scott (2012, p 23) in his textbook definition 
sees that “the fundamental problem of financial accounting theory is how to 
design and implement concepts and standards that best combine the 
investor-informing and manager performance-evaluating roles for 
accounting information”.  His definition is clearly inclusive of governance 
research, board being the body responsible both for “investor-informing”, 
i.e. disclosure, and management performance evaluation.   Watts and 
Zimmerman (1979), usually credited as the founders of positive accounting 
theory, provide a wide definition: “We would prefer to reserve the term 
“theory” for principles advanced to explain a set of phenomena, in particular 
for sets of hypothesis that have been confirmed […]  However, in this article 
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we use the word “theory” as a generic term for the existing accounting 
literature.” Moreover, Malmi and Granlund (2009) define theory in 
management accounting simply as something that has practical value.  Thus 
it seems that accounting scholars have not only a practical view of theories, 
but almost a laissez-faire view, anything that is useful in furthering our 
understanding of societal phenomena under research can be called theory, 
further deliberations on the concept being left for the philosophers of 
science. 
However, accounting and corporate governance literature is full of theories.  
Positivist approach attempts to find theories that can create testable 
predictions that reliably forecast future events (Friedman 1953).  Accounting 
theory claims to has evolved from normative theories, how things should be, 
to positive theories, understanding how things are (Ball and Brown 1968), 
although the controlling role of accounting information inherently includes 
a normative aspect by definition5.   Accounting and corporate governance 
theories are strongly influenced by general economic theories, core concepts 
such as utility maximization and rational but selfish behavior providing tools 
for elegant mathematical models suitable for theoretical analysis.  On the 
other hand, a relevant challenge to the rationalist roots of economics in 
corporate governance studies arises from behavioral theories (Ees, 
Gabrielson and Huse 2009). Simon (1955), argued that people have only 
bounded rationality, and that they rather satisfy than maximize, 
complemented by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Kahenman and 
Tversky (1979), who approach decision-making from behavioral psychology, 
proving that human decision-making is not rational but can better be 
explained by concepts from prospect theory, such as loss avoidance or 
anchoring.  This demarcation line between formal economic theory and 
behaviorism is probably still the main line dividing theoretical work in 
corporate governance. 
It seems like theory in accounting is a versatile term, but do all interesting 
phenomena actually require a theory of their own?  Does a study on boards 
actually require a theory for the board?  We do not have a theory of 
shareholders, although we have plenty of theories on equity markets.  This 
                                                          
5 For example, global International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are based on a 
normative target of “decision usefulness”, which can be considered as a strong 
encouragement for practice-based research. 
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dissertation takes a view that board is an entity that has a unique 
organizational role, but it cannot be analyzed detached from its 
environment. Theories on boards must be relationship based, discussing 
how boards interact with their environments, consisting of other parties not 
only internal to company, but also parties normally associated with 
stakeholder theory, creditors, employees, regulators, markets and media.  
This external view of boards work has also restrictions.  It does not consider 
board internal dynamics, applying theories of how people make decisions as 
teams of directors, interacting with each other and with the management.  
These theories may provide the micro-foundations of board research, and 
the link between internal and external aspects of governance is still clearly 
underdeveloped. 
A theory includes always choices, assumptions that some factors are more 
important than others (Waltz 1979).  However well founded in observations 
or prior research, such choices are always subjective and thus open to 
criticism.  In social sciences, no phenomena is detached from its 
environment, and it is impossible to consider all such factors in 
understanding and explaining phenomena.  Any theory requires 
simplification, and as discussed in chapter 4, such choices may materially 
impact both validity and reliability of results.  Positivists argue that 
simplification and even unrealistic assumptions do not matter, as long as the 
theory provides reliable predictions of consequences from well-defined prior 
conditions (Watts and Zimmerman 1990).  In the related field of politics, 
Waltz (1979) suggests that explanation rather than prediction is expected 
from a good social science theory, since social scientists cannot run 
controlled experiments that give the natural sciences so much predictive 
power. 
Besides choices, theories are not immune to values (Watts and Zimmerman 
1979).  A majority of governance research seems to be followers of Callicles, 
who further argued to Socrates “That is exactly what I do mean.  My belief is 
that natural right consists in the better and wiser man ruling over his 
inferiors and having the lion's share.“  Plato (380 BC/2004).  Similarly, 
Malmi and Granlund (2009) argue that although value-free research may be 
an ideal, in reality most of researchers take economic efficiency as their 
inherent goal, which as such is clearly a normative goal.  Fundamentally, all 
researchers are human beings, limited by their education, personal 
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experiences, values and their own comprehension of language and thus 
cannot totally externalize value judgments from their analysis (cf. Burrell 
and Morgan 1979). 
Finally, Watts and Zimmerman (1979) raise a moral question and ask if the 
target of theory should be economic efficiency or protection of the weakest.  
This question is related to Rawls’ theory of justice (1976), and traits of this 
strongly normative position on theory can be found from regulation of 
corporate governance – what else is regulated disclosure but protection of 
the weakest, attempts to provide as level playing field for all investors as 
possible, and moreover, what else is the requirement for independent 
majorities in board but a normative answer against excessive powers of 
dominant shareholders. 
 
3.3  Theories of corporate governance 
 
The big elephant in glass house in governance literature is agency theory.  Its 
roots from Adam Smith (1776) via Berle and Means (1932), Coase (1937), 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) have been documented uncalculated many times, and its 
concepts of separation of ownership and control, agency problems of 
stealing and shirking and its solutions of carrot and stick, alignment of 
interests and threats of sanctions form the basis of an enormous literature 
non only in corporate governance but in several adjoining fields of study.  
Despite criticism for the simplistic behavioral assumptions of agency theory 
(Huse et al. 2011, Pepper and Gore 2012, Ghoshal 2005) and inconsistent 
empirical results (Daily Dalton and Canella 2003, Aguilera et al. 2008), 
agency theory is still  the dominant theory explaining human behavior in 
hierarchical organizations (Dalton et al 2007)  
The concept of shareholder supremacy forms the philosophical basis of 
agency theory.  It sees shareholders as the ultimate beneficiaries, the 
interests of which overrule the interest of all other actors. It does not 
normally question the complexity of the web of interactions between various 
actors and multiplicity of shareholder interests.  Standard agency theory 
arises from delegation through contract.  A principal enters into a 
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contractual relationship with an agent, agreeing that agent will perform 
agreed tasks on principal’s behalf.  This leads to two problems, how to ensure 
that the goals of the principal and agent are in alignment, and how to ensure 
that the agent is actually doing what he is supposed to do (Eisenhardt 1989).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) saw three different types of costs arising from 
agency relationships, costs of incentives, control costs and residual loss.  In 
order to ensure that agent works in line with principal’s interests, he should 
be compensated if the results of his work are in accordance with the original 
contract.  On the other hand, agency theory sees people unreliable, and thus 
control is also required.  Controlling agents through mechanisms such as 
audit, board of directors and public disclosure entails costs of agency 
relationship. The third set of costs is more opaque, as it assumes that some 
of agents decisions diverge from maximization of principal’s wealth, causing 
residual losses.  This view fails to consider the potential benefits of 
delegation, agents providing skills that principals do not have, creating 
added value to shareholders though their contractual relationship. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued that in addition to vertical agency 
problem between shareholders and management, differing interests of large 
and small shareholders create another, horizontal agency problem.  They 
argued that dominant shareholders can influence corporate decision-
making to the detriment of minority shareholders, either directly 
expropriating benefits from firms through channeling of funds through 
various contractual means, or indirectly by influencing corporate decision-
making prioritizing their preferences, which may materially differ from the 
majority of interests of diversified minority shareholder base6.    In this 
situation management becomes agents of only some shareholders, not all of 
them.   
In addition to vertical and horizontal agency problems, the relationship 
between the company and its creditors is sometimes called the third agency 
problem (Armour, Hansmann and Kraakman 2009), a concept used in the 
fourth essay of this dissertation.  As the role of principal moves from 
shareholders to creditors in situations of distress, it also impacts the way 
                                                          
6 Shleifer and Vishny’s paper has an interesting historical connection.  They wrote the paper 
after Andrei Shleifer had worked in his native Russia together in a team including Robert 
Vishny, on privatizing companies in Russia after the collapse of Soviet Union.  It is evident that 
their comments on dominant shareholders misusing their rights was heavily influenced by 
what they encountered in Russia. 
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boards and management act, essentially changing the role of a board from 
representative of shareholders to representative of creditors, in line with the 
change in split of risk between various providers of funds, as discussed in 
the fourth essay. 
Agency theory is very close to being a generic theory of organized human 
behavior.  Its intuitive appeal arises from behavioral traits common to all of 
us – how to motivate children.  Threats, extortion and bribes; incentives and 
control are parent-child relationships’ adult adaption.  Agency theory is also 
such a multifaceted theory that almost any behavior can be explained by it.  
In its classical format, it assumes self-interested management, whose sole 
target is to maximize its own wealth using corporate assets.  On the other 
hand,  e.g. Fama (1980) and Pepper and Gore (2012) recognized that 
directors’ and mangers’ self-interest may be based on reputational capital 
rather than personal wealth, motivation arising from benefits that cannot be 
measured financially.  Thus agency theory can predict both financially and 
non-financially motivated behavior, which protects it from empirical 
challenges, as almost any behavior can be explained by either extrinsic or 
intrinsic motivation.   
Basic agency model has remained intact as a theoretical concept, although 
additions, such as seeing governance as a set of multiple agency 
relationships, extending over the boundaries of a firm (Arthurs et al 2008), 
or behavioral agency theory integrating prospect theory and other more 
realistic behavioral assumptions to theory, have clearly contributed to our 
understanding of agency relationships.  For example, behavioral agency 
theory assumes that people have bounded rationality, allows for variations 
in risk preferences, and considers trade-offs people make between extrinsic 
and intrinsic motivation (Pepper and Gore 2012). 
Critics of agency theory have argued that it is under-contextualized and 
unable to explain the governance relationships in different stages of 
corporate lifecycle, different institutional settings or different environments 
companies may encounter (Aguilera and Jackson 2003).   Aguilera et al. 
(2008) criticize the universal nature of agency theory, and argue that 
contingency approach to organizations would better cover the very different 
institutional, evolutional and cultural situations companies encounter, 
calling for a bundle approach to governance research.   Similarly to Pepper 
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and Gore (2012), Ees, Gabrielson and Huse (2009), focusing specifically on 
board of directors, search for alternative concepts for research on board 
behavior.  They argue that instead of classic agency elements of conflict of 
interest, exploitation and distribution of value, researchers should focus on 
co-ordination, exploration and knowledge creation.   
Challenges to agency theory are not few.   Lack of empirical support to 
hypothesis based on agency theory (Daily, Dalton and Canella 2003) have 
led to search for alternative approaches.   Stewardship theory (Davis, 
Schoorman and Connelly et al. 1997) argues that the behavioral assumptions 
of selfish, profit maximizing individuals are not correct, rather people enjoy 
personal utility form collectivist behavior giving higher value to co-operation 
than conflict, in essence arguing that intrinsic motivation can be stronger 
than pure extrinsic motivation.  Stewardship theory is connected to 
stakeholder approach, which assumes that in the conflicting environment of 
constituencies with contrasting interests, people will make choices they 
consider to be in the best interests of all stakeholders, not only company 
shareholders (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson 1997).  Resource 
dependency theory treats governance structures as complementary to each 
other, e.g. boards providing resources that managements do not have 
(Hillman and Dalziel 2003).   Behavioral approach sees governance as a 
system of interactions between various actors influencing corporate 
decision-making, reducing the owner-manager problem to just one the 
several relations influencing corporate governance (Huse 2007).  Probably 
the most elegant criticism of agency theory arises indirectly from Ghoshal 
(2005), who sees the theory impacting reality, and agency theory being 
based on selfishness as a motive and carrot and stick as tools provides a 
dismal influence on current and future generations of managers.  If the only 
way of controlling the selfish behavior of top management in companies is 
through a mixture of control and incentives, we inherently teach our 
students and our managers that selfishness is the expected mode of behavior 
when they rise to higher echelons of the society. 
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3.4. Theories on boards 
 
Since direction over the activities of a corporation is exercised through 
the board of directors, we may say for practical purposes that control lies 
in the hands of the individual or group who have the actual power to 
select the board of directors, (or its majority), either by mobilizing the 
legal right to choose them—"controlling" a majority of the votes directly 
or through some legal device—or by exerting pressure which influences 
their choice. Occasionally a measure of control is exercised not through 
the selection of directors, but through dictation to the management, as 
where a bank determines the policy of a corporation seriously indebted 
to it. In most cases, however, if one can determine who does actually 
have the power to select the directors, one has located the group of 
individuals who for practical purposes may be regarded as ''the control." 
 
Berle and Means 1932,  
 
Although Bearle and Means (1932) are usually credited for first defining the 
separation of ownership and control, they also considered boards as 
delegates of most powerful shareholders.  Dominant owners exerted power 
through their “own” directors with little consideration for any independent 
role of boards.  This view is in strict contrast with Mace (1971) or Lorsch and 
MacIver (1989), who reversed the power relationship and painted boards as 
“pawns” of management, with little influence on business and limited tools 
of controlling the very management that in practice chose their own boards.  
The revival of boards started in 1990’s, as evidenced in Cadbury report on 
Corporate Governance in UK (Cadbury 1992), which became an 
international benchmark document for governance guidance.  It recognized 
the potential independent role of directors,  and laid the basis for the 
triangular model of governance found in publicly listed companies in Europe 
today.  This changing role of directors has contributed to an explosion of 
board-related literature in accounting, finance, management and other 
related fields. 
In their influential survey on research over board of directors, Adams, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) noted that the majority of research on 
boards is empirical, lacking common theoretical basis.  Even the more 
theoretical works (e.g.  Adams and Ferreira 2007, Raheja 2005 and Song 
and Thakor 2006) could be called models of behavior in specific situations 
rather than theories on boards.  However, do we even need a specific theory 
on boards?  There is no commonly accepted theory of shareholders as a 
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group even though a vast financial literature discusses portfolio selection 
and impacts of ownership.  Board is not a self-sufficient body, its existence 
is defined through its relationships, most important the ones towards 
shareholders and management.  Pettigrew (1992) recognized the lack of a 
coherent theoretical approach to boards and proposed seeing them through 
a sociological prism of managerial elites having powers to control 
organizational behavior.  There are theories related to boards, useful 
theories for understanding board behavior, but similarly to what Malmi and 
Granlund (2009) noticed in accounting, board research theories are mainly 
borrowed from other fields of study, applying them to specific situations 
boards encounter. 
Agency theorists and practitioners often equate boards as agents of 
shareholders together with management (e.g. Reeb and Zhao 2013, 
BlackRock 2014), although postulates of agency theory only weakly apply to 
boards.  It may be partly due to institutional and cultural set-up of the 
extensive the US-based research.  Board election process in US is dominated 
by management and existing board (Sur, Lvina and Magnan 2013)7, while in 
Europe various forms of direct shareholder involvement in board selection 
have become more common (OECD 2012).  Moreover, almost half of the 
listed US companies combined the role of Chief Executive Officer and 
Chairman of the Board (Conference Board 2011), while the same percentage 
in the European sample of this study was 13,5 %8  dual structure being 
against recommendations in most European Union countries.  Due to 
election process and duality of leadership, it is evident that board’s role in 
corporate governance is somewhat different in Europa from United States 
and the results of a study of board’s role in Europe are not fully applicable to 
US circumstances. 
                                                          
7 European and American role of directors may be different as their election processes are 
different.  Sur, Lvina and Magnan (2013) describe the US mechanism as follows: “The director 
selection or appointment process occurs as follows. First, the board’s nominating committee 
scans potential members and issues a recommendation to the full board. The Chair, who sets 
the agenda for board meetings, then ratifies that recommendation. Second, the full board 
votes on a slate of board nominees. The CEO is typically consulted in this stage. Third, the 
board’s slate of nominees is submitted for ratification at the shareholders’ meetings. Owners 
have various ways to intervene in this process, as directors associated with a particular owner 
group have a say in the work of the nominating committee.”  
8 81 companies out of 600.  In addition, 32 companies had an ex-CEO as the chairman, or had 
an executive chairman, i.e. salaried by the company 
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Considering the dominance of agency theory, this dissertation can be seen 
as an addition to existing theory, even though it argues that the role of the 
board has only weak resemblance to the basic postulates of agency 
relationship.  Boards have limited extrinsic financial motivation as their 
compensation is generally fixed.  Although share ownership by directors is 
often recommended, or even mandated by effectively enforcing directors to 
purchase company shares through their compensation, financial incentives 
cannot be considered a dominant basis for director motivation9.  Adams, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) point out reputation as a significant 
motivating factor, while Ees, Gabrielson and Huse (2009) stress the role of 
intrinsic factors.  Moreover, control as a second element of agency 
relationship is also only weakly present in the relationship between board 
and shareholders.  Empirical research shows that boards very seldom are 
held legally accountable for corporate outcomes (Black, Cheffins and 
Klausner 2006), being protected by business judgment rule – as long as 
decisions are properly made, even bad decisions are not a basis for legal 
consequences.  Independent audit can be seen as a control mechanism not 
only over management but also over board, but in effect, regular elections of 
board members in shareholder meetings are the main formal control 
mechanism available to shareholders. 
Lack of explanatory power of agency characteristics calls for alternative 
approaches to analyzing boards in corporate governance.   Probably the most 
general theory of boards actually arises from political science, theory of 
representation, which ponders the relationships between a large number of 
interested parties and their elected representatives, and the role of these 
representatives in relationship to a management or an organization they are 
supposed to control. Representation is a term sparsely used in corporate 
governance research (Verstein 2012).  Classical works (e.g. Jensen and 
                                                          
9 Hay Group in its 2014 study of European boards found that average compensation for the 
chairman in their sample of 374 listed companies was 265.000 EUR in 2012 while regular 
directors received an average of 81.800 EUR with the vast majority paid out either in cash or 
equal amount in company stock (Hay 2014).    Similarly, in Conference Board 2011 survey of 
director compensation and board practices, the average board total compensation in the 
surveyed 334 companies was in retail trade (USD 211.658) and while the majority of 
compensation was in the form of stocks, it was mainly an alternative way of compensation 
rather than a normal incentive, stock options accounting only for a fraction of total 
compensation (Conference Board 2011). Dalton, Hitt, Certo and Dalton (2007) may have 
misinterpreted earlier Conference Board surveys, claiming that 93 % of boards in US had stock 
options in 2005, probably mixing shares as mode of compensation and actual options 
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Meckling 1976, Fama and Jensen 1983, Eisenhardt 1989, Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997) do not use the word at all, and recent influential surveys 
(Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach 2010, Daily, Dalton and Canella 2003, 
Becht, Bolton and Röell 2005) either bypass the issue or refer to it in 
stakeholder context, questioning how structures of corporate governance 
represent the interests of third parties.  Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
provide an exception by writing “Corporations are republics. The ultimate 
authority rests with voters (shareholders). These voters elect representatives 
(directors) who delegate most decisions to bureaucrats (managers). As in 
any republic, the actual power-sharing relationship depends upon the 
specific rules of governance.”, although bypassing the question of 
representation and turning instead to the question of shareholder rights and 
corporate performance.  All in all, in governance literature there is little 
discussion on how boards represent the interests of diverse shareholders 
with varying risk preferences and time horizons. 
Representation theory is well developed in political science.  The central 
question is if the role of a representative is to act on her independent 
judgment (Burke 1774) or on preferences of her electors (Madisson 1788).  
The same question can be asked in corporate governance, should directors 
be independent from the opinions of their electors, or should they rather 
represent preferences of clearly identifiable shareholders.  The second essay 
in this dissertation applies the theory of representation (Pitkin 1967, 
Mansbridge 2003, 2011), arguing that representation provides the basis of 
governance relationship between shareholders and directors, board 
behavior being based on accountability rather than incentives and control.   
Disclosure is seen as the primary feedback of representation, and theories of 
accountability (Tetlock and Bottinger 1994) and disclosure (Verrecchia 
2001) are integrated as building blocks of what the first essay calls principal-
representative-delegate model of governance. 
Another approach studying boards relates to their impact on firm 
governance.  Is board “hands-on”, participating actively in the decision-
making (Adams and Ferreira 2007, Harris and Raviv 2008) and thus having 
a managerial role, or are they more “supervisors”, monitoring and assessing 
top management rather than influencing actual issues (Hermalin and 
Weisbach 1998, Raheja 2005).  The third essay in this dissertation 
investigates the same issue, arguing that at least in large publicly listed 
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companies in Europe boards have a managerial role, as the vast majority of 
disclosed board rules include specific thresholds which make boards actual 
decision-makers. 
Theoretical underpinnings for the empirical research on managerial or 
supervisory role of boards can be found from theories on delegation and 
information gap.  Harris and Raviv (2008) build a model according to which 
optimal delegation is a function of information gap, and show that in certain 
circumstances, delegation is advantageous to both parties.  Aghion and 
Tirole (1997) further argue that we need to separate between formal and real 
power, both being relevant to the delegate motivation.   Information gap is 
closely related to resource dependency theory, board members providing a 
skillset to a company that it is lacking, giving advice to top management on 
issues where internal resources might not have enough experience (Hillman 
and Dalziel 2003, Daily, Dalton and Canella 2003).  In essence, resource 
dependency theory sees boards as part-time consultants providing skills that 
companies do not need on day-to-day basis.  Resource dependency theory is 
also related to representation, decision experts providing what Pitkin (1967) 
calls substantive representation, delegation of decision power to specialists 
in a field.  
Behavioral theories tend to focus on the motivation and actual practice of 
board work.  Very few researchers have had access either to boardrooms or 
board materials.  Although numerous authors have called for access to the 
famous “black box” of the boardroom (e.g.  Daily, Dalton and Canella 2003, 
Beyer et al. 2010), the vast majority of studies focuses on input-output 
models of governance, i.e. what are the impacts of external characteristics, 
such as ownership or board structure, on corporate decisions or outcomes 
(Gabrielsson and Huse 2004, Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach 2010).  
Besides the abovementioned examples, it is hard to find studies that would 
have been able to receive direct access to primary materials of board minutes 
or materials, or being able to observe actual dynamics of board room.  This 
is evidently due to what Pettigrew (1992) calls “strong norms of privacy”, in 
order to maintain trust and confidentiality, transparency of what happens in 
the boardroom is clearly not required. 
 
 
 35 
3.5 Board research related to board rules 
 
There is very limited extant research that has been able to penetrate to the 
internal workings of a board room and even less there exists a proper theory 
of board process (Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach 2010).  Research on 
board rules provides a novel contribution to this stream of research.  
Decision rules provide first-hand information on how boards interact with 
management and how directors understand their role as shareholder 
representatives. Although rules as such may have limited impact on actual 
outcomes, they open up a new avenue for understanding how boards really 
impact corporate decision-making.  
Of the few related antecedents, Machold and Farquhar (2013) observed six 
boards for two years, concluding that information dissemination took 
excessive part from limited time for board work, and called for shifting of 
focus to more strategic issues, an observation in line with this dissertation, 
which challenges if boards in public companies actually are able to focus on 
issues material to shareholders. However, the applicability of Machold and 
Farquhar study to large publicly listed companies is limited by its small 
sample and four out of six boards belonging to non-profit entities.   
Huse and Zattoni (2008) conducted a longitudinal study, where one of the 
researchers acted as a director in three small companies, documenting his 
observations, concluding that board role changes in different life-cycle 
phases of a company and that internal and external trust and perceptions of 
competence and integrity may be more important characteristics than 
formal independence of board members.  Huse and Zattoni’s observations 
challenged the standard assumption of board studies that externally 
observable board characteristics such as independence would be most 
important factors impacting board behavior.  Bezemer, Nicholson and 
Pugliese (2014) videotaped board meetings from two companies, and in line 
with Huse and Zattoni, concluded that internal dynamics in board room are 
more important than external characteristics.   
Johansson (2008) had access to board accounts, i.e. material provided to 
board members by the management for board meetings for a period of 10 
years, in a publicly listed Swedish company.  Johansson highlighted the 
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importance of personal trust as a decision-making criterion, as materials 
provided for the meetings could even be neglected if the presenter had the 
necessary credibility.  He also noted a major discrepancy on the time used 
for material and immaterial issues, resource allocation being, to say the 
least, illogical.  From the point of view of this dissertation, Johansson’s work 
highlights the relevance of improving boards’ concept of materiality, so that 
board work efficiency could be increased and quality of decision-making 
improved.    
Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) investigated board minutes of 11 Israeli 
companies where Israeli state held a major interest.  They concluded that 
boards widely fall into two models, managerial, where they have a direct role 
in firm decision-making, and supervisory, where boards monitor 
management decisions but do not participate in those themselves.  Similarly, 
in case boards disclose the rules for management decision authority, they 
take an active role in material decisions, acting as “management-type” 
boards (Song and Thakor 2006, Adams and Ferreira 2007, Harris and Raviv 
2008) while boards with no clearly specified rules can take a more hands-off 
role of supervising and assessing management work as they are not directly 
accountabile for specific decisions (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998, Raheja 
2005).  However, the results of Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) may not 
be fully applicable to large public listed companies in Europe, where 
requirement for public accountability is higher than in smaller, state-
controlled companies in Israeli circumstances.   
Investigating disclosed board rules will not enter into the actual decision-
making process, however, rules provide information on matters surrounding 
the boardroom, definitions of materiality and representation of shareholder 
interests, division of power between board and management and shifting of 
loyalty from shareholders to creditors in situations of distress. Thus research 
on board rules provides us a glimpse of the structure of board work, which 
is more extensive what traditional input-output models can provide, but 
which evidently lack the micro-foundations of research on actual 
interactions and motivations of directors and management. 
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4.   Methodology, research  
methods and data 
 
 
4.1.  Methodology 
 
This study takes a positivist methodological view, assuming that through 
theory-based empirical quantitative analysis, we can find relationships of 
social reality, which enable us to understand and explain human 
organizational behavior.  Silverman (1993) defines methodology as a 
collection of choices, methods of data gathering and forms of data analysis, 
defining our approach to studying our subject, such as  quantitative and 
quantitative analysis.   We can also consider research philosophies as 
methodologies, positivism representing a methodological approach 
assuming that we can find statistical relationships that provide reliable 
predictions of future (Friedman 1953). However, the statistical results in 
social sciences generally need to be treated with care, as empirical material 
is to a major degree based on categorizations that may only roughly classify 
various determinants used to investigate the phenomena.   
A second methodological trail relates to conceptualization.  Both scientists 
as well as practitioners need linguistic concepts that enable us to 
communicate and analyze reality.  This study introduces certain new 
concepts and brings some concepts from neighboring social sciences into 
analysis of governance.  Even though corporates have distinct governance 
characteristics based on ownership, dispersion of ownership means that 
ownership and control have distanced from each other to the extent that 
general problems of representation and accountability increasingly apply 
also to corporate forms of governance.  The extent of indirect representation 
is immense, considering for example that practically everybody in developed 
economies belongs to some kind of pension savings system, where fund 
managers themselves act as representatives of citizens as ultimate 
beneficiaries. 
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The third methodological choice of this dissertation is orientation towards 
practice.   The practical relevance of this study is related to board 
accountability and efficiency, how directors can be better representatives of 
shareholder interests.   In essence, this means that the inherent normative 
objective of this study is improving board efficiency, in line with Malmi and 
Granlund (2009). Efficiency must not be confused with increasing 
shareholder value, as such an objective is diffuse, and does not separate 
means from the goals.  By improving corporate governance, we can only 
increase the quality of governance process, so that it better reflects interests 
of various beneficiaries of corporate outcomes, on an accepted risk level and 
with an appropriate time horizon, whatever they may be.  
 
4.2  Method 
 
Silverman (1993) defines methods as specific research techniques such as 
personal observation, textual analysis or statistical studies through 
regression analysis. The main research methods used in the second, third 
and fourth essay is standards multivariate regression analysis. An empirical 
database is collected, categorized and combined with existing outside data.  
After formulating relevant research questions and hypothesis, models for 
multi-nominal regression are built, and further analyzed by standard 
ordinary least square calculations.  In addition to standard tests of model fit, 
descriptive statistics and correlation tables are presented and analyzed.   
Choice and treatment of dependent and independent variables is a key 
method choice.   The dependent variable in the second essay analyzing 
representation is an index of disclosure, which follows e.g. Gompers, Ischii 
and Metrick (2003) using indexes as a proxy of quality of corporate 
governance.  In the third essay, which focuses on division of power between 
board and management, dependent variable is the decision limit as a 
proportion of market value of the company, reflecting the proportion of 
shareholder wealth boards are willing to delegate to management in 
investment decisions.  The final essay investigates how decision control is 
impacted by financial distress, and what kind of impact it has on the division 
of power between board and management.  Creditor interest is measured 
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through monetary decisions thresholds, better reflecting creditor 
perspectives in corporate risk taking.  Independent variables used in 
empirical regression models can be divided into three main categories, 
variables related to ownership, variables related to board characteristics and 
variables related to firm characteristics. This division is typical in corporate 
governance studies, firm-related variables being used as control variables to 
increase the reliability of results.  However, the first essay applies a different 
method.  It is a conceptual and descriptive work where basic statistics and 
examples are used to illustrate how companies understand materiality in 
decision-making.   
 
4.3.  Data 
 
The empirical material of this study is based on 600 largest European 
companies by market capitalization, and its most important variables are 
collected from board rules, matters that boards consider material enough to 
require their involvement.  Already the Cadbury Report on Corporate 
Governance in UK and its proposed Code of Best Practice, published in 1992, 
required that  
“1.4. The board should have a formal schedule of matters specifically 
reserved for it for decision to ensure that the direction and control of 
the company is firmly in its hands”  
 
and further in its notes recommended that  
“A schedule of matters specifically reserved for decision by the full 
board should be given to directors on appointment and should be 
kept up to date.  The committee envisages that the schedule would 
at least include: 
 
(a) acquisition and disposal of assets of the company or its 
subsidiaries that are material to the company 
(b) Investments, capital projects, authority levels, treasury policies 
and risk management policies 
 
 
This dissertation seems to be the first one systematically investigating 
matters reserved to board, which may be explained by its unique sample of 
companies.  European material provides an advantage, as based on random 
checks, similar information does not seem to be commonly available for US 
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companies, and cross-country studies considering European Union as one 
single market for governance research are still few. 
The research material is based on hand-picked data from 600 largest 
European companies by market capitalization, forming EuroSTOXX 600 
index as of 25.8.2012.  The companies in the sample are listed in 17 different 
countries belonging to European Economic Area and represent 19 different 
industries. Although a few exceptions exist, the legal domicile and location 
of listing are usually the same.  This paper assumes functional governance 
convergence for companies in developed economies, in line with Hansmann 
and Kraakman (2001) and Hopt and Leyens (2004). Investors, boards and 
management are assumed to adapt their approach to decision management 
in ways to align their practices according to commonly accepted principles 
of corporate governance, despite lack of uniform legal environment.  Such 
practices include clear separation of roles of owners, board and 
management, transparent corporate governance, commonly accepted 
international reporting practices and oversight by competent authorities.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) have 
argued that the integration of global financial markets is driving the 
integration of governance practices, and national legal environments follow 
only with a lag.   Shareholder as the primary beneficiary of governance forms 
the philosophical basis of the functional convergence.     
 
The material on companies has been collected from their websites, and 
includes also annual reports, articles of association, corporate governance 
reports or statements and most importantly, rules of the board10.  This 
material on board rules and decision limits is not available on any databases, 
and its collection and coding is not only laborious but requires in-depth 
analysis of what the boards have actually meant. The key data consists of 
thresholds of decision control, monetary or other numeric values that 
determine when management is obliged to submit a decision for board 
approval.  The numeric limits cover four major areas, investments, financial 
transactions, commercial agreements and technical matters like litigation or 
tax settlements.  Each company may have more than one decision limit 
                                                          
10 Rules of the board can have various names, matters reserved to the board, board charter, 
board by-laws etc.  Sometimes board rules are included in other documents, like document 
de reference in France or regulatory corporate governance reports in Italy or Spain 
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related to each area, and the limit may be expressed either as an absolute 
value, as a relationship to another financial indicator like sales or equity or 
in commercial agreements even as megawatts.     
 
More than half of the 600 companies in the sample disclose their board rules 
or essential parts thereof, and 297 disclose at least one numeric limit of 
decision control, showing that boards commonly consider what defines 
materiality in decision-making.  The total number of identified numeric 
limits in the sample companies was 1120, which means that companies 
disclosing their board rules define on average for four separately identified 
decisions thresholds subject to board authorization.   
 
Focusing on monetary limits omits certain other matters boards consider 
important like strategy, CEO choice and regulatory oversight (Adams, 
Hermalin, Weisbach 2010).  However, as all of these belong to the agenda of 
practically every single board, there is no variation so their impact is difficult 
to study.  Boards can also make decisions that may be of symbolic value like 
political donations or charity, which do not have direct impact on company 
performance.  Such decisions have been omitted from this study even if 
boards had disclosed limits for them. 
The annual reports were used as the source of information for classification 
of ownership and board structures.  The reports were analyzed for the 
financial year that ended between 31.12.2011 and 30.12.2012 as quite a 
number of companies close their financial year in the middle of the year.  
Boards were categorized for their independence, CEO role in the board, 
management representation, employee representation, internationalization 
of the board and gender split.  Most of the companies disclose such 
information, but in cases where it was not explicitly provided, the personal 
biographies of board members were used11.  In cases where independence 
was separately disclosed for independence related to the main shareholders 
or independence of the company, classification required a fulfillment of both 
criteria.  Besides the composition of the board, data on number of board 
                                                          
11 This relates mainly to companies based in Germany and Switzerland, which do not require 
the disclosure of board independence by person.  In case nationality of board members has 
not been disclosed, biographic information like name, past work experience and education 
has been used.  In case where members are from culturally similar neighboring countries like 
Germany/Austria, categorization may not be exact, but the difference is considered irrelevant 
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members and frequency of meetings was also collected.  The company 
websites were analyzed for any other additional information. 
The largest owners were categorized into 11 main categories, but for the 
analysis these were further simplified into four, firms that have Family or 
State or Other clearly identifiable single owner as the dominant shareholder 
or companies that are Widely held12 (Table 1).  It can be questioned if this 
kind of categorization is internally consistent, if such groups are 
homogenous enough to behave in a similar manner.  Anyhow, for the 
purposes of this study, the aforementioned classification is adopted, as it is 
widely used in corporate governance literature and thus the results are 
comparable with past research. 
The financial data is derived from Orbis databases, using annual information 
for the accounting year that ended between 31.12.2011 and 30.12.2012.   
When needed, the data has been converted into euros with the FX rates in 
force at the moment of closing, considering the different closing months of 
the companies.  When pieces of information have been missing from Orbis, 
annual reports have been used.  The accuracy of Orbis data has been 
controlled through random checks.  The data collection process has included 
two research assistants, and more than 10 % of the data has been checked by 
two persons for potential errors in classification.  Furthermore, all data has 
been reviewed at least twice in order to ensure the quality of data collection 
and consistency of coding.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12 There are 73 cases where agent owners (institutional investors) hold in excess of 10 % but 
below 20 % of the votes.  These are anyhow categorized as widely held 
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TABLE 1  Ownership voting share 
 
This table reports summary statistics for ownership statistics for the 600 largest publicly listed companies 
in Europe by market capitalization.  The firms are classified by their largest owner (share of votes), as 
disclosed in the annual report for the financial year ending between 31.12.2011 and 30.12.2012.   Category 
“Family” consists of firms where the largest shareholder is either a single person or a family-controlled 
entity, “State” firms where state is either directly or indirectly the largest shareholders, “Other” is a 
category consisting of various types of dominant shareholders, such as “Investment companies” such as 
Industrivärden in Sweden, “Companies” denoting other firms as dominant shareholders, such as Porsche 
controlling the majority of Volkswagen stock.  All abovementioned categories include only firms where 
such an owner controls more than 10 % of the voting share, all other companies are classified as widely 
held, even if the largest shareholder with less than 10 % share would otherwise belong to these categories.  
The remaining companies are classified as “Widely held”. 
 
 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Med 
Family 130 43% 19% 12% 90% 49% 
State 46 36% 16% 11% 85% 32% 
Other 145 37% 21% 11% 99% 29% 
- Association 1 22% … … … … 
- Bank 8 36% 22% 13% 27% 82% 
- Company 56 38% 34% 15% 34% 92% 
- Co-operative 3 31% … 17% 52% 23% 
- Employees 2 13% … 12% 14% 14% 
- Foundation 19 52% 23% 20% 99% 54% 
- Investment company 44 29% 30% 11% 70% 35% 
- Private Equity 7 43% 30% 11% 70% 35% 
Widely held 284 8% 3 % 2% 20% 7% 
       
Total 600 24% 15% 2% 99% 15% 
       
 
 
Table 2 presents the breakdown of the full sample by country and industry.  
All of these companies publish their regulatory information on their website, 
and the overwhelming majority of material is available also in English.  
There are some minor exceptions where parts of the material (board rules, 
articles of association or corporate governance statements) are only 
available in the native language, French, Spanish, Italian, Dutch or German, 
and in such cases original language versions were used. 
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Table 2  Eurostox 600 companies as of 25.8.2012 by industry and by country of listing  
 
EuroSTOXX 600 stock index divides companies into 19 different industries.  All of the companies are listed in countries either 
belonging to or associated with European Union, although a few have their headquarters in other countries.  Countries are 
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, CH = Switzerland, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, GB 
= Great Britain, GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, LU = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, PT = Portugal, 
SE = Sweden 
 
Industry    
Country 
 AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU NL NO PT SE TOT 
Automobiles & parts    6   1 4 1    2      14 
Banks 2 1 5 2 3 6 1 4 5 1 1 9   1 1 4 46 
Basic resources 1   2  1 2 1 15   1  1 1  3 28 
Chemicals  2 4 9   1 2 4     2 1   25 
Construction & materials   3 2 1 3 1 5 1  1   1   3 21 
Financial services  3 3 1  1  2 14   1     5 30 
Food & beverages  1 4 1 1 2  3 6 1 2 1  5 1   28 
Healthcare  1 7 6 6 1 1 3 6  1   1   3 36 
Industrial goods and services 1  9 11 2 3 5 14 36  1 4  8 1  9 104 
Insurance 1 1 5 3 2 1 1 3 10   1  3 2   33 
Media  1  3    7 10   1 1 2 1  1 27 
Oil & gas 1     2 1 5 12   2  2 6 1 1 33 
Personal & household goods   2 5   1 6 10   2     5 31 
Real estate 1 1 4 3    5 9     3   3 29 
Retail  2 2 2  2 1 3 9     1  1 1 24 
Technology   1 6   1 7 7   1  2   1 26 
Telecommunications 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 4   1  1 1 1 2 19 
Travel and leisure    1    3 14 1 2       21 
Utilities 1   2  5 1 4 7   4    1  25  
Total 9 14 50 67 16 28 19 82 180 3 8 30 1 32 15 5 41 600 
 
 
4.4. Reliability  and validity 
 
Reliability concerns the consistency of research setting, if we can repeat the 
same results in similar circumstances, while validity measures if our 
research achieves what it is attempting to do (Smith 2003).  The first test of 
reliability relates to the quality of data-gathering process and the internal 
consistency of categorization.  Considering that a vast majority of data in this 
research is based on audited information, the reliability of source data has 
been externally verified.   
Reliability of data gathering can also be increased by comparing its 
descriptive statistics to an external source. Corporate governance is a subject 
for extensive consultant and industry association surveys (see e.g. 
Conference Board 2011, Korn and Ferry 2012). A survey most closely 
resembling the sampling of this study is Hay Group’s regular study on 
corporate governance in Europe.  The latest release (Hay 2014) is based on 
a sample of 374 large listed companies in 12 European countries and its data 
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is collected from annual reports by consultants in each one of the countries.  
There are also some significant differences, though, as the study focuses only 
on non-executive directors, its country basis is more limited and the 
minimum size of companies included in the list differs by country.  However, 
most of the companies included in Hay survey are included in EuroSTOXX 
600, so the sampling has a high level of overlap.   A comparison on the 
available common descriptive statistics shows that data collection processes 
have led to similar results, supporting the validity of collection and 
classification of raw data in this study. 
 
Table 3  Comparison of descriptive statistics to Hay Group Study (Hay 2014)  
 
Hay Group regularly studies corporate governance in Europe. Although their sampling is somewhat different, they publish certain 
descriptive statistics that are comparable to this dissertation.  The main differences in sampling arise from weighting by country – 
Consultants from Hay Group include companies from 12 different countries while this study includes 17. The selection of companies is 
based on national stock indexes, which leads to major differences in country weighting.  Largest negative deviations (between 3% and 
5 %) in Hay sample arise from Spain, Germany and France while largest positive deviations arise from Italy, Norway and Austria.  In 
addition, Hay considers only directors that are not employed by the company, which materially increases the proportion of independent 
directors, reduces the number of directors with the same nationality as the company and reduces the proportion of female directors. 
 
 Hay Group This Study 
  
Year 2014 2012 
Companies 372 600 
Countries 12 17 
Average number of board 
members 
10 11 
Average number of board 
meetings 
8 9 
% independent directors 78 % 59% 
Same nationality as company 64% 78% 
Female 23% 16% 
 
 
 
The remaining differences can be explained by differences in sampling.    Hay 
group study is based companies that form a major equity index in each 
country, leading to major underrepresentation of German and French 
companies and overrepresentation of companies from all smaller countries.   
Hay study is based on non-executive directors, while this dissertation 
includes all board members in its database.  Hay excludes information which 
is not readily available, like independence of directors in Germany, which 
this study assessed through analysis of individual directors’ backgrounds.   
A second challenge to reliability concerns the internal consistency of 
categorization of data.  This work follows past practice of classification 
schemes commonly used in corporate governance research.  However, these 
classifications are not without problems.  Groups of actors may have internal 
differences so large that seeing them as one consistent variable may not 
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make sense.  This problem is common in all social sciences, where actors are 
grouped based on some common traits.  As an example, ownership structure 
can be analyzed from a clearly defined perspective of percentage of voting or 
dividend rights.  However, governance studies, including this one, assume 
that types of owners as a category is also relevant.  Two examples of such 
categorization are family owners or institutional investors.  It can be argued 
that using families as an independent variable is gross simplification and 
may distort reality as there is no guarantee that families form a consistent 
category.  The same applies to institutional investors, some being funds with 
specific goals or investment strategies, others being semi-public institutions 
tightly controlled by regulators, such as pension insurance companies or 
social security funds.  Similarly, independence of directors is a concept 
widely used and information on independence can be found in annual 
reports or separate governance disclosures.  In extant board research, 
independence is by far most common variable in empirical studies, and the 
determinant receiving extensive support as being connected to various acts 
of governance. However, there is no guarantee that independent directors 
would act consistently with each other, but even acknowledging the 
behavioral weaknesses of the categorization variables used, they are strongly 
supported by extant research, and lacking access to suitable alternatives, the 
reliability of such variables is as good as possible. 
A third challenge related to reliability arises from if and how national 
corporate governance frameworks influence the results of the study.  
However, there are strong arguments to support the assumption that the 
sample forms a coherent whole.  The empirical material of this study is 
primarily collected from board rules, which as such are not subject to 
national regulations.  The companies in the sample are very large, consisting 
of 600 largest publicly listed companies in Europe, and their character is 
very international.  Even though information for non-nationals share of 
shareholding is not available, for example, 76 companies had the largest 
global investment manager, US based BlackRock Inc as their largest 
shareholder.  Boards are also international, on average companies had 2.3 
foreign board members, more than two thirds of companies having at least 
one board member of different nationality from the company.   
In order to further assess the potential country impact to the relevance of 
results, Table 4 presents certain key variables by country or country groups.  
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The counties are assessed as follows: Two largest (France and Great Britain) 
separately, two similar Germanic countries (Germany and Netherlands) 
grouped together and all other smaller countries combined. 
Table 4  Averages for key variables by country (N=242)  
 
This table presents the key variables by country, grouping countries as follows: FR = France, GB = Great Britain, DE+ NL = 
German and Netherlands and Other = all other countries.  In order to make the statistics as relevant as possible for the 
dissertation, only companies that have disclosed an investment limit (N=242) are included.   
Country    
  
FR GB DE+NL OTHER Tot 
N 65 54 44 79 242 
Sales, billions of EUR 21.1 9.4 18.6 14.6 18 
Median Investment limit as of MVE 1.7% 0.4% 0.6% 0.4% 0.6% 
Board characteristics      
No. of members 13.4 10.4 10.9 11.6 11.7 
No. of meetings 8.6 9.0 7.1 10.3 9.0 
PCT Independent 52% 60% 66% 63% 60% 
PCT Foreign 21% 19% 25% 22% 22% 
PCT Female 19% 15% 16% 15% 16% 
Largest shareholder      
Family 26% 11% 11% 29% 21% 
State 22% 2% 7% 15% 12% 
Other dominant 29% 13% 27% 22% 23% 
Widely held 23% 74% 55% 34% 44% 
      
Ownership share of largest shareholder 30% 18% 21% 28% 25% 
 
The analysis of descriptive statistics by country provides a mixed picture.  
The median value of “Investment limit as of market value of equity”, which 
is used as the dependent variable in the third essay, is highest for the French 
companies, all other country groups being generally on the similar levels.  
However, considering that the core focus of this dissertation are the boards, 
board statistics are strikingly similar, providing support to the relevance of 
the results based on Europe-wide sample of boards.  Ownership statistics 
show a well-known difference between UK and continental European 
companies – a high proportion of large companies have a clearly identifiable 
dominant owner in all other countries except in UK.  However, in the 
empirical analysis the challenge provided by nationality is considered 
through using a Hofstede cultural indicator as a control variable, which 
proves to be significant in all regression models. 
Another challenge on reliability of results can arise from language issues, as 
the empirical material is collected from 15 different European countries and 
some of it was available only in companies’ home country native language, 
although the vast majority is in English.  However, the terminology is very 
similar in most Latin languages, and with good understanding of several key 
European languages, the translation of terms was not seen as a material 
issue 
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We can also question if the nature of boards impacts the reliability of the 
results.  As argued earlier, a board is defined to be an elected body that 
represents shareholder interests and which exerts decision control over 
management.  Such a body is normally called board of directors, although in 
Germany, supervisory board has a very similar role and is considered “a 
board” in this study.  Other entities having a position between shareholders 
and boards, based on the analysis of the data, have practically no decision 
rights besides potentially having the right to nominate board members on 
behalf of the shareholders.  This dual structure of nomination may impact 
the accountability of directors, but as such cases are very few, they have not 
been excluded from the analysis.  Similarly, shareholder nominating boards 
are starting to become increasingly common, especially in Nordic countries, 
and they carry real power in board nominations, even if formal power 
remains in the hands of the shareholders. However, this structure can be 
seen rather as strengthening the accountability of board members towards 
shareholders, as it creates a clear structure how to find candidates and assess 
board performance on behalf of actual shareholders. 
Finally, it can be questioned if the legal role of top management differs 
country by country, especially in bodies called executive boards that exist in 
Germany.  Although such a structure may highlight the legal liability of top 
management, it does not change the basic responsibility of directors in 
boards determining management decision rights. 
Validity measures if our research setting does what it is supposed to do.  
Validity can further be divided into internal, external and construct validity 
(Smith 2003).   Internal validity questions the causality of relationships of 
variables.  Board studies are hampered by the question of endogeneity 
(Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach 2010), understood as a loop of causality 
between independent and dependent variable.  This dissertation does not 
make any claims of causality, and considering the cross-sectional data used, 
it would even be virtually impossible, as causality requires a sequence in 
time.  Thus the internal validity is impossible to assess.  
External validity asks if the results are applicable to other research settings.  
The empirical material of this research is based on 600 largest publicly listed 
European companies by market capitalization. Although data represents 
well the corporate sector and ownership structure of European companies, 
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there is no guarantee that similar results could be reached for smaller 
companies or companies managed from locations outside European Union.  
Aguilera et al. (2008) argue that governance solutions are contingent to their 
institutional setting and environmental factors, and although global 
regulatory environment has tended to converge (Hansmann and Kraakman 
2004), differences may still be large enough to make international 
comparisons incomplete.  The most significant challenge concerns US 
markets, especially as a majority of research in accounting, finance and 
corporate governance is US-based.  As discussed earlier, the institutional 
setting of board selection has major differences across the Atlantic, so results 
may have limited external validity for US companies. 
Construct validity questions if the research is really measuring what it is 
intended to measure, or if the phenomena could be explained by factors 
external to the model.  A constant issue with interpretation of statistical 
results in social science research are the low levels of phenomena being 
explained by models, expressed as adjusted R squared (Gill 2015), and a 
question arises if this refutes the construct validity of results.  However, 
considering the complexity of phenomena and unavoidable lack of precision 
in proxies used, this is not surprising.  Receiving statistically significant 
results from “noisy” material can actually be considered positive for the 
reliability, as “noisiness” increases random variance and thus tends to 
reduce the strength of relationship between observed variables.   In addition, 
it can be argued that in the case adjusted R squared results were very strong, 
most likely the phenomenon and relationship would be self-evident, and the 
same conclusions could probably have been reached without scientific study. 
A second challenge to construct validity arises from definition of proxies.  As 
research questions cannot be directly analyzed through available data, in 
line with extant research, this research uses proxies to measure its research 
objects.  In the second essay, an index of disclosure is used as a proxy of 
board accountability, and calculated based on number of disclosed 
numerical limits of decision thresholds.  Similar proxies are commonly used 
in governance and disclosure research (e.g. Gompers, Ischii and Metric 
2003, Bebchuck, Cohen and Ferrell 2009), so the treatment is consistent 
with past practice.   An unavoidable problem with  proxies based on 
frequency is that different indicators receive equal weighting disregarding 
their importance.  In the second essay this problem is less material than in 
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comparative research. Assuming that boards define materiality in internally 
consistent way, there should be less variation to criteria used across 
definitions of materiality.  
The variables used in the third and fourth essay are based on financial 
information, so they are not subject to the same classification problem, 
although it can be questioned how boards have arrived in their specific 
limits, if they are a result of a deliberate process, follow thy neighbor process 
or a pure administrative exercise.  Considering the major variance in both in 
the scope of matters as well as thresholds of control, it is difficult to arrive in 
any other conclusion that such limits are based on an intentional process, 
and thus generally reflect the best understanding of boards of directors what 
is material enough to require their involvement for the company they serve 
and the business in which the company competes.   
This dissertation does not specifically investigate how board rules are created.  
In principle, such rules could be approved in shareholder meetings, however, 
this does not seem to be the case.  Already the pivotal Cadbury commission 
report (Cadbury 1992) required that “The board should have a formal schedule 
of matters specifically reserved to it for decision to ensure that the direction and 
control of the company is firmly in its hands”.  Although the report does not 
explicitly determine how such schedule should be approved, boards seem to be 
self-sufficient in setting their own rules13. Throughout the data collection 
process, not a single observation was made of any shareholder involvement in 
setting board rules. 
An additional remark on validity needs to be made on what Silverman (1993) 
calls historical, political and contextual sensitivities.  By historical sensitivity 
she means the time-bound nature of results, as phenomena are not separate 
from the historical setting in which they exist14, and as social science 
                                                          
13 For example, BHP Billiton states in its “Board governance document” dated 10 May 2012 
that “In appointing the Board, shareholders vest the management and control of the business 
and affairs of the Group in the Board. The Board has reserved some matters to itself for 
decision and, save for those matters, has delegated authority for all other matters to the 
CEO” 
14 In order to solve this problem of alternative realities, we need to make choices.  It may be 
useful to be aware of the personal background of the person(s) providing the research.  As 
commented above, in order to understand the horizontal agency problem as described by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), it is relevant to know their background in privatizing state-owned 
assets in post-soviet Russia, and the problems they encountered establishing what developed 
markets consider as proper arrangements of ownership and governance.    Although the ideas 
of Shleifer and Vishny have evolved to become concepts of their own, the selfish world-view 
of raw capitalism hides behind their analysis, which may not be applicable to other social 
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research has endogenous tendencies – research may impact the way people 
act in the future.  Governance is an evolving process, and there is no 
guarantee that the empirical results of this study would remain stable over 
time. Political sensitivities refer to choice of subjects, being impacted by the 
attention given to problem in hand in societal discourse.  All researchers in 
corporate government have encountered numerous articles motivated by a 
few highly published corporate scandals, or compensation studies motivated 
by excesses of executive pay.    
The motivation for this study arises from practical experiences of board 
work, and the related interest to understand what is the role of the board, 
how it arrives in its decisions and if it has real impact on outcomes.  Thus 
internal validity of this study may be hampered by pre-assumptions 
researcher has made on reality based on his own experiences.  Contextual 
sensitivity is a concept closely related to contextual validity, discussed above.  
It questions if the concepts used are actually optimal for the defined research 
questions.   In the second and third essay, concepts from extant corporate 
governance research are considered insufficient to analyze the 
representative role of boards, and thus well-established concepts from a 
related field, political science, are introduced into literature.  It may limit the 
contextual sensitivity of this study, as extant governance researchers are 
unfamiliar with such concepts and may struggle to apply them to their own 
research. 
 
5. Summary of the essays 
 
 
5.1. First essay, “Materiality in Corporate Governance” 
 
The first essay investigates materiality from ex ante decision-making 
perspective, instead of widely researched ex post view of audit and legal 
                                                          
contingencies.  Russia in 1990’s was in transition from central planning to market economy, 
and rule of law, transparency of information and proper regulation found in developed 
markets were still lacking. 
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studies.  The concept of materiality is not well defined in accounting or legal 
literature.   Consequently, regulators and courts leave the judgment to 
individual auditors and judges, based on how “a reasonable investor” would 
act if misstatements of failures of disclosure were not observed and 
corrected.  However, boards of directors need to take a stand on materiality 
with uncertainty of outcomes, and decision thresholds determined by boards 
thus provide unique information how directors understand materiality. 
 
Definitions of materiality have two axis, depth and width, depth designing 
the level of decision control, providing measurable values when a decision is 
material and when not. On the other hand, width of materiality is much more 
complex, as it requires boards to define which issues have material 
significance to companies and thus need to be brought under board control.  
The most common definitions concern investment decisions, reflecting the 
traditional approach of boards of directors, seeing long term commitments 
of funds on physical assets as most important decisions companies can 
make.  However, in several industries investments in fixed assets cannot be 
considered as most material decisions, and thus commercial, financial or 
technical decisions, are assessed in this essay comparing them to investment 
limits as a benchmark. 
 
The essay being a descriptive and conceptual study, its benchmarks can be 
seen as its main outcomes.  The average investment limit for the 242 
companies providing such a limit15  was 0.68 % of market value of equity, 
which, when compared to benchmarks set by auditing firms seems quite low.  
There is a huge variation in the magnitude of decision limits, clearly 
indicating that some boards act as managements, subjecting minor decisions 
to their decision control, while other boards take only a supervisory role by 
delegating most of their powers to day-to-day management. 
 
The differences in width of limits reflect the behavioral characteristics of 
directors.  Although boards commonly define different monetary limits for 
different types of decisions, a phenomena of “magic numbers” is also 
present, boards setting single thresholds of materiality disregarding the 
                                                          
15 Essay 2 presents a median limit of 0.6 %, the difference being explained by the exclusion on 
financial sector from its sample of 202 companies 
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nature of decision.  In addition, showing the human nature of directors as 
decision-makers, limits related to direct losses were found to be generally 
lower than other decision limits, indicating presence of loss avoidance. 
 
The objective of Essay 1 was to advance our understanding on the concept of 
materiality, specifically through investigation of what constitutes a material 
decision in corporate governance.  The novel approach was to study 
materiality from ex ante perspective, differentiating it from ex post analysis 
of material misstatements or omissions of material facts, which are the focus 
of audit and legal research on materiality.  The essay provides new 
knowledge on issues boards consider material enough to require their 
involvement in decision-making.  In addition, the essay develops our 
conceptual understanding of materiality, which is one of the core concepts 
in accounting literature, by establishing the two axis of materiality in 
decision-making, width, describing the variety of issues boards consider 
material and depth, analyzing the numeric thresholds board set as limits for 
decisions requiring their approval.  
 
 
5.2.  Second essay, “Representation, Accountability and 
Disclosure - A Principal-Representative-Delegate Model of 
Corporate Governance” 
 
The second essay introduces representation theory into corporate 
governance.  It starts by arguing that the distinct role of board of directors 
does not well correspond to standard postulates of agency theory, incentives 
and control, introducing a more refined principal- representative-delegate 
model of governance.   In order to better understand the intermediary role 
of the board, the relationship between shareholders and directors is seen 
through representation, where accountability and disclosure form the 
necessary tools for shareholder assessment.  In addition to governance 
literature, this essay contributes also to disclosure literature by introducing 
and analyzing the concept of board disclosure as a separate phenomenon 
from general corporate disclosure.   
Representation theory sees trustee and delegate as the two basic forms of 
representation.  In the first, representatives (board of directors) act on their 
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own judgment as trustees, distancing themselves from shareholders after 
they have been elected, while in the second, boards more truly attempt to 
reflect the opinions of their electors, acting as delegates.  In order to analyze 
the nature of representation, it is concluded that representation requires 
accountability, and a proxy of accountability is created from disclosure of 
matters under board decision control.  In the empirical results both 
characteristics of representation were present, role of trustee being 
connected with companies with diversified shareholding or agent owners as 
dominant shareholders, while in companies with clearly identifiable 
dominant shareholders boards rather act as delegates, providing less 
information to all shareholders, essentially having face-to-face 
accountability towards largest shareholders.  In addition, empirical analysis 
shows the endogenous role of directors, board disclosure representing 
directors’ self-interest in promoting their skills to society at large as 
proficient decision experts.  
The practical relevance of this paper arises from accountability of directors.  
It highlights the need for a closer link between directors and shareholders 
based on accountability.  Moreover, principal-representative-delegate 
model has implications to director election processes and management 
incentives.  It challenges current ways of electing corporate representatives; 
back-room negotiations leading to proposal of candidates is opaque, and 
does not guarantee a true representation of preferences of whole 
shareholder base.  Increased transparency of the election process could 
improve the quality of representation by making directors more 
accountable.  Principal-representative-delegate model could also have 
consequences to incentive systems.  If we see top management as delegates 
of shareholders’ representatives, carrot and stick of incentives and control 
as sole basis of motivation can be criticized.  Delegates act on limited 
authority, and the behavioral assumptions of motivation of a delegate are 
different from the self-interested agent as they have limited tools to 
maximize their personal utility, their powers being explicitly restricted by 
the board.   
The objective of essay 2 was to provide new insights to the relationship between 
shareholders and board, seeing boards as intermediate actors with a distinct 
role in governance, with a role that classical agency theory fails to consider 
adequately.  This goal was reached by introducing the theory of representation 
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into corporate governance, arguing that the role of board can better be 
understood by applying concepts of representation and accountability.  In 
addition, the theory of representation was successfully applied in the empirical 
analysis, demonstrating that boards tend to act as trustees in situations when 
owners are diverse and as delegates when company has a clearly identifiable 
single dominant owners.  This essay opens several fruitful avenues for future 
studies on the relationship between boards and shareholders. 
 
 
5.3.  Third essay, “Power and Decision Control” 
 
 
The third essay investigates the limits of decision-making power as 
determined by boards of directors. It starts with the traditional split of 
governance roles, risk-bearing by the shareholders, decision control by the 
board and decision management by the CEO and top management team. 
Even though shareholders may have formal power, in reality most of 
decision rights are delegated to their elected representatives, board of 
directors.  Boards have an interesting self-regulating role, as they 
independently determine which decision rights to retain, and which rights 
to further allocate to the management.   
 
In order to analyze the division of decision rights, the essay discusses 
concepts of power, separating process power, i.e. ability to influence 
decisions, from power to influence actual outcomes.  It is evident that boards 
have process power, but extant research has struggled to establish if it also 
leads to intended outcomes.  Outcome power is also discussed by Aghion and 
Tirole, (1997) who argue that formal power does not necessarily entail real 
power.  However, this essay focuses only on process power, arguing that a 
properly designed decision structure enables a more efficient process of 
decision-making, enabling boards to concentrate on issues material to 
shareholders and simultaneously allowing management focus on 
preparation of such issues, leading to better quality decisions. 
 
Limits of board powers are investigated through a model, where monetary 
values of decision limits are explained by ownership, board, management 
and corporate characteristics.  First a power function of a firm is built, where 
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combined powers of board and management are considered as constant in 
the short run, the split between the two determined by thresholds of power 
set by the board.  The empirical analysis supports the idea of board 
functioning as a distinct and independent body, as no influence from 
shareholder structure or ownership concentration was found in the ways 
boards determine decision rights, indicating that current governance 
arrangements in Europe are a satisfactory solution for horizontal agency 
problems.  On the other hand, symptoms of vertical agency problem seem to 
exist in boards with a dual CEO/Chairman structure, such boards delegating 
more of their decision rights to management than in other companies.  
Otherwise empirical analysis indicate that  independent directors may suffer 
from information gap being more inclined to delegate powers to the 
management, while active boards keep tighter reins on power than directors 
that meet less frequently. 
 
The objective of essay 3 was to contribute to the literature on corporate 
governance by investigating the relationship between board and management 
through concepts of power, decision control and delegation.   This goal was 
reached by defining a model on how power is divided between various actors in 
corporations, and then analyzing the division of power between board and 
management in depth through the empirical material. It was demonstrated that 
boards are effective means of mitigating horizontal agency problems, although 
traces of vertical problem were found still to exist. 
 
 
5.4. Fourth essay, “Corporate Governance in Financial  
Distress – Reflection on the Third Agency Problem” 
 
 
Creditors have no formal role in corporate governance, but they have major 
influence in situations of distress.  Distress is an abnormal situation where 
creditor governance replaces standard shareholder-centered governance 
and where classical agency relationships between shareholders, board and 
management no longer hold.   Creditor governance is a means of solving 
conflict of interest between holders of debt and holders of equity.   This is 
what governance theory understands as the third agency problem. 
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The final essay focuses on what happens to governance in the gray area when 
distress is evident but formal power still remains in the hands of corporate 
bodies.   The relationship between a company and creditors is governed by 
contract, and as contracts include assumptions of firm ability to repay the 
debts in the future, they are bound to be incomplete and need to include a 
mechanism to resolve unexpected outcomes.  This is called incomplete 
contracting theory, and its most apparent practical application is financial 
covenants restricting companies’ freedom of action under situations of 
distress. 
The essay develops further a model of creditor governance presented by 
Nini, Sufi and Smith (2012), arguing that there are five different stages of 
creditor influence on firms.  First, in the state of normalcy, creditor influence 
is hard to observe as the company is healthy and able to fulfill all its 
contractual commitments.  A second stage arises when a prospect of 
breakage of financial covenants arises, already impacting corporate 
decisions.  The actual breakage with a major shift in decision rights is the 
next stage, followed by restructuring and in the end, bankruptcy, each stage 
having its distinct governance characteristics 
The empirical part of the study focuses on how the role of the board changes 
from representatives of shareholders to representatives of creditors in 
situations of distress.  This phenomena is demonstrated through a humped 
structure of decision rights, companies approaching distress allocating more 
decision rights to management, until a critical level is reached, where 
directors radically limit such rights in order to protect creditors, and at the 
same time their own reputation.  Through decision control, directors protect 
creditors from potential moral hazard of shareholders in situations where 
their share of enterprise value is very small, and they have a non-
symmetrical incentive to increase risk as gains will be theirs but losses 
belong to creditors. 
The objective of the final fourth essay was to contribute to literature on the third 
agency problem, the one between the company and its creditors, integrating 
concepts from financial contracting theories into corporate governance, 
specifically in situations of distress.  The essay provided new conceptual analysis 
on how boards mitigate the potential moral hazard of shareholders and 
management, which is one of the key issues in incomplete contracting theory 
 58 
and which was shown to be the conceptual basis of covenants.  The empirical 
analysis provided support to key assumptions, and although evidence was 
limited, it demonstrated the changing role of directors from representatives of 
shareholders to representatives of creditors in situations of financial distress.  
Thus the objective of the fourth essay was achieved. 
 
 
6. Contributions and 
Implications for Practice 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This dissertation is based on a refined agency model of corporate 
governance.  Instead of seeing governance as bipolar arrangement between 
owners and management, this work treats the governance as a triangle, 
where shareholder interests are conveyed into acts of management through 
their representatives, the board, and which thus consists of separate but 
interlinked relationships board has towards shareholders and management.  
The fundamental prism through which this triangular model is analyzed is 
allocation of decision rights, being a proxy of how boards understand their 
role as representatives of shareholder interests.  In order to understand 
decision rights, this work also builds on the concept of materiality, defining 
the limits of power and through their disclosure in board rules, provides 
evidence to shareholders of the accountability of their elected 
representatives. 
The dissertation contributes both to theory of corporate governance, and 
more specifically, theory on boards, as well as provides new insights useful 
for the practitioners.  The triangular model of governance extends the 
classical agency theory by providing a more refined understanding of the 
dynamics of corporate governance, treating separately the two main 
relationships of delegation of decision-making power, the first between 
shareholders and boards and the second between boards and managements.  
It shows that the traditional postulates of incentives and control are not 
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sufficient to understand board’s role in corporate governance, and argues 
that theories of representation and accountability are more suitable for 
understanding this relationship.  This work approaches the relationship 
between board and management from the perspective of power and 
delegation of decision rights, and its contribution to theory is to see 
management rather as delegates of directors than agents of shareholders. 
Although the aim of this dissertation is not to argue that agency theory is 
irrelevant, it raises serious concerns if the omnipotent agency approach is 
sufficient in understanding governance, at least in large publicly listed 
companies.  It can be argued that corporate governance is only a subset of a 
larger governance problem, how the interests of a large number of 
beneficiaries are transferred into action through a representative body, as 
the beneficiaries are too many to participate effectively and directly in 
decision-making, and thus a representative body with wide delegated 
powers becomes necessary to control the actual organization managing the 
decisions.  Thus the proposed principal-representative-delegate model can 
be seen as a more general model of corporate governance than the 
traditional dualistic principal-agent model, and it may open up new avenues 
in understanding the roles, responsibilities and behavior of various actors.  
Even though empirical analysis included in this dissertation is generally 
supportive to the principal-representative-delegate model of governance, 
further theory development as well as empirical testing is certainly needed 
before it can become more mainstream. 
There are several important contributions to practice.  First, by developing 
the concept of ex ante materiality, boards should better be able to create 
rules that improve their efficiency by enabling them to use the limited time 
and resources on issues that are most material for the shareholders.  
Secondly, this dissertation helps boards better understand to whom they are 
accountable and how they can improve this accountability through 
disclosure.  Thirdly, delegation of decision rights being the responsibility of 
boards, a better understanding of determinants thereof assists boards in 
monitoring managements and again, assists boards in decision control, 
providing better understanding of when boards can add value and when not.  
Finally, the fourth practical contribution arises from a better understanding 
of boards’ relationship towards creditors, and the ill-understood change in 
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board role from representatives of shareholders to representatives of 
creditors in situations of financial distress. 
Next, I turn to a more detailed discussion of the contributions 
 
6.2 Conclusions and contributions 
 
Dualistic shareholder-manager model of governance provides a simplistic 
model of governance, which can be further developed by shifting the 
perspective to a triangular model considering shareholders, boards and 
managements as separate actors, each with a distinct role.  Triangular view 
sees governance consisting of two independent but closely related 
relationships, the relationship between shareholders and board of directors, 
based on representation and accountability, and the relationship between 
directors and management, based on delegation and control.  Additionally, 
the relationship between management and shareholders forms the third leg 
of this triangle, primarily consisting of economic outcomes of acts of 
management.   This approach acknowledges diversity of shareholder risk 
preferences and time horizons, and governance is seen as a mechanism of 
translating these multiple preferences into an organized structure that is 
capable of action. 
Board of directors is the apex of corporate decision-making (Fama and 
Jensen 1983), although the extent of its powers and influence on corporate 
outcomes is weakly understood.  Shareholders delegate the vast majority of 
their powers to directors, due to economies of decision-making, as it would 
be impractical for them to participate in complex decision requiring 
extensive knowledge of day-to-day business issues, besides decisions 
fundamental to shareholder rights.  On the other hand, board is a self-
sufficient entity in corporate governance, independently determining its 
limits of powers, which matters it considers material enough to require its 
involvement and which can be delegated to operative management.   
The main argument in this dissertation is that boards need to be considered 
as a distinct actor in corporate governance, having an independent role with 
extensive powers, being able to influence not only management decisions 
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but also how shareholder preferences are translated into a unitary decision-
making structure. The detailed contributions analyze how this intermediary 
role manifests itself in board’s relationship with shareholders, managers and 
creditors.  
The first contribution arises from defining how boards understand 
materiality in decision-making.  Materiality as a concept is not clearly 
defined in accounting (Edgley 2014), and extant literature mainly considers 
the problems of auditors, how to determine thresholds for ex post 
assessment of misstatements in financial reports.  Neither audit nor legal 
literature considers the ex ante problem of defining materiality in decision-
making, which anyhow is the basis of any hierarchical structure of control.  
The empirical results of the first essay provide novel factual information on 
materiality, providing benchmarks both for practitioners as well as 
regulators and standard-setters.   Two concepts of materiality, depth and 
width are introduced, depth describing the limits of power on specific issues, 
while width defines the scope of matters boards consider material enough to 
require their involvement. 
Each of the three remaining essays introduces a novel conceptual or 
theoretical lens to governance research.  The second essay introduces a 
framework of analysis and concepts from general theory of representation to 
corporate governance research, investigating the relationship between 
shareholders and board.  A principal-representative-delegate model of 
governance is presented, defining directors as representatives of 
shareholders and management as delegate or agent of the board. Another 
contribution relates to understanding how decision power is divided within 
a company.  It is based on collection and analysis of previously neglected 
information on governance, matters reserved to the board as disclosed to 
shareholders.  In the third essay, the power function of a company is defined 
to consist of powers held by shareholders, combined powers of board and 
management, powers of outside parties and unknown actors.   The results 
demonstrate that traditional horizontal agency problem between dominant 
and minority shareholders are absent in the way boards execute decision 
control.  However, duality of leadership in combined CEO / Chairman of the 
board role reduces board powers in relation to management, indicating 
continued vertical agency problems in such structures.   
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The final contribution of this dissertation focuses on the agency problem 
between the company and its creditors.  Using conceptual framework from 
theory of incomplete contracts, it suggests that in situations of distress, the 
role of the board changes from representatives of shareholders to 
representatives of creditors, curbing moral hazard when the majority of 
residual financial risk transfers from shareholders to creditors.  A conceptual 
model evolving from Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012) is built, showing the risk 
profile of a company as a function of relative split of enterprise value 
between shareholders and creditors.  This essay also contributes to covenant 
literature in finance, modeling the role of financial covenants as a crossing 
point of risk level and risk split. 
 
6.3. Contribution related to agency theory 
 
This dissertation started by arguing that principal-representative-delegate 
approach is a complement but not a replacement of agency theory.  In this 
triangular model, governance still is a method for conveying shareholder 
interests into acts of management, and shareholders can be seen as principals 
and management as agents, although the term delegate can be used 
interchangeably with the term agent. However, this relationship is indirect, as 
board, acting as representative of shareholders, has wide delegated powers and 
an independent and intermediate role in the representing shareholder interests. 
The contribution to agency theory emerges from the realization that governance 
consists of two separate but related relationships, the one between shareholders 
and directors, based on representation and arising from election, and the other 
between board and management, based on delegation and originating from 
contract.   In contrast, standard governance theory sees only one relationship, 
between shareholders and management, and instead of representation and 
delegation, this contract leads to agency.  Essentially, the central actor in what 
is called principal-representative-delegate model of governance is the board, 
which has an independent but intermediate role, influencing how shareholder 
interests are conveyed into acts of management.     Representation and 
delegation can be seen as methods of managing both vertical and horizontal 
agency problems between shareholders and management and between large 
and small shareholders and thus being linked to classical agency theory.  
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Similarly, as discussed in the fourth essay, representation is a useful concept 
also in understanding how to solve the third agency problem, between the 
company and its creditors, if and how directors evolve from representatives of 
shareholders to representatives of creditors.   
A theoretical implication of this work is to argue that corporate governance is 
only a subset of a larger societal issue of representation.  Representation 
problem arises when a large number of interested parties arrange their decision-
making in order for the interests of final beneficiaries being properly 
represented in actual decisions.  Besides political or other societal 
organizations, this problem is increasingly relevant also for corporations, as the 
ownership of large publicly listed companies is dispersed, and through agent 
owners such as pension funds, other institutional investors or the state, 
practically everybody becomes an interested party in how corporates are being 
governed.  Thus theory of representation may provide a framework for 
analyzing governance in large public companies, which form a very significant 
part of global economic activity, and which cannot be understood from the 
simplistic perspective of seeing shareholders as a unitary body whose sole 
interest is value maximization.  The classical agency view does not properly 
consider the multiplicity of views, risk profiles and time horizons of various 
actors, and thus fails to understand the role of the representative body, boards 
in companies, in determining how this complex web of interests is translated 
into a unitary decision-making structure capable of action. 
 
6.4.  Implications for practice 
 
The role of the board in corporate governance has gained weight over the 
last twenty years, both through regulation as well as pressure from 
shareholders and media.  Corporate governance codes regularly establish 
limitations for companies how to organize their board work.  Boards need to 
have a majority of independent directors and independent experts serving 
as heads of audit committees, minimum gender balance is recommended or 
even mandatory in EU countries and the combination of roles of Chief 
Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board is either forbidden or 
discouraged.  The list of regulations and recommendations is long and 
impressive.   
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However, governance rules focus on control and few of them consider how 
to improve the efficiency of board work.  As Tuggle et al. (2010) show, a vast 
majority of board resources is devoted to regulatory affairs and information 
distribution, leaving little time for actual decision-making.  This dissertation 
focuses on the concept of materiality, and its main practical significance 
arises from helping companies, their boards of directors, managements as 
well as creditors to understand how to improve their governance process 
through better allocation of resources on decisions most relevant to 
beneficiaries of such decisions.  It is evident from the research material that 
currently boards have not given proper consideration to materiality, which 
issues and down to what magnitude they, as representatives of shareholders 
should control these decisions.  Defining and disclosing limits of power 
increases board’s accountability to shareholders, a target Roberts, McNulty 
and Stiles (2005) noted in their influential assessment.   Better 
understanding of materiality will enable boards to use their limited time 
wisely, and increased accountability should improve the quality of decisions, 
leading to better representation of shareholder interest in corporate 
governance. 
Ultimately, assuming the view that principal-representative-delegate model 
provides a more accurate image of corporate governance, it may impact the 
way corporate boards understand their role as representatives of 
shareholder interests.  It may turn them into more accountable 
representatives, being better aware of how to use their extensive powers for 
value creation, in contrast to the classical image of boards as relatively 
impotent members of societal elite having little impact on how companies 
actually are being run. 
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Materiality in corporate governance  
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Abstract: 
 
 
Materiality is one of the fundamental concepts in accounting.   It 
has been extensively analyzed from ex post audit and legal 
perspective, but these provide little assistance to corporate boards 
and other decision-making bodies while determining when a 
matter is material enough to be subject to their decision control.   
 
This paper analyzes how corporate boards define materiality in 
decision-making.  It is based on hand-picked data from 600 
largest European companies by market capitalization.  A 
majority of these companies provide numeric information on 
decision thresholds set by corporate boards, limits when 
decisions must be subject to their authorization.  These 
thresholds essentially define boards’ understanding of ex ante 
materiality. 
 
Materiality is analyzed from two perspectives, depth and width, 
depth referring to levels of decision thresholds as determined by 
boards while width refers to the scope of matters subject to 
hierarchical decision control. A reasonable benchmark for the 
most common threshold, median value for investment 
authority was found to be only 0.68 % of the market value of 
companies’ equity. 
 
Although descriptive by nature, this paper is linked to behavioral 
theories of decision-making by demonstrating that boards show 
traces of anchoring and loss avoidance in setting their limits of 
materiality.  It also forms the basis for the subsequent essays in 
this dissertation. 
 
 
 
Key words: materiality, decision control, board, anchoring, 
loss avoidance 
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1. Introduction 
 
In essence, "materiality" means simply this: if it doesn't really 
matter, don't bother with it’’ (Hicks, 1964) 
 
 
 Boards decide on matters of material significance1 is a boilerplate statement 
in corporate governance.  However there is no commonly accepted definition 
on what is a material decision.  As a concept it is related but separate from 
audit and legal definitions of materiality.  It refers to ex ante decisions with 
unsure outcomes rather than ex post judgments on financial reports or 
disclosures thereof.  How to define materiality in decision-making, and more 
specifically for boards in corporate governance is the subject of this study. 
 
The concept of materiality is core to accounting and auditing (Messier et al. 
2005, Edgley 2014).  Auditors investigate financial reports, if they “give a 
true and fair view” and if “financial statements are free from misstatement 
of any material fact”2.  The definition of audit materiality has been 
extensively discussed in academic literature (Messier et al 2005, Iskandar 
and Iselin, 1999, Holstrum and Messier 1982) and regulators have provided 
numerous instructions to accountants, auditors and users of financial 
statements (IFRS 2010, FASB 2010, SEC 1999).  However, materiality still 
“has a fuzzy ontology that has constantly evaded precise codification in 
professional guidance” (Edgley 2014).   
 
Materiality is a key concept also in securities law.  Lawyers assess materiality 
primarily from the point of disclosure failure, if companies had failed to 
provide information that markets would have reacted on.  The famous US 
Supreme Court definition3 from 1976 relied on a mystic “reasonable 
                                                          
1 E.g. ABB Board regulations, October 21, 2011: “[Board shall have the duty and authority …] 
to review and approve acquisitions, divestitures, joint ventures, liquidations and other  
transactions which are financially or strategically material to the business activities of the 
Company” 
2 Virtually identical statements are to be found from all audit reports.  This example is from BT 
annual report 2012. 
3 “TSC industries v. Northway Inc” (1976) 
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investor” that determines the materiality of disclosure failure.  It concluded 
that material information is something that would have significantly altered 
the total mix of information, impacting assessment of an individual investor.  
However, no concrete measure for legal materiality has been established, 
and Supreme Court has left it to individual courts to determine, the same 
way as accounting regulators have left it to individual auditors. 
It is evident that practitioners would benefit from better guidelines for 
assessment of materiality.  The problem is not limited just to ex post 
assessment of reporting and disclosure requirements, but it concerns also 
corporate governance, ex ante judgments which decision rights are material 
enough to be retained by a board and which delegated to management.  
Governance codes, such as the pivotal Cadbury Commission (1992), require 
that boards of directors should define what constitutes a material decision, 
subject to their decision control: 
 
“4.24 We envisage that such a schedule would at least include: 
(a) acquisition and disposal of assets of the company or its 
subsidiaries that are material to the company; …  Boards should 
lay down rules to determine materiality for any transaction.” 
 
Such information has become increasingly available in annual reports, 
corporate governance reports or separately disclosed board rules.   Extant 
research has ignored this information even though it provides fruitful data 
not only on materiality but also on the inner workings of the boardroom.    
The empirical part of this paper is based on board rules1 of 600 largest 
European companies by market capitalization, and more specifically, the 
limits boards set on management decision authority. Board rules include a 
wide range of thresholds for materiality.  Swatch Group AG requires that all 
investment in excess of 0.04 % of equity must be decided by the board2.  The 
corresponding limit for EADS is 4.0%3.  Not only do amounts differ, but also 
the variety of matters requiring board authorization.  For example, Unilever 
                                                          
1 Matters reserved to the board, Terms of reference, Board charter, Board by-laws etc 
2 Swatch Group Annual Report 2011, page 134. 
3 EADS N.V. Internal Rules for the Board of Directors, last revision October 22, 2007 
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has defined nine monetary limits for board decision control, ranging from 
capital expenditure to contracts, litigation and pensions1 while BP has none2.      
Materiality in decision-making is proportional to the economic impact 
relative to the size of the deciding entity.  Materiality is relevant for corporate 
governance, as boards as elected representatives of shareholders have only 
limited time and resources for decision-making.  An average board in large 
European companies meets only 8 times per year, and regulatory affairs and 
information dissemination can take a large part of its time (Machold and 
Farquhar 2009).  In order for governance process to have any impact, it is 
essential that the remaining time is reserved to issues that have a material 
importance to shareholders.   Not only can the lack of definite limits lead to 
management-determined agendas (Useem and Zelke 2006), but badly 
defined limits may focus board work on insignificant matters and waste the 
limited time and resources of the directors.  Boards may also omit important 
matters that they should consider, if such matters have not been included in 
the board rules. 
This paper is conceptual and descriptive by nature.  In order to investigate 
materiality in decision-making, it provides benchmarks and examples of 
limits of decision control that assist both researchers and practitioners 
better understand and apply the concept of materiality.   Even though 
descriptive papers are not customary in accounting research, there are 
several examples of influential studies that are amongst the most quoted 
papers in corporate governance, such as Faccio and Lang (2002) or La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanez, Shleifer (1999), which both analyze cross-country 
differences in governance and ownership structures through simple cross-
tables of observable phenomena.  Similarly, descriptive studies are common 
in audit research on materiality.  For example, Eilifsen and Messier (2015), 
assess materiality through internal guidance of eight major US audit firms.   
Although this paper is descriptive, its analysis is based on theories related to 
decision-making.  The starting hypothesis is that boards act rationally and 
we should be able to find commonalities in how yardsticks of materiality 
have been defined, both regarding the width of matters under board decision 
                                                          
1 ”Governance of Unilever 1 January 2012”, available on www.unilever.com 
2 BP p.l.c. Board Governance Principles. 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9021800&contentId=7040614, 
accessed on 23.11.2012 
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control as well as at what level such thresholds are set, reflecting a universal 
understanding of what constitutes a material decision impacting 
shareholders.  An alternative hypothesis is that decision limits are 
influenced by known behavioral traits, such as anchoring, boards finding 
“magic numbers” which define materiality, disregarding the type of decision 
and its potential financial impact, or loss avoidance, boards setting 
materiality thresholds for decisions related to direct losses lower than limits 
related to decisions potentially leading to outcomes with much larger 
economic impact. 
There are two key findings to this study.  First, empirical material provides 
reasonable benchmarks of materiality for boards.   For example, the median 
threshold for the most common area of decision control, investments 
decisions has a value of 0.68 % of market value of equity, which is rather low 
compared to audit thresholds of materiality.  Secondly, decision limits do 
not always form a logical whole, either they focus on just a few material 
decisions, or different limits are inconsistent in comparison to others.  For 
example, boards seem to show traits of loss avoidance, as limits related to 
one-offs, such as legal settlements, are clearly lower than other thresholds of 
materiality.  These results support the notion that materiality is not a 
universal concept but rather a subjective assessment of potential outcomes 
of decisions.  Currently no commonly accepted yardstick for materiality for 
decision control in corporate governance exists, so a need for improved 
guidance is evident. 
This paper is organized as follows.  The second chapter starts with a brief 
discussion on theories of decision-making, followed by a review of the 
concept of materiality in audit and legal literature.  In the third chapter, 
descriptive statistics of materiality in decision-making are presented, 
followed by detailed analysis thereof in the fourth chapter, before 
conclusions related to theory and practice are discussed in the final section. 
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2. Literature review 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
 
In this chapter, we will first briefly discuss theories of decision-making, 
decision rules and thresholds.   The chapter continues by reviewing the 
concept of materiality, how it has been defined and applied in accounting 
and related fields.   This will lead to the empirical part that investigates the 
concept of materiality in corporate governance, and specifically in board 
decision control.  Monetary limits are considered as the explicit definition of 
materiality  
 
Materiality as a term does not seem to appear in corporate governance 
literature, either in general treatises such as Monks and Minow (2011) or 
Huse (2007), nor in a recent extensive literature review (Adams, Hermalin 
and Weisbach 2010), or it appears only within the discussion of ex post 
material misstatements.  Thus the theoretical basis for materiality needs to 
be found in more general management literature. 
 
 
2.2 Theories of decision-making 
 
 
Within the vast literature on decision-making, two key streams of research 
are considered as a theoretical basis for analysis on materiality.  This essay 
analyzes materiality through decision rules set by boards of directors, and 
thus theories of rule-based decision-making form a natural theoretical basis 
for the article.  On the other hand, besides rules as such, definition on 
materiality concerns how rule-setters define decision thresholds and the 
unique empirical data provides a possibility to assess what kind of 
behavioral bias, if any, boards show while setting such limits.  The 
theoretical basis for this discussion arises from critics of rational decision-
making, and more specifically, from the stream of behavioral decision-
making literature starting from the now classic work by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1974). 
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March (1994), defines four different processes how decision rules are set.  
First, rules can be seen as conscious and rational assessment of rule-setters.  
Thus boards would set decision rules that are best suitable for internal 
characteristics of the company and the situation is faces in the markets. 
Further, March sees rules forming an agreement between the parties, which 
assumes that directors take into consideration the behavior of management 
as the subject of rules while determining which powers to retain and which 
to delegate.  Secondly, according to Marsh, rules can evolve through 
organizational learning, as outcomes shape adjustments to such rules.   
Rules may reflect not only the skills but also the level of experience of rule-
setters.  Thirdly, March argues that rules can also be based on fads, “follow-
thy-neighbor” policies, i.e. rules are set by copying other companies, and 
thus we should be able to observe a high level of similarity in how large 
European companies set their decision thresholds.  Besides rational, 
experience and fad-based rules-setting, March also identifies evolution of 
rules based on changes on decision-makers, the study of which would 
require a longitudinal data in board context.  Ocasio (1999) takes a similar 
approach to March in discussing institutional theory of action, arguing that 
both experience and learning guide corporate boards in their decision-
making, however arguing that over time rules become institutionalized and 
difficult to change even if firm situation or competitive environment would 
require a revision.  
 
An alternative approach arises from psychology-based theories of decision-
making, and especially studies on decision traps.  Kahneman and Tversky 
(1974) argue that people are subject to a number of heuristic principles 
which simplify complex decision-making situations into something which 
people with bounded rationality can handle.  Considering the complexity of 
issues boards encounter, information gap between directors and 
management and uncertainty regarding outcomes of major decisions, 
decision rules may reflect such heuristic biases.  Prospect theory (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1974, Pepper and Gore 2012) established that actual 
behavior of people in decision-making situations is not consistent across the 
spectrum of alternative outcomes.  It argues that individuals are loss averse, 
and decisions to avoid losses have more weight than decisions leading to 
equal gains.  Similarly, psychology literature has observed a negativity bias 
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in perception, individuals devoting more attention to negative than positive 
information (Pinsker et al. 2009).  Tetlock and Boettger (1994) also saw 
accountability of decision-makers to be biased towards negative, or risk 
decisions, which in board context would indicate that boards weight their 
accountability to shareholders more heavily on negative than positive 
outcomes.  Negative outcomes lead to more throughout processing, 
indicating that materiality thresholds should be lower for such decisions.  
Consequently, we should be able to observe lower thresholds for matters 
such as litigation or one-off write-downs. 
 
A second potential behavioral bias is anchoring.  It is evident that financial 
outcomes are different for investments, commercial agreements or legal 
claims of same numeric magnitude.  A capable board should differentiate 
between these risks and find individual thresholds of materiality relevant to 
risks involved.  A loss is definite, while business decisions have a much wider 
range of probable outcomes. Anchoring assumes that individuals follow an 
initial estimate even though information would imply that the relevance of 
an anchor is not universal (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Pinsker et al. 
2009).  In the case boards use same or similar numeric values for different 
decisions, they demonstrate evidence of anchoring, considering materiality 
to be a universal measure disregarding the content.   Acito, Burks and 
Johnson (2009) find that firms “follow thy neighbor” while determining 
materiality in correction of accounting errors.  This can be seen as example 
of anchoring, companies following their peers in industries in determining 
what a material decision is and what is not.  Correspondingly, if boards do 
not differentiate thresholds based on their probabilistic outcomes, they show 
traits of anchoring, relying on “magic numbers” across the limits of decision 
control. 
 
Next, I turn to contextual analysis of materiality in accounting and legal 
literature. 
 
 
2.3. Defining materiality 
 
Defining materiality, both regulators and academics have focused on the 
user of information, were she “reasonable investor” (US Supreme court 
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1976), “reasonable person” (FASB 1980), or “average prudent investor” (SEC 
1999) or just “users of financial information” (IFRS 2010).  Edgley (2014) 
notes that materiality is a “time-honored concept”, despite the fact that it 
has not been clearly defined.   No definitions of materiality specifically 
tailored to ex ante decision-making seem to exist, although it is commonly 
referred to in rules, regulations as well as in every-day language.  Already 
Cadbury Commission in UK required that boards should establish rules to 
determine materiality for any transaction (Cadbury 1992).     
In line with audit approach to materiality, a material decision can be seen as 
a decision that impacts shareholder value.  However, materiality in decision-
making is an ex ante concept including uncertainty of outcomes.   A material 
decision impacts the risk position of a company immediately, but its impact 
on cash flows will arrive only in the future.   Materiality is also a relative 
concept, it depends on the level of hierarchy, boards having different 
thresholds from company or divisional management.    
 
By enforcing a lower level of materiality than required by mandatory 
disclosure, boards in effect determine a set of decisions, which either 
separately or taken as a whole may create results that when reported, change 
the way a reasonable investor acts.  In regulation there is a duty to disclose 
decisions (or events) that have a material impact to shareholder value, and 
only a small portion of board decisions are disclosed. Moreover, boards face 
uncertainty in their disclosure judgment, as outcomes are contingent to 
execution, competition and various external factors outside firm control.   
However, certain ex ante decisions are disclosed as made, and those can be 
considered of fulfilling a criteria of “super-materiality”, i.e. boards consider 
that the probability of them materially impacting future cash flows is so high 
that they must be disclosed.       
 
Every decision made within a company has some kind of effect to 
shareholder value, each commercial offer, sales discount, product 
specification or accountant hire.  Decisions are a continuum of materiality, 
and in reality, no clear-cut boundaries exist (Lo 2010).  Materiality has two 
axis – depth and width.  Depth measures the magnitude of decision, while 
width its scope.  If depth of decision control is too low, boards become 
managements, and if they are set too high, boards are irrelevant as 
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representatives of shareholder interests.  Width of decision control poses a 
problem of definition to boards – which areas of decision-making actually 
determine the future of a company, and if board has any capabilities to take 
a stand on those. 
 
The complexity of decision thresholds can be illustrated through a metaphor 
of a city skyline (Picture 1), where buildings represent different areas of 
decision-making within a company.    Some of the large buildings have a flat 
top, i.e. single decisions cannot be observed and thus they are not subject to 
hierarchical decision control, while others have sharp towers, even visible to 
outside observers.  Boards define thresholds above which decision need to 
be subject to their scrutiny.   There is no guarantee that boards draw the line 
on a same height for all items, nor is there a guarantee that decision control 
covers all relevant areas of decision-making.   
 
 
 
      
                     
In the illustration above, a company has defined two materiality thresholds, one that 
applies to investments, financial transactions and contracts, and another applying to 
sales and marketing.  Although R&D decisions may be more material than investments, 
due to information gap, board has not established any limits to them.  On the other 
hand, with special knowledge on sales and marketing, board wishes to be much more 
involved in the day-to-day decision-making on these subjects, imposing a lower level of 
materiality. 
 
Figure 1 City skyline analogy of materiality in decision-making 
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Different meanings of materiality are further illustrated below.  First (ex 
ante), a board makes a decision which is submitted to them due to thresholds 
set for materiality.  Uncertainty leads to a large variety of potential 
outcomes, some of them material and some immaterial.  Board needs to 
make a judgment if the decision is such that its outcome has a high likelihood 
of creating material consequences, thus leading to decision to disclose or 
not.  On the other hand, reported actual outcomes (ex post) include 
accounting judgment, and management has a possibility to influence how 
the outcome is presented in financial statements.  Auditors must assess if 
such a judgment creates a material misstatement and requires a correction 
before the financial statements are published.   
 
 
Figure 2 Ex ante and ex post materiality in decision-making and audit 
 
Decision thresholds in corporate governance serve several purposes.  First, 
they define a level of management disclosure that is lower than regulatory 
requirements.  This should reduce investor risk related to management 
misbehavior.  Secondly decision thresholds increase board accountability 
towards shareholders, as they can better observe director influence to 
 89 
decision processes and outcomes thereof, which Tetlock et al (2013) call 
process accountability and outcome accountability. However, there are 
several firms that do not disclose their decision limits.  Edgley (2014) argues 
that if materiality is not clearly defined, it leads to paternalism and 
mystification.  Mystification is counterparty to transparency – the less 
transparent a board is the more mystic in its decision-making and the wider 
the information gap between shareholders and board.  Moreover, a board 
may hide behind a generic concept of materiality, protecting its workings 
from outside assessment.  A lack of disclosure creates mystery and supports 
board work as “art of management” (cf. Rose et al 1970).    
  
2.4. Thresholds of materiality in audit 
 
Both auditors and lawyers historically have struggled in defining a general 
definition of materiality, leading to variation in judgments in courts as well 
as by individual auditors (Bean and Thomas 1990). The focus of audit 
research on materiality is on the accuracy of financial information.  Similarly 
to the legal definition, information is considered material if it impacts the 
economic decisions of the users of the information (Hicks 1964).  Audit 
research is practice-oriented, attempting to find benchmarks for auditors to 
use.  Weighty definitions have been provided by regulatory authorities, 
however, all of them leave the final judgment of materiality to boards and 
individual auditors, without providing any definite measurements to guide 
the practitioners.  For example, discussing disclosure, IFRS defines 
materiality as follows (IFRS 2010): 
Information is material if omitting it or misstating it could 
influence decisions that users make on the basis of financial 
information about a specific reporting entity. In other words, 
materiality is an entity-specific aspect of relevance based on the 
nature or magnitude, or both, of the items to which the 
information relates in the context of an individual entity’s 
financial report. Consequently, the Board cannot specify a 
uniform quantitative threshold for materiality or predetermine 
what could be material in a particular situation 
 
IFRS thus defines two general principles for materiality.  It is seen as entity-
specific rather than as a generic concept applicable to all companies through 
common thresholds.  Secondly, IFRS considers both depth (magnitude) and 
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width (nature) of issue as relevant in determining materiality.  Moreover, in 
the latest commenting round (IFRS 2015), IFRS board further concludes 
that it does not see a need to revise its materiality definition, although it 
confesses that the vagueness of definition has led to too little or too much 
information provided to investors. 
In empirical studies on how auditors apply materiality in practice, impact on 
net profit is seen as the primary criteria (Iskandar and Iselin, 1999; 
Holstrum and Messier, 1982; Messier et al., 2005).  More specifically, 
auditors commonly use the famous “five percent rule”, items that would 
change the reported net profit by 5 % are material enough that they need to 
be corrected in the financial statements before publication (Acito, Burks and 
Johnson 2009).  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s influential 
SAB991 guidance is generally supportive to the 5 % rule, but it highlights 
several situations of qualitative judgment where the mechanical application 
of the rule is not sufficient. Secondary criteria include impact on balance 
sheet as well as on sales, although both of these are related to the first.  In 
the case balance sheet valuation is considered incorrect, the impact usually 
passes through P/L; equally adjustments to sales figures normally impact 
reported margins.    
Empirical research on audit materiality suffers from low level of disclosure, 
as firms or auditors do not publicly reveal their criteria of materiality of 
mistakes to be corrected in financial statements (Keune and Johnstone 
2009).   Eilifsen and Messier (2015) approached this problem by studying 
internal materiality guidelines from eight major US auditing firms.  They 
found that the thresholds for misstatements vary as follows 
a) 3-10 % of net income before taxes 
b)  0.25-2% % total assets 
c)  0.5-2 % of total revenue2 
d)  0.5-10 % of net assets (with major variations between firms) 
e)  2-5 % of EBITDA 
                                                          
1 Securities And Exchange Commission Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 , 2001 
2 One of the firms had a maximum of 5 % of total sales 
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f) 1-10 % of total equity 
In addition, single accounting firms established thresholds based on gross 
profit, cash flow and total expenses.  Even though the thresholds seem 
definite, some of the measures are related, and misstatement may be 
material based on one criterion but not on another.  Multiple criteria 
unavoidably lead to judgmental issues and may fail to provide a firm basis 
of assessment1. 
Moreover, all these measures are based on accounted values, and none on 
available market values.  Considering that investors are the primary users of 
financial reports, this omission is perplexing, as outcomes of misstatements 
are reflected in valuation of shares.  Even more perplexing is the observed 
difference in assessment of materiality between preparers of financial 
statements, auditors and users of such information, investors (Iskander and 
Iselin 1989).   Cho et al (2003) investigated investor perceptions of 
materiality through market reactions to unexpected financial results, and 
arrived at values that are clearly below what auditors commonly consider 
material.  Their assessment indicated that investors consider deviations of 
between 0.1 and 0.2 % of pre-tax income or between 0.025 % and 0.1 % of 
total assets as material enough to impact their judgment on company value, 
although the impact is quite limited, they found a mean abnormal 3-day 
cumulative return of only 0.15%.  In fact, due to this discrepancy, auditors 
implicitly take a stand on what is a material market reaction to new financial 
information and disregard miniscule impacts even if they are abnormal.   
In research on a related field, failures of disclosure and securities market 
law, studies have focused on investor protection, trying to define what 
information would have caused an informed investor to act in the financial 
markets or changed the market price of a security (Booth 2013).   The US 
Supreme Court has defined materiality qualitatively as “substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by 
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total mix” of 
                                                          
1 This is well recognized also by regulators: ‘‘depending on the circumstances of the 
entity, include categories of reported income, such as profit before tax, total 
revenue, gross profit, and total expenses; total equity; or net asset value. Profit 
before tax from continuing operations is often used for profit-oriented entities. 
When profit before tax from continuing operations is volatile, other benchmarks may 
be more appropriate, such as gross profit or total revenues’’ (AICPA 2012a, §320.A6) 
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information made available”1 (Messier et al 2005), which leaves the 
responsibility of judgment of materiality to individual courts.  In Europe, no 
common definition for legal materiality exists, and for example Chong and 
Venten (1994) find no consistency on the way UK courts interpret 
materiality in securities laws, asking for better guidelines from auditors.  
Besides lack of consistent thresholds, courts cannot rely on market reactions 
as an indication of materiality, as it would lead to endogeneity, the cases 
would not have been brought into courts in the first place if the new 
information had not impacted the securities prices. 
As materiality is ultimately based on human judgment, behavioral factors 
may impact how thresholds are set.  Keune and Johnstone (2012) study the 
role of managers, auditors and audit committees in determining what is a 
material misstatement.  Their results imply that materiality is dependent on 
personal qualities such as director expertise, as more knowledgeable 
directors can better judge what is material for a company in a certain 
industry.  In audit, auditor experience, age and other personal factors have 
an effect, as does audit firm size and object firm industry and size (Edgley 
2014).  Although audit firms establish their own guidelines of materiality 
which auditors can referrer to (Eilifsen and Messier 2015), judgment of 
materiality is ultimately a decision by the responsible auditor.     
Legal and audit materiality are interlinked, as both investigate the 
thresholds of material misstatements or failures to disclose.  However, it is 
evident that auditors’ threshold of materiality should be lower than the one 
established by the courts, in order to self-protect auditors and audit 
companies from legal liability2.   
 
 
3. Methodology and data description 
 
 
The empirical material of this study is collected from 600 largest European 
listed companies by market capitalization, as of 25.8.2012 (EuroSTOXX 
                                                          
1 “TSC industries v. Northway Inc.” (1976) 
2 The audit failures are more spectacular like in cases of Enron or Parmalat, but they are 
related to criminal misstatements and the inability of the auditors to prevent them rather 
than omissions of material facts 
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600).  Although focus on larger companies may create a bias, the 
measurements are universal and should be applicable to any size of 
company.  Large public companies are also under higher scrutiny  by 
markets and regulators, have better resources for disclosure and reporting, 
and the personal liability of board members is higher, also creating an 
incentive for better disclosure.     
 
Of the 600 studied companies, 325 disclose their internal board rules, and 
the 297 of these provide monetary thresholds for decision control.  In total, 
the sample includes 1120 numeric thresholds of materiality.     The material 
on companies has been collected from their websites, and includes annual 
reports, articles of association, corporate governance reports or statements 
and most importantly, rules of the board1.  The numeric limits can be 
categorized in four major areas, investments, financial transactions, 
commercial agreements and technical matters like litigation, and each 
company may have more than one decision limit related to each area.   
The financial data is collected from Orbis databases, using annual 
information for the accounting year that ends between 31.12.2011 and 
30.12.2012.   When needed, the database has been converted into the home 
currency of the company with the FX rates in force at the moment of closing, 
considering the different closing months of the companies.  When pieces of 
information have been missing from Orbis, annual reports have been used.  
The accuracy of Orbis data has been controlled through random checks. 
The sample companies have 17 different nationalities and 19 industries, all 
of them listed in countries belonging to or associated with European Union, 
providing a reasonable image of European corporate sector and investment 
markets.  One of the founding principles of European Union is free 
movement of capital, which is further supported by union-level regulation.  
The sample companies are large and most of them operate across countries, 
their ownership is international as is their management and board.  
Consequently, this paper assumes functional convergence of companies in 
developed economies, in line with La Porta, Lopez-de-Silvanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (2000), Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) and Hopt and Leyens 
                                                          
1 Rules of the board can have various names, matters reserved to the board, board charter, 
board by-laws etc.  Sometimes board rules are included in other documents, like document 
de reference in France or regulatory corporate governance reports in Italy or Spain 
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(2004). Investors, boards and management are assumed to adapt their 
approach to decision management in ways to align the practices according 
to commonly accepted principles despite lack of uniform legal environment.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) have 
argued that the integration of global financial markets is driving the 
integration of governance practices, and national legal environments follow 
only with a lag.  There is no evidence that either national or Europe-level 
regulation would give instructions how boards set decision thresholds.   The 
shareholder as the primary beneficiary of governance forms the 
philosophical basis of the functional convergence and thus shareholder 
value based measurements form a natural yardstick for decision control in 
corporate governance.    
   
This study focuses on the numerical decision limits determined by the board.  
Boards have an interesting self-regulatory role, as the rules are written by 
the boards themselves.  Rules include lists of matters and clear monetary 
limits of authority that reflect the board’s definition of materiality.   The most 
typical limits are traditional, focused on investments (or acquisitions), even 
though purchases of fixed assets are not necessarily the most material 
decisions a company can make.  Companies included in the sample define 
materiality in different ways.  The most common, by far, is a monetary limit 
related to a specific decision.  However, also proportional limits exist, 
relating decision limits to sales, equity or balance sheet total.  In addition, 
limits related to business variables have been defined, such as physical 
measurement of contract values.  
Monetary limits as such are not directly comparable, but this can be 
overcome by relating them to key financials.    This paper relates monetary 
limits primarily to market value of equity.   The higher the threshold, the 
fewer decisions require board approval and the less decision control the 
board retains.  This approach differs from criteria of audit materiality, which 
typically relate material misstatements to accounted values of net result, 
sales or balance sheet.  Market based measures have a direct link to 
shareholder value, as material decisions impact future cash flows and thus 
valuation in the market.  For the sake of comparability, ex ante decision 
thresholds are also assessed against accounting-based figures.  However. 
relating board decisions to firm market value provides a reasonable, if not 
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complete yardstick across companies, asking how much of shareholder value 
needs to be involved before board sees it as its responsibility to retain 
decision control rights, in order to properly represent shareholder interests.  
This measurement is not without problems, though.  For example, it is 
evident that investment decisions differ in their level of risk, if they concern 
replacements of existing machinery or endeavors to totally new markets.  
Investments by start-ups are probably more risky than investments by 
established companies.   
 
Table 1 presents the breakdown of the sample of 600 largest European 
companies by industry and by country.   All of these companies published 
their regulatory information on their website, and the overwhelming 
majority of material was available also in English.  There are some minor 
exceptions where parts of the material (board rules, articles of association or 
corporate governance statements) were only available in the native 
language, French, Spanish, Italian or German.  In some cases, where only 
summaries in English were provided, the original full native language 
versions were used. 
There are no significant anomalies in the division of companies or 
industries, but a few observations are worth commenting.  Financial sector 
(banks, financial services and insurance represent 99 companies of the 
sample (16,5 %).  Although certain financial ratios, such as net sales or 
balance sheet ratios differ between financial and other industries, there is no 
reason why market valuation as a yardstick would not apply also to them. 
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Table 1  Breakdown of sample by industry and by country (N=600) 
 
Eurostoxx 600 stock index divides companies into 19 different industries.  All of the companies are listed in countries either belonging 
to or associated with European Union, although a few have their headquarters in other countries.  Countries are AT = Austria, BE = 
Belgium, CH = Switzerland, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, GB = Great Britain, GR = Greece, 
IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, LU = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden 
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4. Findings and discussion 
 
In this chapter, the concept of materiality is analyzed through limits of 
decision control defined by the boards.  Such limits provide evidence on how 
boards operationalize their understanding what constitutes a material 
decision.  Boards have no obligation to provide this data, but more than half 
of the 600 largest companies in Europe disclose their board rules, most of 
them disclosing numeric limits for materiality, investment limits (242 
companies) being by far the most common.  This material provides a unique 
publicly available database on human judgment of materiality, unavailable 
to researchers investigating misstatements in financial reports.   
Table 2 presents the most important descriptive statistics of this study.  
There are four generic types of materiality thresholds, investments, 
commercial, financial and technical decisions, and the table below presents 
most frequent of them.  For investments, not only capital expenditure, 
mergers and acquisitions and equity participations are individually 
analyzed, but investments are also considered as one large category, where 
the lowest of various investment thresholds is used. In addition, the 
distribution of materiality thresholds for key categories in finance 
(Borrowing), business transactions (Contracts) and technical decisions 
(Litigation) are presented below.  
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of materiality thresholds for various decision types 
  Min Max Median Mean Q1 Q3 STD N 
All investments 0,01 % 37,5 % 0,68 % 2,18 % 0,18 % 1,82 % 4,57 % 242 
- Capex 0,01 % 30,6 % 0,66 % 1,93 % 0,24 % 1,72 % 3,68 % 190 
- Mergers and 
acquisitions 0,05 % 30,6 % 0,82 % 2,24 % 0,29 % 2,19 % 4,21 % 160 
- Equity 
participations 0,01 % 37,5 % 0,59 % 2,74 % 0,25 % 1,82 % 6,11 % 97 
Borrowing 0,03 % 33,2 % 1,26 % 3,14 % 0,51 % 3,15 % 5,65 % 69 
Contracts 0,01 % 35,7 % 0,86 % 2,75 % 0,41 % 2,57 % 5,23 % 56 
Litigation 0,01 % 6,9 % 0,32 % 0,67 % 0,13 % 0,61 % 1,25 % 32 
 
Before entering to specific analysis by subject of decision control, a few 
general comments need to be made.  The dispersion of median values, 
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measured as the relationship of decision threshold to market value of equity 
of the firm vary between 0,32 % and 1,26 %, the lowest being with items 
related to potential losses, litigation, and highest for borrowing 
authorizations, which are probably the most technical of material decisions.  
Most categories included few very high observations, which could also be 
considered outliers, and this is reflected in the mean values, which are 
always higher than median values. Smallest values were only a few 
hundredths of a percent, indicating that some boards understand their role 
as making managerial decisions, rather than delegating necessary authority 
to operative organization. 
 
 
4.1  Investments 
 
 
Category all investments is a combination of materiality thresholds for 
different types of investment limits, choosing the lowest value.  This ensures 
that technical discrepancies in the ways companies define what is an 
investment do not distort the results.  Probably the most significant single 
benchmark arising from this study is the median value of investment limits, 
0,68 % of market value of equity, meaning than for example a board with a 
market capitalization of 1 billion euros considers an investment of 68 million 
as material enough for its decision control, or similarly, market value of 10 
billion would entitle a threshold of 680 million.  Median is a more 
representative value than mean (2,18%), which is heavily impacted by very 
large values, which could also be considered as outliers.  The total number 
of observations is 242, representing 40,3% of companies in the total sample.  
Half the observations were between 0,18 % and 1,82 % of market value of 
equity, which can be considered as a reasonable benchmark range, taking 
into consideration differences between industries and businesses.  
 
In order to assess the relevance of these benchmarks, they can be compared 
with the Eilifsen and Messnier ranges of audit firm thresholds of materiality.   
As auditors do not consider market value based thresholds of materiality, we 
need to rely on accounted values for comparison.  It needs to remembered, 
though, that comparisons are not entirely relevant, as we are comparing ex 
ante materiality with uncertain outcomes to ex post assessment of 
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materiality of known past events.  Median value of investment limit as of net 
sales is 0.60 %, which is within the range of 0.5 – 2 % in the Eilifsen and 
Messier (2015) study.  In comparison to accounted equity, sample 
companies have a median value of 0,9 %, which is just below the lower range 
of 1% - 10 % established in their study.  Median materiality threshold for 
balance sheet total was 0.30 %, which again is at the lower end of Eilifsen 
and Messier results (0.25% - 2 %).  Thus materiality thresholds for decision 
control in large publicly listed companies seem to be at the low range, if not 
below materiality thresholds established by auditors. 
 
Table 3 Comparison of materiality thresholds for investments against different 
benchmarks (N=242) 
  
Market 
value of 
equity 
Book value 
of equity 
Enterprise 
value Net sales 
Balance 
sheet total 
Min 0,01 % ...* 0,01 % 0,01 % 0,01 % 
Max 37 % 31 % 37 % 2500 %** 11 % 
Median 0,68 % 0,90 % 0,56 % 0,60 % 0,30 % 
Mean 2,18 % 2,17 % 1,68 % 12,5 % 0,71 % 
STD 4,57 % 4,75 % 4,00 % 160,7 % 1,42 % 
 
*Cable and Wireless had a negative book value of equity in 2012 
**The unusually high value for investment limit to sales is due to Porsche, which has 
practically no sales as all business in 2011 took place in partially held companies, 
accounted through equity method 
 
In order to further consider validity of results, investment limits can also be 
calculated for various industries, countries and dominant ownership types.  
A dominant owner is defined as a largest shareholder than controls more 
than 10 % of the voting stock of a company.  Dominant owners were 
categorized into four groups, companies where a family is largest 
shareholder, state-dominated companies, companies with other type of 
clearly identifiable dominant owner, consisting of smaller categories such as 
foundations, investment companies or other enterprises, and the final 
category which consists of companies without a dominant owner.   It is 
evident from table 4 that ownership type has little relevance for 
determination of materiality, as median investment limit were practically 
identical. 
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Table 4 Investment limits and ownership types 
 
  Median STDEV N 
Family 0,68 % 4,97 51 
State 0,60 % 1,66 30 
Other 0,86 % 3,90 55 
Widely held 0,60 % 5,54 106 
     
Total 0,68 % 4,57 242 
 
There is more variance when investment limits are investigated against 
industries.  Highest median values were reached for Technology (2.19) and 
real estate (2.18), but there is no clear pattern, so that for example, more 
investment intensive industries would be different from services, and as 
sample sizes are quite small, main conclusion to be reached is that 
materiality is not or is only weakly industry-dependent.  
 
 
Table 5 Investment limits by industry 
  
      
Median N 
Automobiles & Parts 2,06 % 7 
Banks 1,64 % 18 
Basic Resources 0,76 % 10 
Chemicals 0,46 % 15 
Construction & Materials 1,00 % 10 
Financial Services 0,95 % 9 
Food & Beverages 0,41 % 12 
Healthcare 0,19 % 12 
Industrial Goods & Services 0,52 % 41 
Insurance 1,69 % 13 
Media 1,00 % 12 
Oil & Gas 1,11 % 10 
Personal & Household Goods 0,31 % 11 
Real Estate 2,18 % 14 
Retail 0,18 % 9 
Technology 2,19 % 10 
Telecommunications 0,62 % 7 
Travel & Leisure 0,61 % 9 
Utilities 0,58 % 13 
    
Total 0,68 % 242 
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Looking at materiality thresholds by country (Table 6), of the large countries 
with significant number of observations, Great Britain (0,39 %), Germany 
(0,46 %) Switzerland (0.44 %) are clearly lower than two large Latin 
countries, France (1,53 %) and Italy (1,64 %).  However, the two other Latin 
countries from Iberian peninsula have a low threshold average (0,11% and 
0,49%) while Ireland (1,04) has the third highest, so thresholds of 
materiality do not seem to be systematically dependent on the country of 
listing.  
 
 
 
Table 6 Investment limits by country of listing 
 
  Median N 
BE – Belgium 0,79 % 7 
CH – Switzerland 0,44 % 23 
DE – Germany 0,46 % 22 
DK – Denmark 0,21 % 1 
ES – Spain 0,11 % 5 
FI – Finland 0,12 % 1 
FR – France 1,53 % 65 
GB - Great Britain 0,39 % 54 
IE – Ireland 1,04 % 2 
IT – Italy 1,64 % 25 
LU – Luxembourg 0,19 % 1 
NL – Netherlands 0,70 % 22 
NO – Norway 0,39 % 4 
PT – Portugal 0,49 % 2 
SE – Sweden 0,25 % 8 
    
Total 0,68 % 242 
 
 
 
4.2. Mergers and acquisition limits 
 
160 companies had determined a limit for mergers and acquisitions that 
required board approval.  In most cases, the limits were the same as for fixed 
asset investments, and thus average, median and quartile values were not 
materially different from investment limits.   Out of these companies, 22 
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defined the limit either as a proportion of accounted total equity (20 cases) 
or total balance sheet (2 cases).   
 
In case there was a comparable limit for fixed assets investments, for the 
majority of cases board threshold was set at the same level as capital 
expenditure limit, but in 10 cases acquisition limit was set higher and in 10 
cases lower.  Thus it can be concluded that boards consider the risks related 
to acquisition outlays to be on the same level as any other investment.    
 
As an example, Symrise AG, a German chemical company has an acquisition 
limit that is five times that of fixed assets. 1  
 
The acquisition and sale of businesses and of shares in 
businesses as well as every other disposition or encumbrance 
of shares in companies shares, provided that the value of the 
business or company (defined as the purchase price plus the 
net financial liabilities) exceeds an amount of either EUR 25 
million or of EUR 10 million if, in the latter case, the 
transaction has not been provided for in the annual budget 
which was approved of by the Supervisory Board,  
 
…  the acquisition and sale of fixed tangible assets if the value 
of the investment or disinvestment exceeds an amount of EUR 
5 million 
 
Taylor Wimpey PC; a UK company in personal and household goods has set 
a lower limit for acquisitions than for fixed asset investments2 
 
5.2 Contracts which are material strategically or by reason of 
size, entered into by the company or any subsidiary in the 
ordinary course of business, including: 
… 
-  acquisitions, abnegation or disposals of fixed assets above 
£20million; 
                                                          
1 Rules of Procedure for the Executive Board of Symrise AG, 2011 
2 Taylor Wimpey Schedule of Matters Reserved to the Board,  
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5.3 Contracts of the company or any subsidiary not in the 
ordinary course of business, major acquisitions or disposals 
on non-contested terms with an acquisition cost, including the 
assumption of debt, exceeding £10 million. 
 
Both of these companies have defined acquisition limits as debt-free value 
of companies, in line with standard valuation models.  Some companies 
leave the definition vague, such as Vopak N.V, a Dutch company in industrial 
goods and services which requires that executive board must submit 
following decisions to supervisory board approval1,where acquisition 
thresholds are defined differently (“consideration”) from divestment 
thresholds (“book value”). 
 
e2)   an acquisition of a participation in another company with 
existing activities, to the extent the consideration thereof 
exceeds EUR 15 million, and the divestment or reduction of 
such participation to the extent the book value of such 
participation to be divested exceeds EUR 15 million; 
 
f1)  capital expenditures (including capital leases) in 
replacement - and/or expansion investments regarding 
existing activities to the extent these are included in the annual 
capital budget and exceed an amount of EUR 20 million; 
 
These examples highlight the difficulties of defining benchmarks of 
materiality in mergers and acquisitions.  In order to calculate them in a 
consistent manner, calculation methods would need to be more 
standardized 
 
4.3  Other investment limits 
 
104 companies defined a specific limit for equity participations, i.e. 
investments in companies that might not lead to acquisition of majority 
                                                          
1 Rules of the Executive Board of Koninklijke Vopak N.V., approved by Supervisory Board on 
April 26, 2010 
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ownership, indicating that boards consider unusual ownership 
arrangements as something that requires closer board scrutiny, potentially 
as they may involve uncustomary governance arrangements and restrict the 
powers of directors.   Disposal limits were defined by 144 companies, 
primarily as a symmetric counterparty to acquisition limits.   Boards see 
acquisitions and disposals as two sides of the same coin, and use similar 
criteria in assessing their materiality. 
 
An interesting exception to the rule were real estate investments, which had 
a separate limit in 51 of the companies.  While capex, acquisitions and 
divestments generally followed the similar materiality thresholds, limits for 
real estate transactions were clearly lower for 20 % of companies, while only 
3 companies allowed management to make real estate investments of higher 
value than normal capital expenditure.  The rational for considering real 
estate investments as of higher risk is somewhat of a mystery, and may 
rather be due to the public nature and transparency of such transactions (e.g. 
notarization) rather than risk considerations.  Real estate thresholds may 
reflect a legalistic or formalistic approach to decision control rather than an 
approach based on economic impact of decisions.  As an example, Air 
Liquide S.A, a French company in chemicals industry defines following 
decisions requiring prior authorization by board of directors1 
 
of real estate for an individual amount in excess of € 80 million or 
for an annual cumulative amount in excess of € 150 million. 
 … 
commitments to invest in or acquire equity investments or assets, 
consisting of immoveable or moveable property, tangible or 
intangible, which will be listed under "Fixed Assets" on the balance 
sheet, or to subscribe to share capital increases, for an individual 
amount in excess of € 250 million or for an annual cumulative 
amount in excess of € 400 million. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Air LIquide, Internal regulations of the board of directors May 2011 
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4.4.  Financial limits 
 
Creditors regularly require a formal board authorization as a proof that a 
credit agreement can be duly executed, however, 83 companies had defined 
a specific threshold below which management could independently raise 
debt.  In addition, 20 UK companies had defined a borrowing limit board 
cannot exceed without shareholder authorization.  Such authorizations do 
not seem to exist in other European countries1.  For example, Centrica, a UK 
utility company defines such a limit in its Articles of Association as2  
 
The directors must limit the borrowings of the company and 
exercise all voting and other rights or powers of control 
exercisable by the company in relation to its subsidiary 
undertakings so as to ensure that the total amount of the 
group's borrowings does not exceed an amount equal to the 
greater than £5,000,000,000 and three times the company's 
adjusted capital and reserves. This affects subsidiary 
undertakings only to the extent that the directors can do this 
by exercising these rights or powers of control. 
 
The magnitude of board delegation of financing rights was materially higher 
than for investment limits.  In cases where these two limits could reasonably 
be compared, the average multiple of management credit authorization to 
investment authorization was 3,2 while median value was 2.  Management 
leeway in negotiating credit arrangements for companies is thus much wider 
than the authority for making investments or acquisitions.  This can be 
interpreted as recognition that credit is usually a consequence of other 
decisions rather than an independent business decision itself.   
 
A few boards had other finance-related thresholds as well.  Six boards had 
defined a threshold for loan period in addition to credit limits, typically 
allowing management to raise debt without limits for periods of up to 1 year.  
This may reflect an idea that short term credit is related to working capital 
management, and thus tighter control would not be proper use of board 
                                                          
1 Numerous companies do not, though, disclose their Articles of Association on their websites, 
to this conclusion is somewhat uncertain. 
2 Centrica Articles of Association, adopted May 10 2010 
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time.  59 boards had defined a limit for third party guarantees, which is 
effectively another type of credit risk limit on behalf of other companies.  
Most of these cases were related to industries where size of projects is large 
and customers may require financing in order to be able to place orders, in 
industries like oil and gas, utilities or engineering companies.  For example, 
EADS, European aeronautics company limits CEO authority of contingent 
liabilities as follows:1 
 
…. to grant the CEO the authority to allow credits to third 
parties as well as to grant sureties or to accept guarantees or 
to give similar undertakings for  liabilities of third parties not 
consolidated within the EADS Group insofar as the respective 
value of each such measure exceeds euro 100,000,000 
 
On the other hand, very few boards had set separate limits for market risks.  
8 companies had defined a foreign exchange limit and 5 firms disclosed 
limits for other off-balance-sheet items.  It is difficult to interpret this any 
other way than boards struggle with highly technical matters, such as limits 
related to financial risks.  Moreover only one financial services company and 
no banks or insurance companies had a limit for financial risk, despite the 
high relevance of such risks in financial institutions.  Of course, companies 
may have treasure policies that include various limits not disclosed to 
shareholders, but considering highly public failures in managing market 
risks, this lack of board attention indicates restricted technical 
understanding of materiality of non-traditional risks in business.  It needs 
to be noted, though, that annual reports typically include sections of market 
risk management, which provide plenty of information to investors, but 
boards do not seem to take direct accountability rather leaving the 
responsibility to operative management and technocrats.   
 
Financial limits can take a form of limiting size of transactions, such as for 
Evraz Plc, a UK company in basic resources2 
 
                                                          
1 European aeronautic defense and space Company EADS n.v., Internal rules For the Board of 
directors, October 22, 2007 
2 Schedule of matters reserved for the board of Evraz plc, approved by the board of directors 
of Evraz plc on 14 October 2011 
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Contracts of EVRAZ plc or any subsidiary not in the ordinary 
course of business, for example  loans, guarantees and 
repayments above USD 50 million; foreign currency 
transactions above USD 50 million; major acquisitions or 
disposals above USD 50 million. 
  
 Or limits for the total foreign exchange position, as for Unilever N.V1 
 
approving policies in respect of the hedging of net instrument 
exposures, the hedging ( or leaving unhedged) of net equity 
balance sheet exposures of up to (or exceeding) €5 billion per 
currency or any other financial derivative exposure. 
 
In addition to aforementioned financial limits 18 groups had defined board 
limits for intragroup financing, which may reflect lack of trust for internal 
control, and 10 companies had a specific threshold for leasing transactions.  
In practice, leasing being just another form of external financing, treating it 
separately makes little sense and may indicate lack of financial market 
expertise in boards. 
 
It needs to be noted that banks and other financial institutions have 
relatively few disclosed limits of board decision authority, which may have 
interesting implications.  In few other industries hierarchical decision-
making is as natural as in banking, and various clearly specified levels of 
decision authority are already a regulatory requirement.  However, the 
boards seem to have less role in actual decisions than in other industries, 
indicating that their role is rather supervisory than managerial.   
 
 
4.5. Operative decisions 
 
 
A third area of board decision control concerns actual business decisions.  64 
companies had defined a monetary limit for contracts that management is 
allowed to sign without board authorizations, such as Ahold N.V, a Dutch 
                                                          
1 Governance of Unilever, 1 January 2012 
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retail chain, which requires executive board to submit following contracts to 
supervisory board approval1: 
 
… any programs, facility or contracts, (which include but are 
not limited to borrowing and Investment facilities and bond 
debt programs), with a term of more than one year, which are 
not included in the annual budget and exceed a value of EUR 
250 million; 
 
In case where these limits could reasonably be compared to investment 
limits, they were on average 3.1 times larger, although median value was 1.   
A large number of boards had defined equal decision limits for investments 
and business contracts, even though their risk implications are quite 
different.  This may reflect what behavioral theorist call anchoring, defining 
a generic numeric value that needs to be brought to board attention, without 
consideration of actual risks related thereof.  Such simplistic rules clearly 
show limited ability of boards to define the width of matters relevant enough 
for their attention, rather limits acting as “fishing nets” collecting both 
relevant as well as irrelevant matters for board to consider. 
 
The challenges for defining the width of matters requiring board attention is 
also reflected in other decisions with determined decision limits.  Only very 
few companies have defined limits for specific business decisions, such as 
maturity of contracts (15 firms), IT projects (2 firms), “projects” (11 firms) 
and energy contracts (3, out of which 2 for utilities, defined as megawatts 
rather than monetary values).   
 
Generally, decision control on other business decisions besides investments 
and acquisitions are far less frequent.  Considering that decisions such as 
marketing campaigns, product decisions or human resources might be much 
more relevant than traditional investment decisions, they are only implicitly 
present in boards’ consideration for what is a material decision. This would 
imply that not only boards spend too much time on regulatory matters and 
information dissemination, their agendas may focus on personal expertise 
                                                          
1 Koninklijke Ahold N.V. Charter of the Corporate Executive Board, Effective as of January 4, 
2010 
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of board members, and a diversity thereof could increase the scope of board 
authority.  However, many of these subjects may be covered by regular 
budget or strategy processes, though with limited transparency, it is difficult 
to observe board involvement in such decisions. 
 
 
 
4.6.  Technical decisions 
 
The fourth area of board decision control relates to “technical” one-off 
decisions, litigation being the most frequent (33 companies).  Actelion, a 
Swiss healthcare company, defines litigation threshold in matters reserved 
to board decision as follows:1 
 
the initiation and settlement of judicial and administrative 
proceedings and disputes exceeding CHF 10’000’000 dispute 
value. 
 
On the other hand, they may be a part of overall limit of authorization, such 
as in Casino S.A, French supermarket chain2 
 
The Chief Executive Officer must therefore obtain the Board’s 
prior authorisation for the following transactions 
representing over five hundred million euros (€500,000,000), 
including but not limited to: 
- investments in securities and immediate or 
deferred investments in any company or business 
venture, 
-  sales of assets, rights or securities, in exchange 
for securities or a combination of securities and 
cash, 
-  acquisitions of real property or real property 
rights, 
                                                          
1 Organizational rules  (the "by-laws")  of  Actelion ltd, 27.11.2010 
2 Casino S.A 2011 registration document, p 214 
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-  purchases or sales of receivables, acquisitions or 
divestments of goodwill or other Intangible 
assets, 
-  issues of securities by directly or indirectly 
controlled companies, 
-  granting or obtaining loans, borrowings, credit 
facilities or short-term advances, 
-  agreements to settle legal disputes, 
-  disposals of real property or real property rights, 
-  full or partial divestments of equity interests, - 
granting security interests. 
 
The median value of litigation limits in the sample is only half of investment 
limits.  It is somewhat unclear from limits if they concern dispute value 
(Actelion) or settlement value (Casino), so the materiality is difficult to 
assess.    In a few cases, companies had also established limits for what can 
be considered as “one-offs” such as tax settlements (3 firms), restructuring 
provisions (9 firms) or credit losses (3 firms), but as such cases are very few, 
it is impossible to draw conclusions out of such thresholds.  More interesting 
is, though, that one-offs are included in only few board rules, and thus they 
are brought to boardroom based on management judgment, which may be a 
problem, as management may be inclined to hide or split uncomfortable 
losses for failed business decisions if board does not impose their disclosure.  
 
A closer look at litigation and other direct loss thresholds also reveals traits 
of loss avoidance.  Out of the 33 companies establishing litigation limits, 14 
have set it lower than investment limits, on average at 37 % of lowest limit 
related to investment decisions.   For example, Sainsbury Plc requires board 
approval1 for  
 
Any commitment or series of related commitments (including 
acquisitions and disposals and commitments for lease) where 
the projected expenditure or proceeds exceed £60 million or 
any other material commitments not included in the annual 
capital budget. 
 
But on the other hand board needs to approve 
 
                                                          
1 Schedule of Matters Reserved to the Board of J. Sainsbury Plc, as of November 1, 2011. 
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Prosecution, defense or settlement of litigation involving a 
claim or series of related claims exceeding £5 million. 
 
In addition one company has disclosed a litigation limit but no other 
monetary limits of board decision control1.  15 companies have set the limit 
at the same level as investments and only 3 on a higher level2.  This would 
indicate that almost half of the boards show loss avoidance and thus behave 
in line with prospect theory, establishing decision thresholds for direct 
losses at lower comparable levels than for more uncertain business 
decisions.  In addition, the few limits for tax write-downs and loan losses 
seem to follow levels of litigation thresholds. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
 
The empirical analysis provides plenty of benchmarks and tools for 
practitioners how to improve board efficiency.  However, from theoretical 
perspective, a few key observations regarding the framework can be made.  
The first hypothesis was that boards have intentional rationality while 
setting their decision rules.  The large variety in the width and depth of 
decision thresholds indicates that boards clearly consider the firm-specific 
circumstances in consideration while determining which issues are material 
enough to retain decision control.  However, the strong focus on investment-
related decisions casts doubt on this conclusion, as by far the most frequent 
decision limit boards determine was related to clearly identifiable long-term 
commitment of funds, while it is evident that there are numerous other 
material decisions impacting shareholder value that boards do not include 
in their formal authority.  Thus the depth of decision limits supports the first 
hypothesis, while lack of width supports the opposing hypothesis, boards 
                                                          
1 IMI Plc, a UK company in industrial goods and services has disclosed only a litigation limit of 
20 million GBP. 
2 Actelion, a Swiss company in healthcare specifically determines that CEO has the authority 
for “the initiation and settlement of judicial and administrative proceedings and disputes 
exceeding CHF 10’000’000 dispute value”, while the investment authorization is only 
“individual capital expenditure items/projects, including IT, over CHF 3’000’000 if these are 
not included in the annual capital budget, over CHF 5’000’000 if included in the annual capital 
budget”. 
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following each other in determining that investments are most important 
decisions boards can make. 
 
The second set of hypotheses was related to behavioral biases in setting 
decision thresholds.  It was assumed that traces of anchoring and loss 
avoidance would be found from board rules, and although no strong 
conclusions can be made from the limited evidence, numerous boards 
established decision limits based on “magical numbers”, in a manner 
consistent with anchoring, directors determining a number that was 
“material”, and applying it without further refinement in several decision 
categories, disregarding their risk and size of potential economic outcomes.  
Clearly, directors have difficulty to assess the impact of their decisions, and 
need to rely on simplified rules as also proposed by Marsh (1994).  In 
addition, decision thresholds related to direct losses, such as legal 
settlements were generally on a much lower level than other decision limits, 
which supports the hypothesis that boards show traits of loss avoidance in 
their decision control.  This may also be related to board accountability, in 
line with prospect theory, losses have a higher perceived negative utility than 
gains of a similar magnitude.  In case shareholders show the same heuristics 
of loss avoidance, their assessment on board is weighed more on negative 
outcomes rather than positive ones, motivating boards to hold tighter 
control on decisions with clearly negative consequences. 
 
The cross-sectional data does not allow for dynamic interpretation of results, 
and thus the learning and institutionalization hypotheses of Marsh (1994) 
and Ocasio (1999) cannot be investigated in this study.  However, a future 
longitudinal study of decision rules may open interesting avenues to further 
analysis how decision rules change over time. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The descriptive part of this paper attempted to answer the question “What 
constitutes a material decision?” especially in board and corporate 
governance context.  The data is based on 600 largest European companies 
by market capitalization and may thus create a bias for interpretation of 
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results.  However, the analytical conclusions are universal, and although 
thresholds are set on different heights on various levels of organization, 
basic methods of measurement remain the same.   Thresholds are important 
for corporate governance, as they define the boundaries of power between 
the board and management.  Analysis of board rules provides fresh insights 
not only materiality but further insights to the unanswered question of what 
happens in the black box of the boardroom.  
The empirical part of this paper considered market value of equity as the best 
available yardstick in assessing materiality of decisions.  There were two key 
findings.  First, the median threshold of materiality for the most common 
decision assigned a materiality threshold, investments, had a threshold of 
only 0.68 % of the market value firm equity, which was a the lower end of 
thresholds set by auditing companies.   Secondly, boards often show traits of 
loss avoidance in determining materiality thresholds for direct losses, and 
“magic numbers” exist as common measures for materiality.  However, 
currently no commonly accepted yardsticks for materiality for decision 
control in corporate governance exist, although a need for improved 
guidance is evident. 
The theoretical framework of the paper arises from decision-making 
theories.  It provides novel support to heuristic biases also boards encounter 
while setting their rules.  Directors are part of societal elites, and they usually 
have very strong qualifications based on their skills and experience.  
However, as decision-making bodies, their ability to make relevant sets of 
decision rules seems to be hampered by traditional heuristic biases such as 
follow-thy-neighbor, anchoring and loss avoidance.  Further in-depth case 
studies might increase our understanding what are the processes how these 
rules are actually set, which may also help us develop theories of rule-making 
and decision-making by societal elites representing a large number of 
ultimate beneficiaries. 
The results are relevant for standard-setters as well as practitioners.  This is 
the first study providing systematic evidence on how boards determine 
materiality in decision-making, allowing regulators to provide better 
guidance to companies determining their corporate governance 
arrangements.  It is also evident that practitioners should find value from 
benchmarking information provided in this study.  The variations of size of 
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limits (depth) and differences in the range of issues (width) considered 
material was large, and the majority of boards had focused only on 
traditional investment-related decisions to be subject to their explicitly 
determined control. 
What the rules don’t catch is the impact of qualitative decisions.  The two 
main ones, choice of CEO and determination of strategy are not directly 
measurable, and they are included in all board rules and thus cannot be 
controlled.   Material decisions should anyhow have a link to strategy, non-
material decisions by definition have only limited impact on the financial 
outcomes of the company.  Another limitation arises from the subjective 
nature of judgment, boards consist of individuals with their personal risk 
preferences, and it would be important to analyze the process how boards as 
teams have arrived to these thresholds of materiality. 
Concept of materiality in decision-making and corporate governance opens 
up several avenues for future study.  In-depth analysis of threshold setting 
would require either case studies or surveys that would reveal the inner logic 
of decision control.  On the other hand, materiality is a pervasive concept 
throughout the organization, and internal rules cover various levels of 
hierarchy.  A better understanding of the concept of materiality would thus 
also benefit researchers of management control. 
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Abstract 
 
This essay introduces representation theory into corporate governance.  
In order to better understand the intermediary role of the board of 
directors, the relationship between shareholders and directors is seen 
through representation and accountability as the distinct role of board 
does not well correspond to standard postulates of agency theory, 
incentives and control.     This refinement of classical agency theory is 
called Principal-representative-delegate model of governance. 
  
Representation theory sees trustee and delegate as the two basic forms 
of representation.  In the first, representatives (board of directors) act 
on their own judgment as trustees, distancing themselves from 
shareholders after they have been elected, while in the second, boards 
more truly attempt to reflect the opinions of their electors, acting as 
delegates.  Both characteristics of representation are present in large 
European companies, role of trustee being connected with companies 
with diversified shareholding, while in companies with clearly 
identifiable dominant shareholders boards rather act as delegates, 
providing less information to all shareholders, essentially having face-
to-face accountability towards largest owners.   
 
Principal-representative-delegate model is relevant to how corporate 
representatives are elected.  Back-room negotiations leading to proposal 
of candidates is opaque, and does not guarantee a true representation of 
preferences of the whole shareholder base.  Also, if we see top 
management as delegates rather than independent agents, we need 
to ask if compensation systems built on selfish assumptions of agency 
theory, predominantly using incentives as a source of motivation, are 
appropriate for a management that has limited authority and 
accountability shared with directors.  
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Representation, accountability, disclosure, board 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Shareholder value maximization as a unitary goal is one of the largest myths 
in corporate governance.  It is a basis of the classical agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976, Fama and Jensen 1983, Schliefer and Vishny 1997), 
fundamental theories in corporate finance (e.g. Modigliani and Miller 1958) 
and starting point for legal analysis on governance (e.g. Hansmann and 
Kraakman 2001).  However, reality is different.  Investors are not a 
homogenous group.  They have different preferences, risk profiles and time 
horizons that lead to various alternatives on how to strive to reach this 
mythical goal1 (Aguilera 2005, Connelly et al. 2010, Cronqvist and 
Fahlebrach 2009).  For example, Ilmarinen, a pension insurance company 
managing over 36 billion of assets2,one of the largest institutional investors 
in Finland writes in its investment policy3 that it “considers it important that 
commercial and industrial activities in Finland remain competitive” and 
“the companies it owns must … comply with UN Global Compact”.  On the 
other hand, BlackRock, currently the largest fund manager in the world, 
states in its governance principles4 “We do not see it as our role to make 
social, ethical or political judgments on behalf of clients”. It is evident, that 
these policy principles reflect different approaches to shareholder value 
maximization.     
Moreover, how these different interests transfer into corporate actions is a 
question current theories of corporate governance fail to respond 
adequately.  Classical agency theory has only two actors, shareholders and 
management (Jensen and Meckling 1976), and it is based on carrot and stick, 
with little consideration on if and how shareholder preferences are actually 
reflected in corporate decisions.  Researchers and practitioners routinely 
consider boards as shareholders’ agents (see e.g. Reeb and Zhao 2013, 
BlackRock 2014) even though their relationship does not fulfill the basic 
                                                          
1 This approach is related to the concept of equifinality, which assumes that there are several 
routes towards the same goal, and it is virtually impossible to know in forehand, which of the 
routes is the optimal to be chosen.  Corporate governance is a method of determining how 
companies ex ante approach goal of shareholder primacy, although it does not provide 
answers ex post what would have been the outcomes if alternative routes would have been 
chosen. 
2 36.412 million euros as of 30.6.2015, www.ilmarinen.fi 
3 Ownership Policy, approved by Ilmarinen Board of Directors December 18, 2014 
4 Global Corporate Governance and Engagement Principles, June 2014 
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characteristics of agency relationship, incentives and control.  Although 
market-based routes of influence from shareholders to management exist 
(e.g. Becht et al. 2009), direct links between the vast majority of 
shareholders and management are very few, and the most regular and 
structured route is via elected representatives of shareholders, board of 
directors.   This indirect route consists of two distinct relationships, both of 
which need to be analyzed separately.  
Applying theories of representation and legitimacy (Pollak et al. 2009), we 
can define corporate governance as a means of creating a unified company 
decision-making mechanism by transforming unorganized multitude of 
shareholder preferences into an organized structure, which is capable of 
action.  Consequently, governance can be seen consisting of representation 
and delegation, creating a structure whereby a very large number of 
beneficiaries are represented by elected few, which are further responsible 
for decision control, delegating necessary authority to operative decision 
management for day-to-day running of a company (Fama and Jensen 1983).   
This can be called principal-representative-delegate model of governance, 
where shareholders are seen as principals, board as representatives and 
management as delegates.  Principal-representative-delegate model 
contributes to agency theory by separating a dualistic shareholder-manager 
agency model into a more refined model consisting of two different 
relationships, one between shareholders and board, and another between 
board and management. 
Corporate representation is based on ownership, voting power being 
determined by number of shares held1 while the foundation of political 
representation is universal suffrage2.  Corporate representation does not 
follow national boundaries, while political representation is usually strictly 
territorial.  Companies may have formal (legal) domicile, but real domicile 
for large corporations is diffuse, as their ownership, management, 
operations and governing bodies are often international. This also implies 
that governance research founded on national boundaries is inadequate for 
large publicly listed international companies, similarly to evolution in 
                                                          
1 The question of different classes of shares is left outside this paper, although it offers an 
interesting avenue for future research on corporate representation. 
2 Universal suffrage is actually quite a recent innovation, prior to 20th century political 
representation was based on gender, class, wealth or race. 
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political governance, where elections are still primarily national, but 
decision-making has increasingly shifted from nationally elected 
parliaments to multinational bodies, such as European Union (Grant and 
Keohane 2005). 
Representation theory is well developed in political science.  The central 
question is if the role of a representative is to act on her independent 
judgment or on preferences of her electors (Pitkin 1967).  The same question 
can be asked in corporate governance, should directors be independent from 
the opinions of their electors, or should they rather represent preferences of 
clearly identifiable shareholders (Verstein 2012).  Representation as a 
concept is sparsely used in governance literature, i.e. classical works by 
Jensen and Mecklin (1976), Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), 
Eisenhardt (1989) or Schlieffer and Vishny (1997) do not use the term at all, 
or influential surveys (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003, Adams, Hermalin and 
Weisbach 2010) use the term only in discussing external stakeholder (labor, 
creditor) representation in boards, but there is little discussion of 
representation by various types of shareholders or shareholders with 
different preferences.  Representation is a universal idea, most famously 
defined by Pitkin (1967), as creating presence of something or somebody 
that is not physically present.   The fundamental challenge of corporate 
governance in publicly listed companies is the same, how to represent the 
interests of a large number of distant beneficiaries, whose ability to express 
their interests is limited and whose preferences are difficult to determine.  
In this paper, disclosure is used as a lens to understand how representation 
actually works.     Management disclosure has been extensively researched 
(see e.g. Verrecchia 2001, Beyer et al. 2010), but literature on board 
disclosure is practically non-existent, even though European corporate 
governance rules mandate companies to disclose plenty of information on 
boards and their members1. However, regulations leave vague what boards 
should disclose on their inner workings, leaving it up to companies 
                                                          
1 Information on boards can be found on several documents.  Annual reports include chapters 
on governance, and sometimes companies provide a separate governance report, such as in 
Italy or Spain.  However, a large number of European companies also voluntarily provide 
explicit information on matters that boards decide, on matters that boards as representatives 
of shareholder interests consider material enough to require their approval.  This material is 
unique not only due to its hand-collected nature but also as European companies provide 
more information on boards than their American counterparties. 
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themselves to determine what kind of voluntary information, if any, adds 
value to shareholders.  This has led to a huge variety in the content and level 
of detail in board disclosure, which provides a fruitful basis for research.   
The empirical part of this paper is based on disclosure of board rules, and 
specifically retention and delegation of decision-making authority.     This is 
the first study systematically investigating board rules, even though they 
provide first-hand evidence on corporate governance and role of the board.   
Basic assumption is that the more board discloses of its influence on 
corporate decision-making, the more accountable it becomes to 
shareholders.    Classical representation theory differentiates between 
trustees and delegates as two basic types of representatives, trustees acting 
on independent judgment while delegates attempt to reflect faithfully the 
views of their electors.   Board disclosure provides us with insight how 
boards understand their representative role, and what determines the 
nature of representation in corporate governance.   
Key results demonstrate a link between different ownership structures and 
modes of representation.  Boards act as trustees in widely held companies or 
companies dominated by agent owners, exercising what representation 
theories call process accountability.  On the other hand boards in companies 
with clearly identifiable shareholders act as delegates, disclosing less of their 
responsibilities, consistent with face-to-face accountability.   In addition, 
board disclosure is found to have externalities, independent directors 
signaling their skills to director markets, better disclosure demonstrating 
their capabilities to potential electors.   
This paper is organized as follows:  In chapter 2 basic concepts of corporate 
governance are reviewed against theories of representation, accountability 
and disclosure.  In the third chapter, a model of disclosure and 
accountability is built and analyzed, in order to understand the role of 
representation in corporate governance.  Chapter 4 concludes with 
recommendations for future research. 
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2. Literature review 
 
This paper proposes a principal-representative-delegate model of corporate 
governance, providing a more nuanced image of governance than the 
classical dualistic principal-agent model (Jensen and Meckling 1976).   
Instead of seeing shareholders as principals and management as agents, 
principal-representative-delegate model sees governance as a triangle, 
where shareholders retain the role of principal, but instead of having a direct 
link to management, shareholder interests are conveyed to corporate 
decision-making through their elected representatives, the board, which 
controls material decisions and further allocates necessary powers to the 
management for the day-to-day running of the company.    
The key actor in representative approach to governance is the board.  Its role 
is two-dimensional, acting as a representative of shareholders and at the 
same time as a principal to management.  Licht (2014) calls it the epicenter 
of power relations in a corporation.  Role of the management can be seen 
either as an agent or as a delegate of the board, although these two concepts 
are very close and can be used interchangeably.    Due to the intermediary 
role of the board, agency elements in the relationship between shareholders 
and management are primarily indirect1.  This distinction is probably one of 
the key structural weaknesses of classical agency theory in corporate 
governance.   
Even though last two decades have evidenced an explosion in board-related 
research, it is still considered under-theorized (Adams, Hermalin and 
Weisbach 2010, Aguilera and Jackson 2003).  Most common approach is to 
see board as a monitoring and controlling mechanism (Van Den Berghe and 
Levrau 2004, Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan 2008), complementing direct 
influence from large shareholders (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1986) and threat 
of takeover through equity markets (Grossman and Hart 1980).  However, 
direct shareholder influence and takeovers take place far less frequently than 
                                                          
1 Recent evolution in regulation has strengthened this relationship, though, at least in US, 
where Dodd-Frank legislation from 2010 provides shareholders “say-on-pay”, rights to 
express their opinion on the compensation of top management in a company.  However, the 
economic significance of such rules is rather symbolic as average compensation for S&P CEO’s 
in 2014 was less than 0.1 % of companies’ market cap.  See www.spindices.com and 
www.mercer.com or www.aflcio.org.  
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regular board work, leaving boards as the primary mechanism of 
management control and representation of shareholder interests.   
Even though the relationship between board and shareholders is not based 
on incentives and control, two basic elements of agency theory, researchers 
and practitioners routinely consider boards as shareholders’ agents (see e.g. 
Reeb and Zhao 2013, BlackRock 2014). Typically in Europe board 
compensation is only weakly tied to corporate performance as it is publicly 
approved in shareholders’ meeting and there is less negotiation compared to 
management compensation.  Board members dissatisfied with the offered 
compensation will not be proposed to shareholders, and thus the game-
theoretic situation is simple: take it or leave it.  Instead of extrinsic 
motivation, directors are driven by intrinsic factors, such as reputation or 
esteem, being a part of social elite (Pepper and Gore 2012, Adams, Hermalin 
and Weisbach 2010).   After directors have been elected, direct control 
mechanisms are also few.  Audit and legal system provide some control, and 
largest shareholders may be able to control their representatives through 
direct access to board members, but fundamentally board success as 
shareholder representatives is assessed in shareholder meetings where 
directors are selected and can be dismissed.  
In order to understand how shareholder interests are represented in 
corporate governance, principal-representative-delegate model draws from 
the literature on representation (Pitkin 1967, Mansbridge 2003, 2011), 
accountability (Tetlock 1983, Buchman, Tetlock and Reed 1996, Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles 2005, Tetlock et al. 2013) and disclosure (Leuz and 
Verrecchia 2000, Healy and Palelu 2001, Beyer et al. 2010).  These 
approaches are necessary building blocks for a new model of corporate 
governance, applicable to major public companies in Europe with large 
shareholder bases, consisting of varying shareholder types and being 
represented by directors with different understandings of their roles as 
representatives.  This chapter further establishes the basis why board 
disclosure can be seen as a proxy of accountability and why accountability is 
the basis of representation, leading to empirical analysis of representation 
in the following chapter.    
It is argued in this essay that by introducing theory of representation into 
corporate governance literature, together with theories of accountability, we 
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can build a more refined agency model of governance.  Standard agency 
theory does not separate between the two distinct main relationships, 
between shareholders and board, and further, between board and 
management, but rather focuses on the shareholder primacy, and how 
various actors contribute to the mythical goal of shareholder value 
maximization. Thus the approach in this essay is clearly connected to but it 
is more refined than the traditional agency theory by analyzing separately 
the two relationships, and bringing the theory of representation as a 
framework for analysis. 
 
2.1  Theory of representation 
 
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and 
hostile interests, which interest each must maintain, as an agent and 
advocate, against other agents and advocates; but Parliament is a 
deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the 
whole.  You choose a member, indeed; but when you have chosen 
him he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of Parliament. 
- Edmund Burke (1774) 
Two main streams of political (philosophical) representation are attributed 
to Thomas Burke (1729-1797) and James Madison (1751-1836), who 
respectively consider representatives as either trustees or delegates.  Burke 
sees that representatives should have independence of judgment after they 
have been elected, and distance themselves from the narrow interests of 
their own electors1.  On the other hand, Madison assumes a much closer 
relationship between electors and representatives, seeing representatives as 
delegates, representing as faithfully as possible the preferences of their 
electorate (Madison 1788).  It is easy to see that current corporate 
governance has elements of both – independent directors using their own 
judgment while directors dependent on major shareholders inherently or 
explicitly taking their reference group into consideration.  How to combine 
                                                          
1 See O’Gorman (2004) as a good summary of Burke’s political thought and ideas on 
representation 
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these two distinct roles in a board is a fundamental dilemma of 
representation in corporate governance. 
Political representation and corporate governance share the same value 
basis.  Both are based on transparency and equality (Pollak et al. 2009).  
Information disclosure enables voters and shareholders to make 
independent assessment of their representatives.  Voters and shareholders 
have equal rights of vote in electing representatives, although in governance 
one-share-one-vote principle is not universal1.  Another similarity arises 
from goal setting.  Political representation is usually seen to target “common 
good” (“the greatest possible good for the greatest possible number of 
individuals“)2, a concept resembling “maximization of shareholder value”.  
However, political process presents various alternatives to reach this goal, 
while director elections in corporate governance are seldom effectively 
contested (Aguilera 2005). 
The standard theory of representation is based on large communities, 
authorization and accountability, elements also found in widely held large 
public companies.  “The essence of representation is the delegation or 
granting of authority” (Tussman 1947, quoted in Pitkin 1967); in corporate 
governance shareholders delegate the vast majority of their powers to 
elected representatives, the board.  Moreover, theory of accountability 
considers a representative someone who is to be held accountable to another 
for what he does (Pitkin 1967, p. 35).  Representative accountability differs 
from agency theory in one critical aspect:  in agency, accountability is based 
on contract, while in representation its basis is election. Management 
accountability is assessed by a defined group of people (board) and can lead 
to dismissal at any moment, while representative accountability in normal 
circumstances allows shareholders to change directors only at pre-
determined intervals. 
Pitkin (1967) classifies four different types of representation, symbolic, 
formalistic, descriptive and substantive.  All four types can be found also in 
corporate governance.  Lorsch and McIver (1989) called directors as pawns 
– boards being at the mercy of management, unable to influence even 
                                                          
1 Universal suffrage is also a quite recent invention, as voting has been restricted by wealth, 
gender or race for most of the period of human representative democracy. 
2 This quote is normally attributed to Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), although the idea can be 
found in antique political philosophy 
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material decisions and thus providing only a symbol of representation.  
Boards being a universal phenomenon in corporate governance, symbolic 
representation can be seen as the minimum level of representation.  
However, it provides shareholders with few tools to ensure proper 
representation of their interests.  Hard and soft law1 are the basis for 
formalistic representation, where accountability is seen through legal 
liability, representatives acting as delegates of shareholders, controlling that 
management acts in line with rules and regulations, but formal 
representation does not ensure that directors would have a major influence 
on the business.  In formalistic representation, shareholders are able to 
observe that decisions are correctly made, but responsibility for outcomes 
lies firmly with the management.  Descriptive representation is directly 
related to elections.  Shareholders can choose directors that are known to 
reflect their preferences, although requirements for gender or minority 
representation can also be considered as descriptive representation.  
Electing directors which resemble shareholders should provide a reasonable 
proxy for interest alignment, directors acting in line with their electors’ 
preferences.  The last of Pitkin’s types is substantive representation, such as 
a regulatory requirement of having financial expert in board audit 
committee.  In essence, board consisting of directors with a variety of skill 
sets is based on substantive representation, each providing something other 
board members or top management may be lacking. 
An alternative view to Pitkin’s now classical definition is provided by 
Mansbridge (2003, 2011), who sees modern societies having promissory, 
anticipatory, gyroscopic and surrogate representation.   Promissory 
representation is similar to formalistic model; a key task of board as 
representatives is to ensure that company is being managed in line with laws, 
regulations and corporate documents.  This legalistic view highlights the 
controlling role of board on behalf of its decision role.  Anticipatory 
representation is related to re-elections of representatives, how directors can 
influence their future electability through disclosure of their role in 
corporate governance.  Shareholder choice is dependent on information 
available on the quality of their representation and thus directors act as they 
                                                          
1  Hard law consists of e.g. corporate and securities market laws, while soft law consists of 
binding recommendations such as corporate governance codes.   See e.g. Enriques, 
Hansmann and Kraakman (2009) on discussion of hard and soft law in corporate  governance 
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believe shareholders expect them to act.  In case directors dynamically adjust 
their acts in line with the evolution of events1 Mansbridge talks about 
gyroscopic representation. This concept is an evolutionary version of Burke’s 
independent judgment, representatives acting on their own beliefs and 
principles, although gyroscopic representation assumes changing 
preferences rather than stable principles.    In surrogate representation, 
directors attempt to express interests of large groups of shareholders, not 
only their own immediate reference group.  Surrogates act as if those 
represented were present, a model resembling Madison’s archetype of 
representation.  It needs to be noted that these four types of representation 
are not exclusive of each other, and applied to corporate governance, boards 
consists of directors with varied understandings of their representative 
roles, hiding differences behind a unitary image of representation. 
We need to add one more type of representation to cover the important 
difference between political and corporate representation, the changing 
nature of caucus, possibility of entering and exiting shareholder base.  In line 
with analysis of electorate (Pollak et al. 2009), three different types of 
owners can be identified, traders who come and go between board elections, 
passive owners who sit and hold but do not vote, and active owners who wish 
to influence the real decisions in a company and participate in election 
process of representatives.  These three have very different implications for 
representation and accountability.  Traders and other buying and selling 
shareholders as principals do not really correspond either to Pitkin’s or 
Mansbridge’s categorization, but rather to marketplace representation 
(Arnold 1993), exerting power on companies and their governing bodies 
through their impact on share prices.   For passive shareholders 
representation is primarily symbolic, as they do not wish to influence the 
way their representatives act.  On the other hand, active shareholders can 
further be split into ones with formal and real power (Aghion and Tirole 
                                                          
1Quoting Mansbridge (2011): “In this model of representation, voters select representatives 
who can be expected to act in ways the voter approves without external incentives. The 
representatives act like gyroscopes, rotating on their own axes, maintaining a certain 
direction, pursuing certain built-in (although not fully immutable) goals. As in the other new 
models of representation introduced here, these representatives are not accountable to their 
electors in the traditional sense. In this case, the representatives act only for “internal” 
reasons. Their accountability is only to their own beliefs and principles.” 
 
 
 131 
1997).  I contend that a fundamental shareholder right is to participate and 
vote in general meetings, but for most owners, this is a formal right with little 
real power, corresponding to symbolic representation.  Large shareholders 
have real power, having the ability to influence the selection of candidates as 
well as election thereof.    It is very unusual that shareholders’ meetings are 
given a choice between several board candidates, so real power of 
representative selection takes place outside the actual meeting (Aguilera 
2005).  The process of electing shareholder representatives has received 
little academic attention, and it is not well understood1.  What actually 
happens in back-room negotiations is another black box of corporate 
governance. 
Representation is not a unidirectional relationship from shareholder to 
directors, it also requires a feedback loop of accountability.  Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles (2005) argue that agency-theoretic arguments’ 
dominance on governance debate does not sufficiently consider the practical 
challenges boards encounter in creating and sustaining accountability, 
calling for more understanding on governance relationship between boards 
and investors, focusing on accountability.  Roberts, McNulty and Stiles 
(2005) further differentiate between remote and face-to-face accountability, 
effectively describing two prime appearances of representation.  Board has 
remote accountability towards distant shareholders, without direct access to 
board members.  Public disclosure is a means for remote accountability, 
giving the impetus to shareholders for determining how to vote with their 
shares.  On the other hand, boards have face-to-face accountability towards 
major shareholders, who have access to board members, and which are 
consulted on the choice of candidates for election in shareholders’ meeting. 
Accountability as a concept is well analyzed in behavioral decision-making 
theories.  Tetlock et al. (2013) separate ex ante process accountability from 
ex post outcome accountability.  In corporate governance, disclosure of rules 
                                                          
1 In political science, empirical research has shown that most voters do not have clear 
preferences nor deep knowledge, highlighting the information gap between principals and 
representatives in governance.  Electoral decisions are based on identity, common interests 
or expertise (Pollak et al. 2009).   Although shareholder meetings practically never lead to 
changes in proposed directors (Bebchuck 2005, Cai Garner Walkling 2009), election results as 
such can impact governance and even corporate outcomes.  Ertimur, Ferri and Oesch (2015) 
find that shareholder votes influence governance, even if they are defeated.  Fischer et al. 
(2009) find a relationship between low board approval in shareholder elections and CEO and 
board turnover, improved acquisition and divesture performance. 
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and responsibilities is a means to communicate process accountability, while 
financial results are the basis of outcome accountability.  As Tetlock et al. 
note, neither of the two types is pure, and in practice accountability consists 
of both process and outcome elements.  Buchman, Tetlock and Reed (1996) 
define different strategies of accountability1, two of which are closely related 
to theory of representation.  Alike Madisson’s representation, Buchman 
Tetlock and Reed define acceptability heuristics as a process where 
representatives choose a path of least resistance, mimicking the views of 
“important others”.  Important others can be understood as large clearly 
identifiable shareholders in corporate governance.  On the other hand, 
resembling Burke’s independent judgment, “vigilant information 
processing” representatives do not know the views of those being 
represented, and thus act on independent judgment, leading to a more 
careful process of decision-making.  More generally, Tetlock (1983) argues 
that already awareness of being accountable impacts decision-making, 
accountability being a powerful motivating factor.  It improves the quality of 
thought processes, contributing to better decision-making (Tetlock et al. 
2013), although it does not guarantee that the decisions themselves would 
be better.   Even though accountability researchers have not explicitly 
investigated boards, it is evident that representation without accountability 
in corporate governance is virtually impossible. 
Although primary focus of this paper is on representation, relationship 
between board and shareholders, it is useful to discuss briefly the 
relationship of delegation and accountability. Literature starting from 
Holmström (1984) analyzes delegation in a simple owner-manager agency 
setting.  Aghion and Tirole (1997) contribute to it by arguing that 
information gap is essential in defining optimal delegation, while Harris and 
Raviv (2010) question if enhanced control of decision rights actually leads 
shareholders better off.   However, principal-representative-delegate model 
is more complex, as there are two levels of delegation, an extensive general 
delegation from shareholders to board and a more detailed delegation of 
decision rights from board to management.   The extent of delegation is 
dependent on level of materiality, shareholder powers being quite formal, 
being documented in Articles of Association, while directors can quite freely 
choose their level of involvement through definition of matters that are 
                                                          
1 Buchman, Tetlock and Reed call their approach “Social contingency model” 
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reserved to board.  Board has both process accountability for optimal 
delegation of decision rights and outcome accountability for their economic 
results, disregarding if decisions were made in the board or not.    Assessing 
determination of of delegation rights is outside the scope of this paper, 
although the question itself is important1.    For example, Graham, Harvey 
and Puri (2014) study decision-making authority within a firm, focusing on 
CEO’s delegation of decision rights to lower levels of organization and find 
that delegation is more likely if a firm is complex, that reputation of 
divisional managers impacts the amount of delegation and that decisions 
external to the firm (mergers and acquisitions) are less likely to be 
delegated2.  Similar questions should be asked on what and why board 
delegates to management.  
Representation is a general way of organizing expression of interest for any 
large community.  Large, widely held companies have numerous 
shareholders, and the number of interested parties is even larger, as agent 
owners 3 themselves represent a wide variety of beneficiaries, such as current 
and future pensioners and citizens of nation states.  Dualistic agency model 
is based on a simplified model of representation, where no independent 
body with delegated powers exists.   Principal-representative-delegate model 
asks the questions of representation, accountability and delegation in 
addition to motivation and control.   Representation theory provides us with 
well-established concepts adaptable to corporate governance, such as 
symbolic, formal, substantive and descriptive representation, or 
marketplace representation, process and outcome accountability and 
remote and face-to-face accountability.  Accountability provides a feedback 
loop necessary for effective representation, and disclosure, to which we turn 
next, is the primary way of communicating it. 
 
 
                                                          
1 This question is discussed in detail in the third essay of this dissertation, “Power and 
decision control” 
2 M&A decisions, based on the empirical data of this study are normally board decisions  
3 This distinction is important, as agent owners, such as state or institutional investors may 
have a large ownership share, but being themselves representatives of their ultimate 
beneficiaries, their disclosure needs arise from their own accountability 
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2.2 Disclosure 
 
Gibbins et al. (1990) defined disclosure as “any deliberate release of financial 
information, whether numerical or qualitative, required or voluntary, or via 
formal or informal channels”, urging for researchers to analyze the extent 
and determinants of voluntary disclosure.  Beginning with general theory of 
disclosure, this chapter reviews the rationale, process, costs and relevance of 
disclosure, including behavioral aspects and motivation thereof, in order to 
establish the link between disclosure, accountability and representation.   
The main empirical hypotheses driven from this analysis are that the amount 
of disclosure is positively related to remote accountability and negatively to 
face-to-face accountability, remote accountability expressing symbolic and 
formalistic representation, while face-to-face accountability is closer to 
descriptive and substantive representation.   These hypotheses also test if 
and when representatives act as trustee and if and when as delegates. 
A large literature investigates corporate disclosure.  Excellent summaries are 
provided by Healy & Palepu (2001), Leuz and Wyzocki (2008) and Beyer et 
al. (2010).   However, there seems to be no research specifically focusing on 
board disclosure, even though there is plenty of relevant material available.  
Board disclosure can be defined as public information on the characteristics, 
policies and acts of boards of directors, usually either in form of special 
sections in annual reports, as stand-alone governance disclosures, as 
additional information on websites or in US circumstances, in proxy 
statements.  Neither recent reviews on board literature (e.g. Adams, 
Hermalin and Weisbach 2010), nor reviews on disclosure literature (e.g. 
Beyer et al. 2010) include any references to studies that would specifically 
focus on this issue.  The reasons may be manyfold.  Board disclosure may be 
considered irrelevant to shareholders, having limited impact on company 
value, disclosure may be seen only as a necessary evil, or  researchers may 
simply not have had access to suitable information.1  However, authorities 
                                                          
1 It is interesting to compare disclosure of private entities to public institutions.  
Accountability requires wide discovery rights for citizens, and even boards of central banks 
have begun to publish their detailed meeting minutes, providing more information to the 
markets to reduce uncertainty regarding their action.  Societal benefits of disclosure are 
considered superior to its consequential costs. 
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seem to considier extensive board-related disclore relevant, as it is a 
common requirement in European regulation1.   
Several studies investigate the relationship between corporate governance 
and corporate disclosure.  Generally, these studies find a positive link 
between indicators of good governance and disclosure (Ernstberger and 
Gruning 2013).  In these studies, disclosure is defined as an index of 
published information (e.g. Eng and Mak 2003, Chen and Jaggi 2000) or as 
a specific act, such as management compensation (e.g. Laskmana 2008) or 
quality of financial forecasts (e.g. Ajinkya et al. 2005 and Karamou and 
Vafeas 2005).  Recently, there have even been attempts to use computerized 
textual analysis in order to overcome the oversimplification inherent in 
calculated indexes of disclosure (Ernstberger and Gruning 2013).  Reduction 
of information asymmetries is seen as the primary motivation of disclosure 
(Leuz and Verrecchia 2000) as it should lead to lower cost of capital, 
typically proxied by buy/sell spreads and liquidity of shares in the market.   
There are two types of disclosure: mandatory and voluntary.  Standard 
theory of disclosure argues that mandatory disclosure is motivated by 
economies of scale, agency costs and real and financial externalities, while 
voluntary disclosure is motivated by adverse selection, information 
asymmetry and risk premium (Beyer et al. 2010, Holmström 1979).  
Elements of standard theory can also be found in board disclosure.  It can be 
value-relevant as it signals investors that their representatives are “in 
charge”, reducing the risk of management not respecting shareholder 
interests.  Without disclosure of information on latent powers of the board, 
investors may not be able to determine the depth and width2 of their 
representation, which could lead to adverse selection because of risk 
avoidance bias.  Similarly, in agency terms, Lombardo and Pagano (2002) 
argue that better disclosure reduces monitoring costs as investors need less 
                                                          
1 A typical example is item 35 of Austrian Corporate Governance code (2012):”The supervisory 
board shall adopt internal rules of procedure for its work, which shall contain stipulate 
ions regarding the disclosure and reporting obligations of the management board, including 
subsidiaries, unless these obligations are defined in articles of incorporation or the internal 
rules of procedure of the management board. Furthermore, the internal rules of procedure 
shall define the establishment of committees and their scope of competence. The sections of 
the internal rules of procedure concerning these areas are to be disclosed on the website of 
the company. The number and type of committees set up and their decision-making scope of 
competence are to be disclosed in the Corporate Governance Report”. 
2 Depth defined as the threshold of decision limits and width as the range of matters specified 
to be under board decision control. 
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effort to verify basis of their assessment of investment choices.  Board rules, 
in fact, establish a second level of corporate disclosure that is more extensive 
than the information provided to shareholders and thus creates economies 
of scale in monitoring on behalf of shareholders. However, even if several 
elements of standard theory can be found in board disclosure, principal-
representative-delegate model argues that standard model is incomplete, as 
it primarily focuses on the relationship between management and 
shareholders, bypassing the elements of representation and accountability, 
the relationship between board and shareholders.   
Disclosure and accountability have a temporal dimension important for 
representation.  In line with Tetlock et al’s (2013) concepts of process and 
outcome accountability, Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) differentiate between 
ex ante and ex post disclosure, and argue that ex ante commitment increases 
investor trust, disregarding if information is pleasant or not.  Disclosure of 
board rules is ex ante information and creates process accountability, being 
a commitment from the board to act on matters it considers material.    
Roberts (2009) argues that transparency is “a mechanism of accountability”, 
specifically for “distant others”, a concept related to remote accountability.   
Transparency reduces the danger of collusion behind the doors, large 
shareholders using face-to-face accountability to influence corporate 
decision-making without consideration for the interests of distant 
shareholders.  Ex ante process disclosure may thus provide protection from 
informal power relationships, invisible in formal representation. 
Board disclosure is an endogenous process, and its motivation may also arise 
from matters internal to the board.  Pepper & Gore, (2012) stress the 
behavioral aspects of governance, and argue that intrinsic motivation can be 
more influential as board motivator than extrinsic financial motivation.  
Through disclosure, boards may signal to shareholders that a properly 
organized decision control process evidences a good representation of their 
interests, and thus increases reputational capital of directors.  Additionally, 
part of the motivation for board disclosure may be due to anticipatory 
representation, signaling capabilities of board members, improving their 
chances of being re-elected or being elected to other boards (Reeb and Zhao 
2013).  Thus board disclosure may have externalities, similarly to what Beyer 
at al. (2010) call real externalities, disclosure impacts decisions by third 
parties, electors of boards in other companies. 
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In addition to benefits, disclosure also has costs.  Verrecchia (1983) splits 
such costs into direct and consequential expenses, first being the costs of 
preparation and distribution of information and the second consists of 
potential costs of disclosing sensitive propriety information.  Public 
disclosure may lead to harmful outcomes for a company due to product 
market competition, and disclosure of board rules may include essential 
strategic information useful also for competitors.   Consequential losses from 
weak disclosure appear not only in market-based outcomes, but also in real 
decisions.  In line with basic investment theory, higher cost of capital as an 
outcome of weak disclosure reduces the number of “good” investment 
projects available to a company and thus has real effects not only for the 
company but to the economy as a whole (Admati & Pfeiderer, 2000).  
Similarly, disclosure of board limits of delegated authority may impact real 
future cash flows.   Disclosure creates accountability and a requirement for 
the board to act.  In case the range of issues subject to board control is too 
wide, or if the level of materiality is set too high, both may lead to non-
optimal decision-making, creating losses to shareholders (see Harris and 
Raviv 2010). 
Disclosure is an essential element of representation.  Principal-
representative-delegate model of governance argues that representation 
creates a need for accountability, and accountability would be impossible 
without disclosure.  Ex ante disclosure of board rules creates process 
accountability and ex post financial reporting outcome accountability.  
Public disclosure is a means of remote accountability, only the very largest 
shareholders benefiting from face-to-face accountability. The following 
empirical analysis investigates the link between disclosure, accountability 
and various forms of representation 
 
3. Analysis and results 
 
In order to analyze the relationship between board and shareholders 
through the principal-representative-delegate framework, an empirical 
model is built where disclosure of accountability is used as a proxy of 
representation.  The dependent variable (A_INDEX) is a proxy for board 
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accountability towards shareholders, built from board disclosure by 
calculating the number of specific decisions that require board approval.  
Logic of the model is the following:  representation is based on election, and 
shareholders must assess board candidates in order to provide their votes.  
There are two types of board candidates, ones who wish to continue in their 
current role, and on whom shareholders have past experience, and others 
who are new, and on whom shareholders have no experience within their 
company1.  Assessment can be based either on process accountability, where 
directors have shown past ability to create an organized structure capable of 
decision-making, or on outcome accountability, where company 
performance can be seen as a proof of not only management but also director 
quality.  In order to gain information on director capabilities, primary 
method of assessment is through disclosure, as very few shareholders have 
direct links to board members.  Financial disclosure provides information 
on outcome accountability, but it is difficult to separate the influence of 
organizational decision management from board decision control.    
However, disclosure of board’s role in decision control is directly related to 
board’s own process accountability.   The extent of disclosure provides 
evidence on how widely boards understand their representative role; the 
basic assumption is that the more remote the shareholders are, the more 
accountability is based on board disclosure while dominant shareholders 
have the possibility to observe director performance through personal 
contacts and they need less disclosure.  It is also assumed that owners which 
themselves represent a large number of ultimate beneficiaries require 
disclosure as a proof of their own accountability.  Such agent owners include 
not only institutional investors but e.g. states representing the interests of 
citizens.  This leads to the first hypothesis: 
                                                          
1 If we see directorship as a specific skill, both shareholders and board recruitment 
consultants can assess director quality through board disclosure.  Dominant shareholders may 
use their personal knowledge of director performance for selecting directors for other 
companies, although in the sample material of 600 largest European companies by market 
capitalization, interlocking dominant shareholders do not exist.  Interestingly, though, in 76 of 
the widely held companies in the sample, BlackRock is the largest single shareholder, holding 
usually less than 10 % of the voting stock.  The influence of such large agent owners on board 
selection would be worth a separate study.  
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H1: In the case largest shareholders are agent owners, board disclosure is 
more extensive than in cases where dominant shareholders can be 
clearly identified.   
In the first case, representation is based on what Roberts, McNulty and Stiles 
(2005) call remote accountability, while in the second case, directors have 
face-to-face accountability.  This distinction is related to horizontal agency 
problem (Shliefer and Vishny 1997, Roe 2004), which sees the relationship 
between dominant and minority shareholders as the second main agency 
problem in governance, dominant shareholders driving corporate decision-
making to their own benefit.  However, the situation is more complex, as a 
board has several members with potentially different views and interests, 
and ownership dominance must pass through board decision control in 
order to influence actual corporate decision-making.  In line with classical 
agency theory, Schliefer and Vishny (1997) assume a direct link between 
owners and management, but their analysis does not consider the structure 
through which the dilemma arises, and more specifically, how board with 
broad powers and an independent role influences the problem through its 
understanding of representation.    Thus representation provides us with 
additional understanding of the horizontal agency problem, and it may also 
provide us with insights how to further improve corporate governance. 
Assessing the first hypothesis against past literature, previous results need 
to be treated with caution, as it seems that there is no research specifically 
investigating board disclosure.   Disclosure is usually seen as a managerial 
exercise, in line with agency theory, although board retains the ultimate 
responsibility for all corporate disclosure.  There are conflicting results 
regarding the relationship between ownership and disclosure.  Eng and Mak 
(2003) argue that the more diffuse the ownership the more monitoring is 
needed, implying a negative relationship between ownership concentration 
and disclosure. Similarly, Ajinkya et al. (2005) find that concentrated 
institutional ownership leads to reduced disclosure, as large owners are able 
to extract information from companies directly from its directors and 
management.  On the other hand, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find that 
institutional ownership improves forward guidance, which may be a specific 
part of disclosure related to professionalism of such investors.  The 
relationship may also be inverse, as Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999) 
observe that companies with good disclosure attract institutional investors.   
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Similarly, Healy Hutton and Palepu (1999) and  Bushee and Noe (2000) 
report that increases in disclosures are associated with an increase in 
institutional investors ownership, possibly because of the pressure they 
exert on managers. While plenty of literature focuses on institutional 
ownership and disclosure, past research leaves vague if ownership type and 
ownership concentration are conceptually two different phenomena.  Eng 
and Mak (2003) find a positive relationship between government ownership 
and disclosure,   which may be due to the inherently transparent nature of 
public bodies.  Fan and Wong (2002) report on East Asian data that 
controlling owners are perceived to report accounting information for self-
interested purposes, causing the reported earnings to lose credibility to 
outside investors. Additionally they find that concentrated ownership is 
associated with low earnings informativeness as ownership concentration 
prevents leakage of proprietary information about firms’ rent-seeking 
activities.  
Based on agency theory, we should find a negative relationship between 
ownership concentration and disclosure, as ownership should provide 
dominant shareholders with a higher voice through their representatives in 
the board, and as economic outcomes increasingly belong to them, they need 
less open accountability.  However, we could also assume a reverse 
relationship based on regulation.  It is a common requirement in European 
corporate governance that a majority of directors should be independent of 
both large shareholders as well as of management, even if majority of votes 
is controlled by a single shareholder.  Thus board disclosure might also 
provide signal information of proper governance structures, board decision 
control mitigating potential horizontal agency problems.  If control of 
management decisions is firmly in the hands of a collegium of directors, it 
reduces the potential misbehavior by large shareholders.    As these 
assumptions lead to different conclusions, no assumption is made of the 
direction of relationship between ownership concentration and board 
disclosure 
H2: Ownership concentration has no association with disclosure of 
accountability  
A second subject related to representation, and discussed in the disclosure 
and governance literature, is the relevance of board characteristics as a 
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determinant of corporate disclosure.   Boards can make only one disclosure 
decision, and it is evident that the structure of a board has influence on such 
decision.  Analyzing general voluntary disclosure, Wang and Hussainey 
(2013) find that corporate disclosure is driven by directors’ ownership, 
board size, board composition and duality of Chief Executive Officer’s and 
Chairman of the Board’s role, concluding that better governance improves 
disclosure quality.  Independence is considered to be the most important 
board characteristic impacting its behavior. Ajinkya et al. (2005) and 
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) find a positive relationship between quality 
of earnings forecasts and board independence.  Seamer (2014) finds 
evidence that disclosure failure is less likely if the proportion of independent 
directors is higher. In a meta-analysis of 27 relevant empirical studies, 
Garcıa-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2010) report that board independence 
is positively related to voluntary disclosure.  Eng and Mak (2003) come into 
contrasting conclusion concluding that independence reduces voluntary 
disclosure, which may be due to country-specific factors on their data on 
Singapore companies. Armstrong, Core and Guay (2014) investigate the 
direction of causality, and they report that increase in share of independent 
directors results in generally better corporate transparency. Lim, Matolcsy 
and Chow (2007) separate different types of voluntary information in their 
analysis.  They find that disclosure of historical financial information is not 
related to board characteristics, but boards dominated by independent 
directors voluntarily disclose more forward-looking quantitative and 
strategic information, which would support the assumption that 
independence is associated with better disclosure of board rules.   However, 
motivation for disclosure may also arise from intrinsic motivation and 
director market considerations.  Lim, Matolcsy and Chow (2007) further 
argue that voluntary disclosure signals to the director market that members 
of the board are fulfilling their duties.  Bushman et al. (2004) find that 
ownership concentration and outside directors’ reputations vary inversely 
with disclosure quality.  Stein (1989) observes high ability directors are more 
willing to have open disclosure than lower ability directors.   Thus board 
disclosure may not only be connected to representation, but it may be a way 
for independent directors to communicate their abilities to director market, 
improving their ability to be re-elected or elected to other boards.  In 
contrast, non-independent directors have no similar need for extended 
disclosure, as their election is dependent on large shareholders.  Thus we 
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should be able to observe a positive relationship between proportion of 
independent directors and board disclosure: 
H3: Proportion of independent directors is positively associated with 
board disclosure 
Board disclosure may also be related to other board-specific factors, which 
also will be included in the empirical model. Literature generally assumes 
that CEO/COB duality reduces board independence (Fama and Jensen 1983, 
Wang and Hussainey 2013) and thus may negatively impact voluntary 
disclosure.  Seamer (2014) finds empirical support to this argument, 
concluding that that separation of CEO and COB roles improves disclosure 
quality. Another similar variable is board size, which often is connected with 
monitoring, although with conflicting assumptions.  For example, Jensen 
(1993) argues that smaller boards are more effective in controlling the 
management, while Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) consider that board 
size increases its knowledge base and balances its workload.  Following 
Laksmana (2008), this study assumes non-directional relationship between 
board size and board disclosure.  On the other hand, Laksmana (2008) finds 
that less time spent on board meetings leads to lower transparency, and 
increased accountability should result in a more frequent communication 
between the board and management.  Duality of leadership and board 
activity, proxied by the number of meetings held, are thus included in the 
model as additional board-related independent variables. 
We cannot exclude an assumption that board disclosure is linked to firm-
specific factors.    Several studies (e.g. Lim, Matolcsy and Chow 2007, Eng 
and Mak 2003, Laksmana 2008, Ajinkya et al. 2005 and Karamanou and 
Vafeas 2005) find that firm size is positively related to quality of disclosure, 
which seems natural, as larger firms are more complex and they have better 
resources to report, although this may also be explained by representation, 
as larger firms normally have more shareholders and the need to 
communicate effectively is higher. A common proxy for firm size is log of 
assets (see e.g. Lim, Matolcsy and Chow 2007) which is somewhat 
problematic due to differences in industries, specifically regarding 
companies from financial sectors.  
Two institutional variables are included in the model as control variables.  
Although all companies in the sample originate from European Economic 
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Area 1 and have a very similar regulatory environment, there may also be 
country-specific cultural differences.  This approach is strongly supported 
by the research on legal origin (LaPorta et al. 2008).  However, instead of 
using histories of legal systems as a proxy, considering compulsory EU rules 
such as Transparency directive 2004/109/EC, (revised in 2013/50/EU), this 
paper assumes that institutional environment for disclosure is harmonized 
and if there are country differences in disclosure, they can better be 
explained by cultural factors rather than country dummies.  Thus Hofstede 
indicator of power distance is used as a simplified proxy for country effects 
as out of his six indicators it is most closely related to how decision control 
is divided between corporate bodies2.  It gives highest scores to Latin 
countries (such as France, Spain and Italy), which also provide most 
information on board rules (table 1).    In addition, dummy factors for 
industry are tested, as the industry in which company operates may also 
influence disclosure (see Cai et al. 2014) reflecting “follow thy neighbor” 
practice (Elzahar and Hussainey 2012).   
Thus, the following model is estimated: 
ܣ̴ܫܰܦܧܺ ൌ ߚ ൅ݔଵܱܹܰܧܴܵܪܫܲ ൅ݔଶܤܱܣܴܦܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ ൅
ݔଷܤܱܣܴܦܣܥܶܫܸܫܻܶ ൅ݔସܵܫܼܧ + ݔହܥܷܮܷܴܶܧ ൅ ݔ଺ܫܰܦܷܴܻܵܶ ൅ߤ  
 
where dependent variable (A_INDEX) is calculated as a total number of 
specific decisions that require board approval3.  Specificity is defined as a 
numeric limit that enforces submission of decision to board decision control, 
such as “all investments larger than 100 MEUR must be decided by the 
board”.  Specific limits are seen as a reasonable proxy of accountability, 
while “all material investments are subject to board approval” –type of rules 
leave accountability vague.  This does not mean that no-disclosure boards 
would not have any decision limits, but without disclosure there is no 
evidence of process accountability available to shareholders.  In addition, as 
                                                          
1 Only Switzerland and Norway are not direct members of European Union, but EEA 
agreement provides them the same rights and responsibilities for free movement of goods, 
people and capital as any EU member state has.  The agreement also requires EEA members 
to implement EU directives regulating financial markets 
2 Other five Hofstede indicators are individualism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, 
indulgence and long term orientation.  See http://geert.hofstede.con/national-culture.html 
3 Index calculation includes one extra point for disclosure of board rules, disregarding if they 
consist limits of authority or not. 
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most of other key items in board rules are virtually identical (selection of top 
management, strategy, regulatory control), voluntary information on 
powers retained by boards provides distinct information on board 
accountability.    Eng and Mak (2003) calculate the number of disclosed 
items as a proxy of quality of disclosure although such an index is somewhat 
problematic, as it does not differentiate between more and less important 
matters.  However, giving equal weighting to all limits of decision control 
can be supported by assuming that boards define materiality consistently, 
each limit being equally relevant for representation of shareholder interests.  
Board rules show various characteristics.  385 companies in the sample of 
600 largest European companies by market capitalization either disclose 
their board rules (325 companies) or provide at least one numeric limit of 
board authority (297 companies), matters that management is required to 
submit to board decision control, implying a direct accountability of 
directors for such decisions.  60 companies disclose decision limits as a part 
of their other disclosures, without providing complete board rules.  There 
are four generic types of decision limits, acquisitions and investment, 
business transactions, financial agreements and technical limits, such as tax 
or legal settlements, investment limits being most common.   Each category 
may have more than one type of decision limit, and the analysis separates 
e.g. investments from acquisitions or divestments. Maximum value for 
A_INDEX in the sample is 14, and mean, including firms with no numerical 
limits is 2,41  Table 1 presents A_INDEX by country and by industry.   
The research sample consists of unique, hand-collected information on 600 
largest European companies by market capitalization, as of 25. August 20121.   
It includes companies from 17 countries and 19 industries, providing a 
reasonable image of European corporate sector.  As Ernsberger and Gruning 
(2013) note, European companies share the same minimum level of 
disclosure, due to European Union Transparency Directive and EU’s IAS 
regulation, largely harmonizing potential national differences in 
institutional setting.  The material was collected from annual reports, 
separate governance reports or separately disclosed board rules, or in some 
cases from articles of association.  Collected material consists of information 
 
 
                                                          
1 EuroSTOXX 600 as of 25.8.2012 
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Table 1   A_INDEX by country and by industry  
 
EuroSTOXX 600 stock index divides companies into 19 different industries.  All of the companies are listed 
in countries belong to European Economic Area, which all are required to follow EU Transparency Directive 
(2004/109/EC, revised in 2013/109/EC).  Countries are AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, CH = Switzerland, DE 
= Germany, DK = Denmark, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, GB = Great Britain, GR = Greece, IE = 
Ireland, IT = Italy, LU = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden 
 
Industry     Country 
 AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT LU NL NO PT SE 
Automobiles & parts    0,8   0,0 3,75 2,0   4,5      
Banks 0,5 0,0 1,4 4,0 0,0 1,7 0,0 4,3 2,8 1.0 3,0 2,8   1,0 1.0 0,3 
Basic resources 0,0     1,0 0,5 5,0 2,7   0,0  0,0 5,0  0,33 
Chemicals  3,0 3,0 2,6   0,0 6,0 2,5     8,5 4,0   
Construction    6,0 0,0 0,0 0,7 0,0 2,8 0,0  3,0   1,0   1,7 
Financial services  1,0 0,0 0,0  1,0  7,5 2,7   3,0     0,0 
Food & beverages  7,0 0,8 8,0 0,0 1,0  7,3 3,8 1,0 0,0 7,0  5,6 0,0   
Healthcare  5,0 3,7 0,3 0,7 1,0 0,0 3,7 1,5  1,0   1,0   0,3 
Industrial goods and 0,0  4,1 2,2 0,0 1,7 1,2 4,5 1,7  1,0 5,8  4,8 1,0  0,1 
Insurance 0,0 4,0 2,8 0,3 0,0 4,0 0,0 3,3 1,8   10.0  4,3 0,5   
Media  1,0  0,0    2,6 3,1   3,0 5,0 1,5 0,0  2,0 
Oil & gas 0,0     2,5 0,0 2,0 0,8   8,5  3,5 0,8 5,0 0,0 
Personal & household   1,5 3,6   1,0 1,8 1,5   9,5     0,2 
Real estate 0,0 2,0 2,5 2,3    4,6 1,9     3,7   1,3 
Retail  0,5 1,5 0,0  1,0 0,0 7,7 2,8     10,0  3,0 0,0 
Technology   3,0 0,8   1,0 4,9 1,7   3,0  1,0   0,0 
Telecommunications 0,0 4,0 7,0 0,0 0,0 1,0 0,0 3,0 2,0   7,0  3,0 0,0 1,0 0,0 
Travel and leisure    0,0    5,7 3,3 1,0 0,0       
Utilities 0,0   4,5  3,2 1,0 7,3 2,3   6,8    1,0  
TOT 0,1 2,4 2,9 1,6 0,3 1,8 0,6 4,3 2,2 1,0 1,0 5,1 5,0 4,2 1,1 2,2 0,4 
N 9 14 50 67 16 28 19 82 180 3 8 30 1 32 15 5 41 
                  
                  
 
on decision limits requiring board authorization, data on ownership 
concentration, largest shareholders, information on board members and 
level of board activities.  In addition to ownership and governance data, 
financial information for the year closing between 30.12.2011 and 
30.12.2012 was collected from Orbis database.  Two research assistants 
participated in the classification process, and their coding was 
independently verified. Statistical analysis was carried out using SPSS 
statistical program. 
Companies from financial sectors (banks, financial services, insurance) are 
included in the analysis, even though they customarily are excluded due to 
differences in financial reporting structures.  Tests were run for the full 
sample (N=600) as well as restricted sample excluding banks, insurance and 
other financial companies (N=489).  Table 2 summarizes the definition and 
measurement of variables 
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Table 2   Definition and measurement of variables 
_____________________________________________________ 
Variable  Measurement  Definition
         
 
A_INDEX Board accountability index Disclosure dummy + Total 
number of disclosed limits 
having an economic value  
DOMINANCE Dominance of largest 
shareholder 
Percentage of votes held by the 
largest shareholder 
CEO_COB CEO influence All cases where Chairman of 
the Board is either current or 
past CEO  
MEETINGS Board meeting frequency Number of board meetings in 
the last financial year 
LN_BS_EUR Company size Natural logarithm of balance 
sheet total  
PCT_INDEPENDENT Board independence Number of board members 
classified independent from 
the company and from the 
main shareholders as a 
proportion of total number of 
directors 
STATE Companies where state is 
dominant owner 
Company where state is 
largest shareholder, owning 
more than 10 % of voting stock 
FAMILY Companies where a family 
of an individual is 
dominant owner 
Company where  a family is 
largest shareholder, owning 
more than 10 % of voting stock 
OTHER Companies where other 
type of clearly identifiable 
non-institutions actor is 
dominant owner 
Such owner with more than 10 
% of voting  
WIDELY_HELD Companies without a 
single dominant owner 
Any owner not belonging to 
categories State, Family or 
Other 
CULTURE Influence of cultural 
factors 
Hofstede score for power 
distance 
INDUSTRY Dummy factor for industry 
effects 
19 different industries in 
EuroSTOXX 600 
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Ordinary least square (OLS) regression was employed to examine the 
relationship between index of accountability and the explanatory variables.   
In addition, due to the large number of zero observation, analysis was 
repeated using Tobit regression, however, as the results were not materially 
different, only OLS results are presented.  In order to understand 
representation, independent variables related to ownership are most 
important.  The ownership variables are voting share of largest shareholder 
(DOMINANCE) and ownership type of dominant shareholder, owning more 
than 10 % of voting stock , and which can be either FAMILY, STATE, OTHER 
or WIDELY_HELD, where OTHER covers several types of owners with a 
single decision-making body, such as corporates, foundations, banks, 
private equity or investment companies.  Even though there seems to be no 
theoretical or empirical basis for the 10 % threshold, it is regularly used in 
literature as a threshold of defining a dominant shareholder, so for the sake 
of consistency it is also applied in this paper (See e.g. Dahya, Dimitrov, 
McConnell 2008, LaPorta et al. 2002) WIDELY_HELD is a residual 
category, including all ownership structures where there are no dominant 
owners holding more than 10 % of votes1.  Corporate governance variables 
are the proportion of independent directors in board (INDEPENDENCE), 
independence being categorized as independent of both the company as well 
as largest shareholders, duality of Chief Executive Officer’s and Chairman of 
the Board’s roles (CEO_COB), considering also cases where COB is ex CEO 
of the company, and number of meetings of the board during the latest 
financial year (MEETINGS). Control variables include size of the company, 
defined as the natural logarithm of balance sheet total converted into Euros 
at the European Central Bank Foreign Exchange rate as of annual closing 
date (LOG_BS_EUR), cultural factors (CULTURE) expressed though a 
Hofstede proxy, power distance, which is connected to authority and reflects 
the national differences thereof, and influence of industry-specific factors 
(INDUSTRY), tested through 19 dummy factors representing the 
EuroSTOXX categorization of sample companies.  
Table 3 provides statistics on A_INDEX by type of owner.  Companies with 
state as the  
 
 
                                                          
1 In few cases where the largest owner is an agent owner (institutional investor) and the 
voting share somewhat exceeds the 10 % threshold, it is still considered widely held. 
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Table 3  A_INDEX by ownership type  
 
Ownership type reflects the largest identified shareholder for sample companies.  Category Other consist of 
several other ownership types, such as other corporations (56 cases), Investment firms (44), Foundations (19), 
Banks (8) Private Equity (7), Co-operatives (3), Employees (2) and Association (1) 
 
 
A_INDEX  Largest shareholder  
      
  Family Other dominant  State Widely held Total   
      
0 57 54 10 94 215  
1 22 37 7 60 126  
2 9 5 1 24 39  
3 8 9 2 19 38  
4 5 9 10 23 47  
5 9 4 6 17 36  
6 7 6 3 12 28  
7 4 10 3 13 30  
8 4 3 2 7 16  
9 2 4 1 3 10  
10 2 2 1 4 9  
11    2 2  
12  2   2  
13    1 1  
14 1    1  
      
Average 2,18 2,34 3,46 2,38 2,41  
N 130 145 46 279 600  
      
 
dominant owner have a clearly highest accountability index value (3,46), 
second highest being with widely held companies (2,38) and the lowers with 
families as dominant owners (2,18).   
Table 4 presents the correlation between variables. Accountability index 
(A_INDEX) is positively correlated with control variable of power distance 
(ρ = 0,315).  There is a negative relationship between concentration of voting 
rights and independence (-0.353), which seems evident, dominant owners 
electing less independent directors.  Interestingly, CEO/COB duality is 
strongly correlated with CULTURE (power distance) (0,436), combination 
of power in single hands reflecting hierarchical corporate decision-making 
structures.  Correspondingly, there is a negative relationship between 
independent directors and power distance (-0.211). 
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Table 4 Correlations between variables 
  
This table reports the correlations between model variables.  Variables are defined in Table 2.  
Significance at the 5% level is denominated by *, and 1% by **. 
 
 
Dominance Family State 
Widely 
held Other Independent 
CEO 
COB Meetings Ln of BS Culture 
A Index 0,027 -0,043 0,106** -0,010 -0,013 0.047 0,074* 0,056 0,022 0,315** 
Dominance  0,450** 0,160** -0,716** 0,301** -0,353** 0,090* -0,077* 0,115** 0,101** 
Family   -0,152** -0,490** -0,297** -0,173** 0,111** -0,205** -0,074* 0,113** 
State    -0,269** -0,163** -0,067* 0.055 0.148** 0,196** 0,120** 
Widely held     -0,526** 0,340** -0,146** 0,032 -0,164** -0,174** 
Other      -0,187** 0,029 0,069* 0,141** 0,019 
Independent       -0,123** 0,080* -0,030 -0,211** 
CEO COB         0,002 0,058 0,436** 
Meetings         0,258** 0,053 
LN of BS          0,085* 
 
     
 
Table 5 reports the regression results. Models 1a and 2a include the full 
sample of 600 firms, while models 1b and 2b exclude firms from financial 
sectors.  Accountability index is regressed on ownership, board and control 
variables.   The results show that board accountability is related to type of 
dominant owner.  Family-dominated companies are negatively related to 
A_INDEX on 5 % level (model 1a and 1 b t-values -2.486 and -2.182), 
similarly to the Other category including all other types of dominant 
shareholders, although this variable reaches level of significance only on test 
1b (t = -1.759).  On the other hand, in Models 2a and 2b, replacing family 
and other dominant owners as ownership types by agent owners (state and 
widely held), the relationships reverses.  Variable State is positively related 
to accountability and significant on 10 % level with both samples (t-values of 
1.933 and 1.746).  Category Widely held is significant only with the sample 
excluding financial sector (t= 1.769).  Thus these results provide support to 
Hypothesis 1, which assumed that accountability is related to type of 
dominant owner.  In case state or institutional investors are largest owners, 
board accountability is connected with higher level of disclosure, indicating 
a relationship of remote accountability.    Correspondingly, the negative 
relationship between clearly identifiable dominant shareholders and 
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accountability index indicates a relationship of face-to-face accountability 
that leads to less transparency to the rest of the shareholder base. 
Ownership dominance, measured as the percentage of voting stock held by 
the largest shareholder is positively related to accountability index in models 
1a, 1b and 2b, with t-values significant on 5 % level (t = 2,255, 2,238 and 
1,833 respectively). 
The relationship between ownership concentration and accountability index 
is positive and significant on three out of four models (t = 2,255, t= 2,238, 
t= 1,619 and t=1,833), which is against assumption derived from agency 
theory, and can be explained by the need of directors to prove  remote 
representation and reduce risk of misrepresentation due to influence of 
dominant shareholders.  In additional tests negative but inconclusive results 
were reached for an interaction variable consisting of proportion of 
independent directors and ownership concentration, which also supports 
the interpretation of independent directors mitigating horizontal agency 
problems also through representation. 
The second set of independent variables is related to board characteristics.  
As expected, independence is positively related to accountability indexes and 
all four tests provide highly significant results (t = 2,914, t= 2,537, t= 2,861, 
t=2,522).  This indicates that independent directors are more inclined to 
communicate their accountability, which is in line with hypothesis three, as 
well as majority of literature on governance and disclosure.  From 
representation perspective, besides being connected to remote 
representation, an elevated accountability index can also be interpreted as 
improving the reputation of independent directors in the director market.   
In the case the CEO of the company had a dual role as also the Chairman, 
the relationship to accountability indexes became negative, being significant 
on all tests (t = -1,743, t= -1,667, t= -1,792, t=-1,710), indicating that the 
influence of top management in the board may reduce accountability of 
other board members.  Number of meetings had no relationship with 
disclosure index, which was against assumptions.  A potential explanation 
could be that disclosure of accountability is related to symbolic 
representation, and that there might be a disconnect between formal and 
real power of representatives. 
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Table 5  Regression results 
 
 
OLS regression results for the accountability index (A_INDEX) as the dependent variable, including financial 
sector (1a and 2a, N=600) and excluding it (1b and 2b, N=491).  Coefficient for each variable is shown with t-
statistics in parenthesis.  * denotes significance at 10 % level, ** at 5 % level and *** at 1 % level. 
 Model   
       
 (1 a) (1 b) (2 a) (2 b)  
      
Intercept -3.669 -3.968 -3.963 -4.516  
 (-1.257) (-1.289) (-1.352) (-1.456)  
Dominance 1.594** 1.843** 1.234 1.617** 
 (2.255) (2.238) (1.619) (1.833)  
Family -2.468** -0.088**    
 (-2.486) (-2.182)    
Other dominant -0.488 -0.655*    
 (-1.517) (-1.759)    
State   0.891* 0.921* 
   (1.933) (1.746)  
Widely held   0.534 0.676*  
   (1.589) (1.769)  
Independent 1.725*** 1.706** 1.694*** 1.695**  
 (2.914) (2.537) (2.861) (2.522)  
CEO_COB -0.553* -0.612* -0.569** -0.630*  
 (-1,743) (1.667) (1.792) (-1.710)  
LN_BS_EUR 0.049 0.072 0.044 0.071  
 (0.641) (0.729) (0.571) (0.765)  
Culture 0,076*** 0.077*** 0.075*** 0.076***  
 (8.369) (7.337) (8.194) (7.249)   
       
Observations 600 491 600 491   
Adjusted ܴଶ 0.127 0.125 0.125 0.125   
 
 
 
Of the control variables, culture proxied by Hofstede index of power distance 
was positively and strongly related to disclosure.  This result may be due to 
differences in reporting practices, Latin European countries having more 
detailed governance reports, which may also reflect their common civil law 
tradition (LaPorta et al. 2008).  Somewhat surprisingly, a traditional strong 
association of company size and disclosure of accountability was absent from 
all test results.  In addition, the results for various industries, which are not 
separately presented, were not statistically significant and indicate that 
there is no isomorphic reporting process (Dimaggio and Powell 1983) in 
specific industries that would lead to a common culture of accountability. 
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Overall, the models provide support to the main hypotheses on 
representation, boards being more accountable for corporate decisions in 
case of agent owners, ownership being dispersed or state being the main 
shareholders. On the other hand, board accountability index is negatively 
related to the two dominant ownership types, family and other, which can 
reflect face-to-face accountability, large shareholders having direct access to 
board members, or it may also mean that boards have less accountability in 
the presence of a dominant shareholder.  Additionally, test results for the 
link of share of independent directors and disclosure index were positive and 
significant, indicating that independent directors increase remote 
accountability towards distant shareholders.  The results can also be 
interpreted to reflect director market concerns of board members – 
transparency signals potential electors of directors’ capabilities as 
representatives of shareholders. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
This paper introduced a refined model of agency theory, seeing corporate 
governance as a triangle, and where board has a distinct but interrelated 
role.  This model was called principal-representative-delegate model of 
governance, and it combined theory of representation arising from political 
theory with theories of accountability and delegation having their 
foundation in various fields of economic studies.   
In order to investigate if the PRD model would provide additional insights 
to corporate governance, the empirical part of this paper investigated the 
relationship between board and shareholders, using disclosure as a lens of 
analyzing if and when board acts as trustee and when as delegate of 
shareholders.  It was assumed that if a company had a clearly identifiable 
dominant shareholder, the level of disclosure would be reduced, 
demonstrating face-to-face accountability towards such dominant 
shareholder, and indicating characteristics of a role of delegate, i.e. directors 
acting in the interests of largest shareholders rather than building their 
support from accountability to shareholder base as a whole.  Such a situation 
would also support the classical horizontal agency problem, large 
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shareholders influencing corporate decision-making through a close 
relationship with the board.  On the other hand, in situations where either 
there was no dominant shareholder or if state as an agent owner was the 
largest owner, board disclosure was more extensive, indicating a role of 
trustee rather than a delegate, and showing what accountability theorists call 
remote accountability, accountability arising from disclosure to distant 
shareholders with little direct contact with board members. 
Besides ownership characteristics, board independence was also related to 
amount of disclosure.  This was interpreted to indicate directors’ own 
motivation to market their skills in the director market, not only to the 
company they are currently serving but also to other potential electorates in 
other companies. 
From theory perspective, this analysis showed the strength of representation 
theory in analyzing corporate governance, seeing governance in large 
publicly held companies as a subset of a larger societal issue, how the 
interests of a large number of ultimate beneficiaries are channeled into a 
single decision-making organization capable of action.  It was shown that the 
postulates of agency theory do not fit well into understanding board 
motivation, and thus an alternative approach better suitable for board 
analysis was introduced.  Theory of representation provides a novel 
approach to board study, complementing not only agency theory but 
showing that alternative approaches, such as stewardship theory or resource 
dependency theory can be seen as variations of the more general problem of 
representation.  Stewardship theory of management has usually been 
presented as an alternative dualistic model to agency theory, assuming that 
top management can have organizational, collective motivation to act in the 
interests of others rather than the purely self-interest model of an agent 
(Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson 1997), or in the case of boards, 
stewardship theory sees trust as the principal concept for board behavior 
(Huse 2007), which closely resembles the role of trustee described above.  
One of the four types of representation for Pitkin (1967) was substantive 
representation, where representatives are chosen for their substantive 
qualities appreciated by their electors, a concept similar to the basic idea of 
resource dependency, boards providing skills companies otherwise might be 
lacking (Huse 2007).  Thus it can be concluded, that by demonstrating the 
applicability of theory of representation to corporate governance, we can 
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bring a novel and potentially more comprehensive approach to 
understanding the distinct relationship between board and shareholders in 
the governance triangle. 
 
5.   Summary 
 
This paper started with the argument that the traditional principal-agent 
model requires additional insights in order to understand corporate 
governance, at least in large publicly listed companies in Europe.  It was 
argued that the relationship between board and shareholders does not 
correspond to the two main characteristics of agency relationship, incentives 
and control, and a new principal-representative-delegate model was 
proposed as an addition to classical agency theory.  This paper does not 
argue that principal-representative-delegate model would be a global model 
of governance, rather it fits situations where a very large number of 
beneficiaries are represented by elected few, who are granted extensive 
powers to act on shareholders’ and indirect beneficiaries’ behalf.  Such a 
complementary approach is supported by theoretical work by Aguilera et al. 
(2008), who argue that governance solutions are contingent to situation-
specific factors, and that one size does not fit all.   
Representation theory sees trustee and delegate as the two basic forms of 
representation.  In the first, representatives (board of directors) act on their 
own judgment as trustees, distancing themselves from shareholders after 
they have been elected, while in the second, boards more truly attempt to 
reflect the opinions of their electors, acting as delegates.  In order to analyze 
the nature of representation, it was concluded that representation requires 
accountability, and a proxy of accountability was created from disclosure of 
matters under board decision control.  It was further assumed that clearly 
identifiable dominant owners have less need for disclosure of board 
accountability than institutional or public sector shareholders.  Considering 
the intrinsic motivation of board members, director independence was 
found to be related to disclosure of accountability, which could be explained 
by director market considerations. 
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Empirical tests based on disclosure of board rules in 600 largest European 
companies by market capitalization provided support to the two main sets 
of hypotheses.  Representation in companies with clearly identifiable 
dominant shareholders was seen related to face-to-face accountability, 
reducing the relationship between directors and minority shareholders to 
symbolic or formalistic representation. On the other hand, representation in 
widely held companies or firms with agent owners as largest shareholders is 
more transparent, and although higher disclosure can be connected to 
remote representation, directors can be seen better accountable to the whole 
shareholder base. 
The second main result was the positive relationship between director 
independence and board disclosure.  This can have two complementing 
explanations.  Independent directors may act as Burkean representatives of 
the whole shareholder base, and disclosure reflects process accountability 
and independent judgment.  On the other hand, the link between 
independence and disclosure may also reflect director market concerns, 
process accountability conveying abilities of independent directors and 
improving their chances of being re-elected or elected to other boards. 
Disclosure of board rules is not a panacea for all ills.  There are several 
caveats; disclosure of board rules may create only symbolic representation 
(Pitkin 1967) by presenting a comfortable image or well-structured 
hierarchy of decision-making (Roberts 1991).  Formal structures may not 
have real impact, and process accountability may have no relationship to 
outcome accountability as real power may be separate from formal power.   
The practical relevance of this paper arises from accountability of directors.  
Principal-representative-delegate model is relevant to how directors are 
elected.  Current ways of electing corporate representatives; back-room 
negotiations leading to proposal of candidates is opaque, and does not 
guarantee a true representation of preferences of the whole shareholder 
base.  If we accept Burke’s concept of representation as preferable basis for 
governance, increased transparency and of the election process could also 
lead to higher accountability and thus better quality of representation.  
Principal-representative-delegate model could also have consequences to 
incentive systems.  If we see top management as delegates of boards rather 
than independent agents, we need to ask if compensation systems built on 
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selfish assumptions of agency theory, predominantly using incentives as a 
source of motivation, are appropriate for a management that has limited 
authority and accountability shared with directors.  
There are several avenues for future study for the principal-representative-
delegate model.  We would need to understand better the election process of 
boards as shareholders’ representatives, how management, current board 
and its committees, consultants and largest shareholders influence the 
search and selection process of directors.  Second main area of potential 
future research relates to differences in preferences of various types of 
shareholders and their link to representation.  Research of shareholder 
expectations on representation and analysis of how these are communicated 
to directors would provide additional understanding of his relationship. A 
third potential area could be further analysis of how directors correspond to 
various concepts of representation, in order to better understand  how 
shareholder interests are conveyed to corporate decisions.  
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Abstract: 
 
 
Power is a concept rarely used in corporate governance studies.  In board 
research, it can be analyzed both from process and outcome perspective, 
what is the influence of directors on material decisions and if such 
decisions have any impact on actual outcomes.  This paper takes the 
process view and investigates the power split between boards of 
directors and managements, using unique hand-collected material from 
Matters Reserved to the Board in 600 largest publicly listed European 
companies by market capitalization.  
Board rules open a new window for researchers on how directors use 
their wide powers.  Thresholds of decision rights determine the 
boundaries of power between board and management.  If decision 
thresholds are too lax, boards may not properly represent shareholder 
interests, while too extensive powers translate boards into 
managements. Decision rights can also be analyzed against classical 
horizontal and vertical agency problems.   In the empirical part of this 
study, it is shown that horizontal agency problem between dominant and 
minority shareholders has little impact on the way boards exercise 
power.  However, traces of vertical agency problem are found in dual 
leadership, a combination of CEO and Chairman of Board roles being 
connected to lower board decision rights.  Independent directors are 
also more likely to be connected to increased delegation, reflecting wider 
information gap between board and management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words:   Corporate governance, Power, Decision control, 
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1.   Introduction 
 
 
Power is a concept inherent in any organization.  It can be seen both from ex 
ante as well as ex post perspective, separating intentions from outcomes.  
The classical definition of process (or social) power is an ability to influence 
on how people act (Turner 2005).  However, process power does not 
necessarily lead to intended targets, as influence may not impact actual ou 
tcomes (Dowding 2011, p 523).   This distinction between process and 
outcome power is useful in corporate governance research, an essential 
question of which is investigating if formal powers of corporate actors, based 
on rules and regulations, lead to acts and decisions that have real observable 
economic outcomes attributable to shareholders (Aghion and Tirole 1997).   
 
Power in corporate governance is split between various actors.  Shareholders 
may have ultimate power as ownership gives them legal rights to exercise 
control (Grossman and Hart 1986).  However, shareholders only create a 
framework of control, seldom participating in actual decisions.  They 
delegate the vast majority of their decision rights to their elected 
representatives, board of directors, which can be considered as the epicenter 
of corporate powers (Licht 2014).  While the impact of shareholder power 
has been extensively researched, board powers and the division of power 
between board and management are still not well understood, although they 
are more relevant for the day-to-day decision-making than rarely convened 
shareholder meetings.  The allocation of decision rights determines which 
issues are reserved for board decision control and which are further 
delegated to management.  This separation of board and management 
powers is the subject of this study. 
 
Research on limits of power focuses on governance processes rather than 
their outcomes.  The rationale for this approach arises from the difficulty of 
proving an empirical link between indicators of governance and financial 
outcomes (Pettigrew 1992, Daily Dalton and Canella 2003, Aguiliera et al 
2008).   The endogenous and exogenous factors influencing corporate 
performance are so numerous that observing the impact of single 
governance factors is bound to be challenging.  Moreover, extant research 
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has struggled to penetrate the inner workings of governance, as boardrooms 
are still clouded with a veil of secrecy (Pettigrew 1992).  It has rather 
attempted to find a connection between externally observable governance 
characteristics and corporate outcomes, bypassing the mechanism of 
influence between the two.  By studying decision processes we can fill this 
research gap and provide a glimpse on how decisions are made in 
boardroom, what are the determinants of formal interaction between 
directors and management.    
 
Thresholds of decision rights are a crucial element of governance, as boards 
have limited resources for decision control.  An average board in large 
European companies meets only 8 times per year1.  Firms differ on how they 
divide decision rights between directors and management, and this division 
is instrumental in understanding board’s role in corporate governance.  If 
decision rules are too lax, boards might not properly represent shareholder 
interests, while too extensive decision rights translate boards into de-facto 
managements.  This paper contributes to board literature by investigating 
limits of power as defined in Matters Reserved to the Board, Board Charters, 
Board Regulations or board rules with any other name2, to answer the 
question how the allocation of decision rights between directors and 
management is determined and what it implies for theories of governance. 
 
Information on limits of power is widely available in Europe, although it has 
been neglected in extant studies. The empirical part of this paper is based on 
board rules of 600 largest European companies by market capitalization3. 
This material is used to investigate the determinants of power in corporate 
governance, and especially the boundaries between directors and 
management.  The results from the study demonstrate that the classical 
horizontal agency problem of governance, resulting from concentrated 
ownership structures is quite irrelevant to the way boards allocate decision 
rights, highlighting the need to see board as an independent actor with a 
distinct role in corporate governance.  Ownership concentration either as a 
                                                          
1 Based on the empirical material of this study.  In addition, directors meet also in various 
board committees, although generally the full board is the decision-making body. 
2 Matters Reserved to the Board is a term primarily used by UK companies, but these rules 
have several other names in Europe, such as Board Charter or Board Regulations.  This paper 
uses “board rules” as a generic term for such documents 
3 EuroSTOXX 600 as of 25.8.2012 
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percentage of voting rights of as a presence of a clearly identifiable dominant 
owner had no impact on how powers are split between board and 
management.  On the other hand, evidence was found that the duality of 
CEO/Chairman of the Board roles reduces board powers, suggesting that 
such structures support continued existence of vertical agency problems.  
Moreover, independent boards proved to be less stringent controllers of 
management, which can be seen either as a proof of information gap 
influencing decision-making (Harris and Raviv 2008) or independence 
leading to more efficient decision-making structures, independent directors 
having the skills to concentrate on most material issues.  Statistically 
significant evidence was also found that board activity, measured by number 
of meetings, was connected with lower management decision rights, an 
intuitive result that is clearly endogenous.  The practical relevance of these 
results is that current governance standards seem to ensure that boards are 
efficient solutions for controlling horizontal agency problems between 
dominant and minority shareholders in decision control, while regulators 
should consider further restrictions on dual leadership roles that still pose 
challenges on boards’ ability to control the management. 
 
This paper is arranged as follows.  First, the previous literature regarding 
boards, corporate governance and decision control is reviewed.  Second, a 
theoretical model of sources of power in a corporation is developed, defining 
the power function of a firm.  In the empirical part, ownership, board 
characteristics, management and company-specific factors are analyzed as 
determinants of how powers are split between board and management.   
After discussing the results, conclusions are drawn on their impact on 
theories of corporate governance and ideas for future research are proposed. 
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2.   Literature review 
 
 
2.1   Power and decision rights 
 
 
Political scientists separate between hard and soft power, power to coerce 
and power to persuade.  These concepts are also useful in corporate 
governance.  Hard power arises from the ability to get what you want 
through enforcement of rules, while soft power depends on people being 
self-motivated to reach the intended outcomes (Nye 2004).  Similarities to 
classical agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) are evident, hard power 
corresponding to control though coercion, while soft power and incentives 
both are based on self-interests of agents.   Similarly to political scientists, 
Huse (2007), while discussing board powers, divides power into direct and 
indirect, direct being based on formal delegated powers of directors while 
indirect concerns boards’ ability to influence opinions.  Huse also discusses 
conscience controlling power, by which he means behavioral techniques 
such as persuasion, education and manipulation and institutional/structural 
power.   
 
Aghion and Tirole (1997) provide a complementary angle, differentiating 
between formal and real power, corporate bodies having formal power 
arising from rules, regulations and procedures, while real power may lie in 
the hands of individuals preparing or executing the decisions.  Moreover, 
power can be divided between process and outcome power, this textbook 
distinction separating ex ante capability to influence how others act from 
capability to influence actual outcomes (Dowding 2011).   
 
Although the term power is rarely used in corporate governance research, it 
is implicitly present in a large body of literature.  The link from governance 
structures to corporate outcomes is essentially a quest for a link between 
process and outcome power, if formal power of shareholders and boards 
impacts risk position, financial results or valuation of a company.  Otherwise 
power lies with factors outside their control, either within organization 
unable to execute intended outcomes, or with external actors, behaving in 
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ways unanticipated in the decision process.  Various mechanisms have been 
designed to ensure that shareholders have real power over management so 
that delegation of decision rights leads to intended outcomes.   
Unfortunately, extant research has not been able to establish the link 
between formal and real power, as empirical test have not proved any 
conclusive link between shareholder or board characteristics and financial 
results (Daily, Dalton and Canella 2003, Ees, Gabrielson and Huse 2009).  
There may be several reasons for the lack of evidence.  Due to regulatory 
convergence, governance solutions may have become so uniform that 
remaining differences are too subtle for researches to observe in outcomes.  
Moreover, financial outcomes are dependent on such a large number of 
factors internal and external to corporations that data may become too noisy 
to provide any significant results.  Thus following Pettigrew (1992) and Ees, 
Gabrielson and Huse (2009), a more fruitful approach to decision control in 
corporate governance focuses on processes, who decides what and what 
determines the division of power between various actors.  This view sees 
governance as a process1 to resolve a problem of multiple preferences, how 
to create a mechanism that represents shareholder interests and channels 
them into corporate acts, targeted to create intended results.  
 
Corporations are hierarchies, in which decision rights are usually 
constructed as pyramids, fewer and larger decisions being made on higher 
levels of the organization.  The boundary between shareholders and board is 
clear, defined by laws and articles of association of the company.   Decisions 
that are material enough to be brought to shareholders to decide are few, 
either procedural (changes in articles of association), directly related to 
shares (dividends, new issues), choices of representatives (board and 
auditors) or in extreme cases related to major transactions like acquisitions.  
However, very few articles of association provide explicit limits when a 
matter of significance would need to be brought to shareholder meeting for 
decision2.  
                                                          
1 Process as a term is used here narrowly, meaning the procedural steps of decision-making, 
rather than the wide definition of process studies, which “address questions about how and 
why things emerge, develop, grow, or terminate over time, as distinct from variance 
questions dealing with covariation among dependent and independent variables”. (Langley et 
al 2013) 
2 There are two major exceptions in Europe. In the Netherlands several companies have 
included a rule relating to mergers and acquisitions, when the board obliged to submit such 
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Articles of association can be considered as rules defining the limits of 
shareholders’ formal power.  Legal scholars often focus on the role of formal 
rules in preventing crises and scandals in corporation (Hopt 2011), 
providing safeguards against gross misbehavior.  Public outcry over well-
known failures in governance may distort the understanding of the relevance 
of such rules, as they provide legitimacy to governance structures but give 
little guidance on how to make decisions that are relevant for the economic 
outcomes of a company.  Extensive research exists on shareholder rules and 
their impact on corporate outcomes.  For example, changes in articles may 
have indirect influence on corporate decisions and the risk profile of the firm 
(Cunat, Gine and Guadalupe 2012).   Gompers et al (2003) built an index of 
shareholder control based on the articles of association of companies, being 
able to show that companies with a higher “G-index” provided superior 
equity returns in 1990’s compared to other listed companies.  Probably due 
to a learning effect, the phenomenon has not been repeated thereafter 
(Bebchuk, Cohen, Wang 2011). 
However, owners’ direct control has also clear weaknesses.  First, ownership 
structure may not be optimal for control.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue 
that in large corporations the fundamental agency problem is horizontal, 
between large and small shareholders rather than vertical, between owners 
and management.  With controlling shareholders, the rights of minority 
owners may be subject to opportunism by the dominant shareholder 
(LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silvanes, Shleifer 1999; LaPorta et al. 2002; Bebchuk 
and Hamdani 2009), leading to non-optimal outcomes.  In most extreme 
cases the controlling shareholder may even be protected by legal structure, 
as in KGaA’s and Sarl’s 1 in Germany and France.  In order to overcome the 
horizontal agency problem, boards are supposed to represent all 
shareholders, and thus mitigate the dominant shareholder problem and 
provide protection for the minorities (Armour, Hansmann and Kraakman 
2009). 
                                                          
transactions to shareholders.  The typical limit is 25 % of the total assets of the company.  In 
UK it is common to include a borrowing restriction in the articles, limiting the borrowing 
powers of the board either to a specific monetary amount or to a maximum gearing, typically 
in the range of 200-300%. 
1 KgaA (Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien) is a German form of a publicly listed limited 
partnership, in which another company is the general partner that actually runs the company.  
A similar structure, Sarl (Société à responsabilité limitée) exists in France and Southern 
Europe.  In our sample of 600 companies, three are of such variety. 
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Dispersed ownership may also lead to weaker corporate governance and 
create a free-rider problem as none of the shareholders is willing to assume 
the costs of stronger control, paying for talent to work on the board to 
represent shareholder interests. (Acharya and Volpin 2008, John and 
Senbet 1998).  Moreover, Jensen (1989) argues that institutional investors 
are quite powerless, and McCaherty, Sautner and Starks (2010) find that 
with the exception of largest shareholders, institutional investors rather vote 
with their money than participate actively in the governance, leading to a 
power vacuum to be filled by other actors. 
Shareholder powers are hampered by the information gap between owners 
and management, and thus models of direct shareholder decision control are 
impractical and costly to administer.  Decision control is dependent on the 
quality of information (Harris and Raviv 2010) and the ability of decision-
makers to act wisely.  Enlarging the number of decisions brought to 
shareholder choice would require deep knowledge from a large group of 
owners and investors with diversified holdings would need to understand 
the inner workings of hundreds of companies.  Thus decision control 
requires separation of ownership and decision expertise, in essence 
delegation of shareholder powers to their elected representatives, board of 
directors. 
 
2.2. Board powers 
 
The division of power and its impact on decision control is analyzed in this 
essay against a simplified model of corporate governance, which identifies 
three distinct roles: risk-bearing by the shareholders, decision control by 
the board and decision management by the CEO and the top management 
team.    Decision control can further be divided into ex ante ratification of 
decisions and ex post monitoring of their outcomes (Fama and Jensen 1983).    
Ratification concerns matters that require a formal decision by the board1, 
                                                          
1 Board is defined as the shareholder elected body of representatives to which shareholders 
delegate all powers not specifically reserve to them in the Articles of Association.  Thus 
supervisory boards in Germany are covered by this definition, but more representational 
bodies that are separate from actual boards of directors are not. Board is also a body that is 
clearly separate from the operative management.   
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implying a direct responsibility for their outcome.   Such matters may be 
formally dictated by the board rules or judged by the management to be 
material enough to require board approval. 
 
Decision control is board’s primary means of using power.  Management 
initiates a decision usually with a proposal that has terms and conditions 
attached to it.  A board has control over the management by either 
approving, amending or denying a proposal.    A decision provides 
management with the authority to act (Adams & Ferreira 2007).   Decision-
making power within a company is limited by its financial resources, and 
thus power can be seen as influence over resources that are in short supply 
(Rajan and Zingales 1998).    
Although rules are determined by the board, the relationship between board 
and management has two directions.  A board cannot function without the 
co-operation of the management.  Holmström (1984), Adams and Ferreira 
(2007) and Harris and Raviv (2008) all highlight the role of information in 
decision-making.  Without proper access to inside information, boards are 
not efficient decision-makers, leading to loss of well-being to shareholders.  
Aghion and Tirole (1997) argue that a board which has formal authority over 
a decision can always veto the proposal of the management, but will not do 
it if the management is better informed, and if its objectives are broadly in 
line with the board’s.  A poorly informed board has few alternatives but to 
rubber-stamp the management proposals as it does not have a better 
alternative.  The management has, in such cases, real authority over the 
board. Delegation may be rational behavior for a badly informed board, 
although it means loss of control and thus diminution of board authority. 
Besides formal board decisions related to legal liability1, there are few clear 
rules on what the boards should decide.   Even soft legislation leaves the 
issue opaque.  For example, in UK the listing rules state that “The board 
should have a formal schedule of matters specifically reserved to it for 
decision”2, to which the UK combined code adds “The annual report should 
record:  a statement of how the board operates, including a high level 
statement of which types of decisions are to be taken by the board and which 
                                                          
1 Borrowing decisions are probably the most common formal decision requiring board 
approval. 
2 UK Listing rules, Code of best practices, April 2002 
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are to be delegated to management”1. This leaves the question of materiality 
and decision control open for the boards to decide.  Matters that are not 
specifically mentioned in the board rules implicitly belong to the powers of 
the management.   In case the decision limits are not clearly defined, the 
management has a possibility to influence board powers.  Useem and Zelke 
(2006) find that executives still determine the board agenda and thus 
dominate the matters which the boards decide.  Clearly, without established 
guidance, scope and depth of board powers differ, and there is a wide variety 
of explicit definitions of materiality.    
Even though a board has formal power, there is no clear evidence if this 
formal power leads to real power.   Most of the research has bypassed what 
happens in the boardroom, and rather focused on how observable facts, such 
as ownership structure or board composition, if they impact corporate 
outcomes (see Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach 2010).  The acts of the 
boards and their consequences have received limited attention2, and only 
few case studies (e.g. Johanson 2008, Schwarts-Ziv and Weisbach 2013, 
Huse and Zattoni 2008) have been able to penetrate the walls of the 
boardroom.  Research on board rules thus provides a novel and potentially 
fruitful window into how board and management interact.   
Although shareholders and boards have the formal power in corporations, 
real power can also be in the hands of other stakeholders. Already Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argued that debt provides effective control over 
management as repayments and interest reduce the amount of funds 
available to management for non-optimal purposes. Financial markets also 
control corporations, as underperforming or undervalued companies are at 
the mercy of the takeover market, which may lead to replacement of owners 
and boards, and threaten the job safety of the management.  Already a 
decline in corporate valuation indicates market dissatisfaction with the 
management and creates an incentive to act.     
As a conclusion, decision control is a means to have power over how people 
act, influencing the process of decision-making.  Such formal power may not 
lead to real power, as actual outcomes may be different from intended 
outcomes.  Formal power is primarily hard power, based on decision-making 
                                                          
1 Combined code, schedule C, A.1.1. 
2 with the exception of CEO hire / dismissal decisions 
 174 
rules and means to control their enforcement.  Soft power is more difficult 
to observe, although it is evident that behavioral factors incentivize board to 
find means to influence corporate outcomes not only through formal 
decisions but also through motivation of top layer of organization 
responsible for decision management.  Next, this article turns to empirical 
analysis of formal power and determinants thereof. 
 
3. Research questions and hypotheses 
 
 
3.1.  Decision rules and thresholds of authority 
 
 
Definition of decision rules can have a major impact on the efficiency of the 
boards and on how they fulfill their role as the representatives of shareholder 
interests. Not only can the lack of decision thresholds lead to management-
determined agendas, but badly defined rules may focus board work on 
insignificant matters and waste the limited time and resources of the 
directors (see Johanson 2008).  Boards may also omit important matters 
that they should consider, if such matters have not been included in board 
rules. 
The empirical part of this study is based on the numerical decision limits 
determined by the board.  The core questions are related to the identification 
of decisions of importance, thresholds of decision control and determinants 
of how formal power is divided between board and management.  The 
approach is symmetrical to analysis of management decision rights as a 
residual of board decision rights.    Although rules can be seen as guidelines, 
they provide plenty of signal information on how the power is split between 
the board and management.  They provide direct evidence on what the 
boards consider to be material decisions which cannot be left to the 
management only.    
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Boards have an interesting self-regulatory role, as their rules are written by 
boards themselves1.  Rules often include lists of matters and clear monetary 
limits of authority that reflect the board’s definition of materiality.   The most 
typical limits are traditional, focused on investments (or acquisitions), even 
though purchases of fixed assets are not necessarily the most material 
decisions a company can make.   Besides investments, boards also define 
limits on commercial contracts, financial commitments and technical 
matters like litigation or taxes.  This paper focuses on investment limits, 
which are the most common thresholds established by directors, and they 
are also easily comparable across companies.  An obvious follow-up 
question, though, is why certain boards include a wider variety of matters on 
their agenda than the others2. 
Monetary limits as such are not comparable across companies, but this can 
be overcome by relating them to key financials.  100 million investment for 
BP is not equal to 100 million investment for Daily Mail.  Limits are can be 
made comparable by relating them to a common financial yardstick, such as 
market value of equity, which measures how much of shareholders’ wealth 
can be put at risk without an authorization from their representatives, 
boards of directors.  The higher the threshold, the fewer decisions require 
board approval and the less decision control the board retains.   This 
approach complements the analysis of disclosure of accountability as 
presented in the second essay. Materiality thresholds measure the depth of 
decision control between board and management, while the extent of 
disclosure of board rules indicates the accountability of directors to 
shareholders.  The second essay also considers the full width of decision 
control, while this third uses only investment decisions as its yardstick. 
 
In order to understand the role of the board in decision control, we need to 
ask if structural factors impact the limits of power, or if all rules are 
situation-specific, contingent to company-specific conditions.  The four 
determinants usually used to analyze the impact of corporate governance on 
                                                          
1 Although the responsibility for drafting and/or approving rules is not always explicitly 
expressed in rules, there was no evidence in any of the material of investigated 600 
companies that such rules would be subject to shareholder acceptance or even presentation 
in shareholder meetings.  Rather, several rules included even a specific date when boards had 
approved them. 
2 Various areas of decision control are discussed in first essay of this dissertation 
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financial outcomes are ownership, board characteristics, company-specific 
factors and the role of management.  Being commonly used in extant 
research, they provide a natural basis for analysis of governance processes. 
Next, each one of them is discussed in order to develop the research 
hypotheses.    
 
 
3.2. Determinants 
 
3.2.1.  Ownership 
 
The research on ownership has focused on the relationship between 
shareholder structure and firm performance, but it provides little direct 
evidence of the relationship between ownership and decision control 
(Demsetz and Lehn 1985, Thomsen and Pedersen 2000, Anderson and Reeb 
2003, Cornett et al 2007). There are basically three different routes large 
owners can influence decision-making. In a few large publicly listed 
companies owners are also part of management, which raises the issue if 
boards’ formal power can result in real power in such situations.  In the 
second case owners are separate from the management, but use informal 
routes of influence, by-passing the formal route through the board.  The 
third, most legitimate channel of owner influence is through the board, 
either having direct representatives as members of board or through 
informal influence on board decisions. 
Two most common ownership-related variables in corporate governance 
research are concentration and classification of ownership.  The basic 
assumption is that the more concentrated the ownership the higher the risk 
of horizontal agency problem, large shareholders expropriating the small 
ones (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  It is also commonly assumed that in widely 
held companies governance is different from companies with a dominant 
owner (Connelly et al. 2010).  However, if there is an impact from dominant 
shareholding, there needs to be a medium that conveys that influence.  Even 
if large owners can directly use real power over the management, formal 
power is in the hands of the board.  Thus in case horizontal agency problem 
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exists, we should be able to observe ownership influence in board rules, 
boards in companies with dominant owners behaving differently from 
widely held companies.  
In this study, in addition to voting share of the largest owner, the nature of 
the largest owner is also investigated as a determinant of shareholder 
influence on board decision control.  Focusing on the single largest owner is 
in line with past research (Faccio and Lang 2002, LaPorta et al. 1999), 
supported by the empirical sample, where an overwhelming majority of 
firms with a dominant owner has only one major shareholder.  11 different 
types of largest owners were identified, but they were further simplified into 
four main types, family controlled companies, state controlled companies, 
companies with any other type of clearly identified dominant owner and 
widely held companies.   In line with Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell 
(2008), dominant shareholder was defined as an owner that controls at least 
10% of the voting rights in the firm.1   However, even if such thresholds are 
commonly used, there seems to be little evidence as to what level of 
ownership actually leads to dominance2. 
The basic hypothesis is that horizontal agency problem can be observed from 
board rules.  In the case a company has a clearly identified dominant owner, 
or in the case ownership concentration is high, board has less power over 
decision control as dominant shareholder can bypass directors and directly 
influence management decisions.  This can be formalized as the first 
research hypothesis: 
H1: Ownership dominance has a positive relation to management 
decision rights. 
However, as prior research has not been able to demonstrate a conclusive 
link between ownership characteristics and firm performance, it can be 
questioned if this is dependent on lack of formal or real power.  In the case 
no support is found for H1, board rules do not support the idea that 
dominant owners would be able to influence corporate decision-making 
through their influence on board powers.  On the other hand, if a 
                                                          
1 In very few cases there are two dominant owners.  in case the largest owner is a clearly identifiable 
institutional investor, also ownership ratios between 10 % and 20 % were considered non-dominant 
2 See Croci, Doukas and Gonenc (2011) on different definitions of control 
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relationship between variables is found, then the question is why formal 
process power does not translate into outcome power. 
 
3.2.2.  Board characteristics 
 
Boards are a group of people which make decisions, if needed, based on 
majority voting, and their internal characteristics impact the way they act.   
Out of board characteristics, independence has probably received most 
research focus.  General view has moved away from Fama and Jensen 
(1983), who valued inside directors over external ones, as they have more 
information on the company’s business, and the role of independent 
directors is now rather seen as value-enhancing (Adams & Ferreira 2007, 
Harris and Raviv 2008, Acharya, Meyers and Rajan 2011).   
Although this study primarily follows companies’ own definition if a director 
is independent or not, the term as such is not analytically very clear.  The 
categorization is conditional of independence of two different bodies, 
independent of the company and independent of major shareholders.  
Basically independence of a company means that a director is not employed 
by a company, although director may have other financial commitments 
with the company.  Companies are generally required to disclose related 
party transactions, and e.g. board member consulting agreements, or 
business arrangements with director’s employer and the company should be 
disclosed.  However, the judgment when such a relationship hampers 
director independence is subjective, and the influence on individual 
directors is impossible to assess.   
A second challenge regarding independence from the company is director 
tenure.  In UK, companies are required to disclose if a director has held his 
or her position for a stated number of years, and classify such a director 
formally non-independent1, assuming that a lengthy service impacts the 
behavior of a director in such a way that the accountability is not towards 
shareholders but rather towards people working in the company.  
                                                          
1 Some companies clearly struggle with this definition, and examples can be found where a 
director is described as non-independent based on tenure but “independent of mind” 
 179 
A third challenge to independence of a company relates to labor 
representatives, which, for example in Germany, constitute half of board 
members.  In order to complicate matters, such representatives might be 
nominated by trade unions, and thus they are truly independent of the 
company management and its shareholders, although have a strong link to 
its staff.  In practice, labor representatives have consistently been 
categorized as dependent on a company in this study. 
The second category, independence of large shareholders is also subjective.  
First, there are no common rules of what constitutes a large shareholder, and 
secondly, relationships to dominant shareholders may be based on informal 
trust relationships without any direct family or employment relationships.  
In addition, for example in Spain a directorship may actually be nominal to 
a legal personality, even if in fact is held by a nominated person.   
However, considering the importance governance codes set to director 
independence, it must be assumed that director classified as independent 
truly are so, even if their personal relationship might cast doubts on single 
person level.  Thus this paper follows company disclosure, and in the few 
cases where such qualities have not been explicitly disclosed, assessment has 
been made based on the personal biographies of directors.In decision 
control, the role of independent directors is interesting.  Harris and Raviv 
(2008) argue that independent majority may be value-reducing in situations 
where information costs are larger than agency costs.  Decision control by 
independent directors in situations where they lack necessary knowledge 
may lead to non-optimal decisions for the shareholders.  Consequently, 
rational behavior for independent directors would be to delegate decision 
rights to management.  Thus a second hypothesis can be made 
H2: Director independence is positively related to management 
decision rights. 
On the other hand, board has several other identifiable characteristics.  
Allocation of decision rights can also depend on social or cultural factors.      
Adams (2009) argues that directors with strong personal ties to CEO will 
rather act as advisors than monitors of management, which would indicate 
that cultural diversity should increase decision control while cultural 
similarity should lead to more decision power for management.     Gender, 
internationalization and employee representation are all expressions of 
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diversity in board composition, and in thus it is assumed that they lead to 
more formal decision-making process than structures where boards and 
management share common background characteristics. 
H3: Diversity of board is negatively related to management decision 
rights 
Finally, board decision control may also be explained by procedural and 
firm-specific factors.  On average, boards in large European companies meet 
8 times per year.  Even allowing for two days per meeting, including 
preparation, a typical board member might use less than one months’ work 
on a represented corporation. Thus as the resources of boards are limited, 
there should be a negative relationship between time available and decision 
control.   On the other hand, such relationship may be endogenous, lower 
decision limits leading to a higher number of items subject to board decision 
control, and thus requiring a more active board.   
H4: Board activity is negatively related to management decision 
rights 
In case none of the hypotheses related to board characteristics or procedures 
has an impact on decision control, a question can be asked if boards actually 
matter, and if recommendations for board independence and diversity are 
truly relevant for the way boards act. 
  
3.2.3.   Management  
 
 
Information gap between the management and the board may have 
implications on how the decision rights are divided.  Theoretical models 
assume that management presence in the board will reduce such a gap 
(Harris and Raviv 2008), as internal directors have better access to inside 
information. This would indicate that insider-dominated boards are more 
powerful than boards lacking sufficient knowledge.  However, an alternative 
assumption can be made for a dual chief executive / chairman of the board 
structure.  The combined leadership may strengthen the management team 
over board as their ability to make informed decision under dual authority 
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should be superior to directors.   Thus it is assumed that a higher proportion 
of insider directors shifts decision power towards the board, while duality of 
leadership supports management role in decision control.  As proportion of 
insider directors is a residual of proportion of independent directors, 
covered by the second hypothesis, an additional hypothesis is only needed 
for the duality of leadership: 
H5: CEO/Chairman of the board duality is positively related to 
management decision rights 
Even though corporate governance recommendations increasingly press 
European companies to separate the two roles, still in 112 of the 600 
companies in the sample either current or past CEO is the Chairman of the 
board or Chairman has an executive role in the company, current CEO being 
Chairman in 81 of these. 
 
3.2.4.   Company characteristics 
 
 
Company characteristics are commonly used as control variables in 
accounting research, so in the empirical model, company size, investment 
intensity and external cultural factors are considered as additional 
determinants.  
Size.  
In line with the information gap hypothesis, as the complexity 
of the matters increases, the ability of board members to take 
informed decisions decreases (Aghion and Tirole 1997).  This 
may lead to a situation that the larger the company, the less 
board can have knowledge of actual business decisions, leading 
to more of the board time being spent on regulatory issues 
rather than on decision control.   
Investment intensity 
The dependent variable in the empirical model is related to 
investment decisions.  Although there are no evident reasons 
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why risks related to long term commitments of funds would 
vary between companies, it is assumed that investment-
intensive companies are more accustomed to investment 
decisions and thus should have higher decision limits. Total 
amount of depreciation is used as a proxy of investment 
intensity, as depreciation reflects past level of investments in a 
firm. 
Culture 
A frequently debated issue in comparative corporate 
governance is if nationality actually matters (LaPorta et al 
2000, 2002, Armour Hansmann and Kraakman 2009).  This 
has traditionally been analyzed either through classification of 
countries as market or bank-based1 or by using Hofstede’s 
national characteristics. Considering the high level of 
integration in European financial markets and power being the 
subject of the study, power distance is used as a control variable 
to assess the impact of cultural differences on decision control.    
 
4. Model and data description 
 
 
In order to analyze the division of power between the board and the 
management, we first need to define the power function of a company.  
Power in this context is understood as process power, the ability to influence 
the decisions that have a material impact on the performance, value or risk 
position of a company.  Process approach differentiates this study from the 
majority of extant empirical governance research, which rather attempts to 
find relationships connected to outcome power.   Considering the various 
parties that may influence such decision, the basic power function can be 
written as follows: 
 
                                                          
1 Ownership data on EuroSTOXX 600 companies does not support the separation of countries 
to market or bank based.  There are very few companies where banks would be largest 
shareholders, and using gearing as an indicator, there is no difference between UK (market 
based) and continental (bank-based) companies. 
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ܲ ൌ ௌܲ௛ ൅ ஻ܲା ெܲ ൅ ܧ ൅ ܷ 
 
Where 
 
P  Represents total process power, the ability of various actors to 
influence material decisions 
 
ௌܲ௛ Matters that shareholders decide 
 
஻ܲ Matters reserved to the board, which include matters that 
board has determined to be of such importance that the 
management does not have the authority to decide alone, or 
matters that the management has judged material enough to 
submit for board decision control 
 
ெܲ Matters that are within the power of the management.  ெܲ is a 
residual of  ஻ܲ, as boards set the limits of decision control, 
matters they keep to themselves, implicitly delegating all other 
matters to the management.  ெܲ could further be split into 
஼ܲாைǡ ்ܲெ்ܽ݊݀ ௌܲ௧௔௙௙,1 but which are outside the scope of this 
study. 
 
E  consists of factors external to the company, which include all 
other decision making bodies except shareholders, directors 
and management.  Such bodies include creditors (ܧ஼), 
authorities (ܧ஺) and employee representatives (ܧாோ) but may 
include also other parties 
 
U  represents unknowns, decisions that happen without the 
influence of any the previous parties.  Such decisions may 
include competitor action, natural events, disturbances in 
financial markets or unauthorized transactions, just to name a 
few. 
 
The determinants have the following propensities: 
                                                          
1 Power of the CEO, power of the top management team and power of the staff 
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ௌܲ is a constant over a short term, as shareholder powers are clearly defined 
in the articles of association, and shareholders have delegated all other 
powers to the board.  Even though corporate governance literature includes 
numerous studies related to ௌܲ, any direct decision control by large 
shareholders over what has been defined in the articles represents a 
violation over the standard corporate governance structure1 
 
஻ܲ ൅  ெܲ is also a constant (C) in the short term,.   
 
 
In order to test the general model of decision power, we can use the decision 
limits set by the board as a proxy of ஻ܲ, which consequently defines ெܲas  
ܥ െ ஻ܲ.  Besides measuring the limits of power, the value of ஻ܲ also defines 
how boards understand materiality, assuming that boards are able to 
prioritize their limited resources to most important issues facing a 
company2.  Decision control consists of width and depth of issues within 
board decision limits.  This paper focuses only on the depth, using its most 
common indicator, monetary limits for investment decisions as the 
dependent variable, leaving the analysis of other types of decision limits for 
further study.   The investment limit acts as a proxy of board process power, 
and although the definition of materiality is interesting and important as 
such, the real research question in this paper is what are the determinants 
of ஻ܲ and if and how they impact its value.    
 
In a special case where company is in financial distress, the value of ܧ஼ 
(creditor power) starts to increase in relationship to ஻ܲ and ெܲ.  As shown by 
Nini et al. (2012), the breakage of financial covenants represent a situation 
whereܧ஼ ൐  ஻ܲ ൅ ெܲ, as debt-holders interests dominate the decision 
control of a company. 
 
                                                          
1 Counterarguments can be made against this basic claim, and there are plenty of examples of 
attempts of active shareholders to influence corporate decision-making.  However, this is 
against the rules as a standard formulation in the articles of association of the research 
sample includes a clear delegation of powers to the board.    
2 Practically all boards consider also qualitative tasks of determining strategy, choosing and 
dismissing CEO and regulatory (audit) control as part of their most important tasks.  Anyhow, 
as there is no variance, these tasks do not differentiate boards from other boards 
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Thus, in a simplified form, the actual model for board process power is as 
follows: 
 
஻ܲ ൌ ߚ ൅ ݔܱܹܰܧܴܵܪܫܲ ൅ ݕܤܱܣܴܦ ൅ ݖܯܣܰܣܩܧܯܧܰܶ
൅ ݓܥܱܯܲܣܻܰ ൅א 
 
where OWNERSHIP, BOARD, MANAGEMENT and COMPANY are generic 
terms for the proxies of actual empirical variables  below.    
In order to build the empirical model, we first define our dependent variable: 
஻ܲ  is investment limit as a proportion of market value 
of equity  
representing the magnitude of the risk involved in major investment 
decisions.  Considering the alternatives to the dependent variable, the 
closest substitute would be investment limit as a proportion of enterprise 
(debt-free) value of the company.  This would anyhow bring the interests of 
debt-holders in the equation, which is not relevant in normal circumstances 
where ܧ஼ ஻ܲ ൅ ெܲ.1  Investment limits could also 
be related to indicators of corporate size, such as total assets, fixed assets or 
sales.  Although such indicators may have merit from company point of view, 
considering that boards represent shareholder interests, measure related to 
shareholder value can be considered more relevant for the research 
questions. 
Next we turn to our independent variables: 
OWNERSHIP: 
DOMINANCE % of voting rights held by the largest 
shareholder 
FAMILY, STATE, OTHER (O_TYPE) denotes companies with 
three different dominant types of 
owners that have a share exceeding 
                                                          
1 Situations of distress, where ܧ஼  starts to increase, are considered in the fourth essay of this 
dissertation 
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10 % of the voting power in the 
company.   
BOARD 
INDEPENDENCE is defined as % of independent directors in a 
board, including directors independent of the 
company and independent of major shareholders.  
FEMALE is defined as a % of female directors in a board and 
used as a proxy of diversity 
MEETINGS Number of board meetings per year, reflecting the 
level of board activity. 
 
The third set of variables concerns MANAGEMENT. 
CEO_COB Situations where either current or past CEO is the 
Chairman of the board, or current Chairman has 
an executive role.  This variable reflects both the 
management influence as well as the information 
gap between the board and the management.  The 
variable is calculated as a proportion of total 
number of board members, assuming that the 
voice of top manager is better heard in smaller 
teams. 
MANAGEMENT Percentage of operative management as of total 
board members 
And finally as control variables indicators directly related to the COMPANY 
LOG_BS Logarithm of the balance sheet total as a proxy of 
company size, in Euros. 
DEPR_PCT Depreciation as a percentage of sales, reflecting 
the fixed asset intensity of the company. 
CULTURE Hofstede indicator of POWER DISTANCE, 
reflecting the impact of national characteristics. 
This indicator was chosen as it corresponds to the 
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research questions related to the division of power 
between boards and managements 
 
Thus the model can be re-written as follow: 
 
஻ܲ ൌ ߚ ൅ݔଵܦܱܯܫܰܣܰܥܧ ൅ݔଶ̴ܱܻܶܲܧ ൅ ݔଷܫܰܦܧܲܧܰܦܧܰܥܧ +  
ݔସܨܧܯܣܮܧ + ݔହܯܧܧܶܫܰܩܵ ൅ ݔ଺ܥܧ̴ܱܥܱܤ ൅ ݔ଻ܮܱܩ̴ܤܵ ൅ 
ݔ଼ܦܧܴܲ௉஼் ൅ ݔଽܥܷܮܷܴܶܧ ൅ ߤ  
 
which is the actual model subject to empirical tests 
 
The research material is based on hand-picked data from 600 largest 
European companies by market capitalization.   Of these companies, 325 
disclose their internal board rules, and 244 provide monetary limits for 
investments1.  The sample was further reduced by eliminating all financial 
companies, including banks, insurance companies and financial services, 
leaving a final sample of 202 companies.  The exclusion of financial sector is 
in line with several other studies, as their business model and financial 
reporting structure are very different from other industries.  Moreover, the 
financial data is from 2011, which was still in the aftermaths of financial 
crisis, so financial sector valuations might have been abnormally low.   
 
The final sample of companies has 15 different nationalities.  This paper 
assumes functional governance convergence for companies in developed 
economies, in line with Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) and Hopt and 
Leyens (2004). Investors, boards and management are assumed to adapt 
their approach to decision management in ways to align the practices 
according to commonly accepted principles of corporate governance, despite 
lack of uniform legal environment.  Such practices include clear separation 
of roles of owners, board and management, transparent corporate 
governance, commonly accepted international reporting practices and 
oversight by competent authorities.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and 
                                                          
1 Investments, mergers and acquisitions, real estate transactions, disposals 
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Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) have argued that the integration of global 
financial markets is driving the integration of governance practices, and 
national legal environments follow only with a lag.   Shareholder as the 
primary beneficiary of governance forms the philosophical basis of the 
functional convergence.     
 
The material on companies has been collected from their websites, and 
includes annual reports, articles of association, corporate governance 
reports or statements and most importantly, rules of the board1.  The 
monetary limits cover four major areas, investments, financial transactions, 
commercial agreements and technical matters like litigation or tax 
settlements.  Each company may have more than one decision limit related 
to each area, and the limit may be expressed either as an absolute value, as 
a relationship to another financial indicator like sales or equity or in 
commercial agreements even as megawatts.  This paper focuses only on the 
investment limits, and in a few cases where there are several differing limits, 
the lowest has been used. Such material is not available on any databases, 
and its collection and coding is not only laborious but requires in-depth 
analysis of what the boards have actually meant.   Although focus on larger 
companies may create a bias, the measurements used are universal and 
should be applicable to any size of company.  Large public companies are 
under higher scrutiny  by the markets and regulators, have better resources 
for disclosure and reporting, and the personal liability of board members is 
higher, also creating an incentive for better disclosure.     
 
Focusing on monetary limits omits certain other matters boards consider 
important like strategy, CEO choice and regulatory oversight (Adams, 
Hermalin, Weisbach 2010).  However, as all of these belong to the agenda of 
practically every single board, there is no variation so their impact is difficult 
to study.  Boards can also make decisions that may be of symbolic value like 
political donations or charity, which do not have direct impact on company 
performance.  Such decisions have been omitted from this study even if 
boards had disclosed limits for them. 
                                                          
1 Sometimes board rules are included in other documents, like document de reference in 
France or regulatory corporate governance reports in Italy or Spain 
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The annual reports were used as the source of information for classification 
of ownership and board structures.  The reports were analyzed for the 
financial year that ended between 31.12.2011 and 30.12.2012.   Boards were 
categorized for their independence, CEO role in the board, management 
representation, employee representation, internationalization of the board 
and gender split.  Most of the companies disclose such information, but in 
cases where it was not explicitly provided, the personal biographies of board 
members were used1.  In cases where independence was separately disclosed 
for independence related to the main shareholders or independence of the 
company, both cases were considered non-independent.  Besides the 
composition of the board, data on number of board members and frequency 
of meetings was also collected.  The company websites were also analyzed 
for any other potential additional information during 1.12.2012 -29.2.2013. 
The largest owners were categorized into 11 main categories2, but for the 
analysis these were further simplified either into four, firms that have Family 
or State or Other clearly identifiable single owner as the dominant 
shareholder or companies that are Widely held3.     It can be questioned if 
this kind of categorization is internally consistent, if such groups 
homogenous enough to behave in a similar manner.  Anyhow, for the 
purposes of this study the aforementioned classification is accepted, as it is 
widely used in corporate governance literature and thus the results are 
comparable with past research. 
The financial data is derived from Orbis databases, using annual information 
for the accounting year that ends between 31.12.2011 and 30.12.2012.   When 
necessary for financial comparisons, the database has been converted into 
euros, considering the different closing months of the companies.  In case 
pieces of information have been missing from Orbis, annual reports have 
been used.  The accuracy of Orbis data has been controlled through random 
checks.  The data collection process has included two research assistants, 
                                                          
1 This relates mainly to companies based in Germany and Switzerland, which do not require 
the disclosure of board independence by person.  In case nationality of board members has 
not been disclosed, biographic information like name, past work experience and education 
has been used.  In case where members are from culturally similar neighboring countries like 
Germany/Austria, categorization may not be exact, but the difference is considered irrelevant 
2 Association, Bank, Corporate, Co-operative, Employees, Family, Foundation, Investment 
company, Private equity, state and Widely held 
3 There are 73 cases where agent owners hold in excess of 10 % but below 20 % of the votes.  
These are anyhow categorized as widely held 
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and more than 10 % of the data has been checked by two persons for 
potential errors in classification.  Furthermore, all data has been reviewed at 
least twice in order to ensure the quality of data collection and consistency 
of coding. 
Table 1 presents the breakdown of the final sample by country and industry.  
All of these companies publish their regulatory information on their website, 
and the overwhelming majority of material is available also in English.  
There are some minor exceptions where parts of the material (board rules, 
articles of association or corporate governance statements) are only 
available in the native language, French, Spanish, Italian, Dutch or German, 
and in such cases original language versions were used. 
 
Table 1  Breakdown of finals sample by industry and by country (N=202)  
 
Countries are BE = Belgium, CH = Switzerland, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = 
France, GB = Great Britain, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, LU = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, PT = 
Portugal, SE = Sweden 
 
Industry    
  
BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GB IE IT LU NL NO PT SE N 
Automobiles & parts   2    3   2        7 
Basic resources       1 7     1  1 10 
Chemicals 2 2 4    2 2    2 1   15 
Construction & 
materials 
 3     4  1      2 10 
Food & beverages 1 1 1    3 2  1  3    12 
Healthcare 1 4  1   3 2       1 12 
Industrial goods and 
services 
 4 5  1 1 10 9  3  7   1 41 
Media       4 4  1 1 1   1 12 
Oil & gas     1  3   2  2 1 1  10 
Personal & household 
goods 
 1 3    2 2  2     1 11 
Real estate 1 2 1    4 3    2   1 14 
Retail  1     3 3    1  1    9 
Technology  1 1    6 1  1      10 
Telecommunications 1 1     1 2  1  1      7 
Travel and leisure       3 6          9 
Utilities   2  2  4 1  4      13 
 
N 6 20 19 1 4 1 56 44 1 17 1 19 3 2 8 202 
 
 
Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the key variables. Ownership 
concentration is common in Europe, half the companies having an owner 
with at least 20 % share of votes.  Independent directors represented on 
average 60 % of board members, and 70 % of companies had independent 
majorities. Lack of independent majorities can be explained by a large 
proportion of companies with a dominant shareholder, but even 10 % of 
companies with no dominant owners had a non-independent majority of 
board members. Labor representatives have been classified as non-
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independent, which somewhat impacts the average, specifically due to 
German co-determination law requiring half of supervisory board members 
being labor representatives.  Diversity in boards is still modest, non-
nationals forming on average 23 % and female members 17 % of boards.  
Nationality is not a clear concept in Europe, as neighboring countries can be 
culturally integrated and thus if a German director in an Austrian company 
is “foreigner” is debatable.  An average board in the sample companies has 
11 members, and boards meet annually 8 times. 
The dependent variable in the empirical model is board determined 
threshold for investment limits subject to its decision control.  As an absolute 
value, the average value is 125 million euros, heavily impacted by the very 
large companies, as median value is only 30 million.  However, for the 
analysis of decision rights, a more meaningful number can be calculated by 
relating the decision threshold to market value of equity, reflecting the 
amount of shareholder wealth involved in such a decision.  The median value 
was 0.6 % and average 1.5 %, half of the values being within a range of 0,2 % 
and 1.5 % of market value of equity, providing boards with a reasonable 
benchmark for determining materiality in decision control.  Median values 
related to accounted equity (0.9 %), sales (0.5 %) and balance sheet total (0.2 
%) provide additional guidance for determination of decision rights.  A 
comparison of decision rights across dominant ownership types shows little 
differences, median values being within a range of 0.4 % and 0.7 % of market 
value of equity. 
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Table 2  Descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 Mean Std Dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max N 
Ownership       
- Voting rights 26% 21 2% 9% 20% 36% 90% 202 
Board       
- % Independent 60% 22 11% 45% 57% 72% 100% 202 
- % Part of
management 
10% 14 
0% 
0% 0% 
17% 
53% 
202 
- % Foreign 23% 23 0% 0% 17% 36% 91% 202 
- % Female 17% 11 0% 9% 17% 23% 75% 202 
- Number of members 11.3 3.6 3 9 11 13 22 202 
- Number of meetings 8.5 3.1 3 6 8 10 22 202 
 Financials (Billions of Eur)       
- Sales 1.,5 23.9 0 1,9 6,0 17,7 167 202 
- Balance sheet total 22.9 36.5 0.4 3.7 8.2 25.8 232 202 
- Total equity 7.2 11.3 -1.0 1.4 2.9 6.9 68 202 
- Market value of
equity 
11.9 19.6 
0.8 
2.6 5.2 
11.4 
147 
202 
- Enterprise value 16.2 24.1 0.7 3.1 6.8 15.4 159 202 
Investment limits (IL)       
- Nominal amount
(MEUR) 
125 301 
0.1 
10 30 
119 
3089 
202 
- As of accounted
equity 
2,1% 4.8 
-32.5% 
0.4% 0.9% 
2.6% 
31% 
202 
- As of market value of
equity (MVE) 
1.5% 2.7 0.0% 0.2% 0.6% 1.5% 20% 
202 
- As of enterprise value 1.0% 1.9 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 1.1% 18% 202 
- As of sales 1) 14.3% 175 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 1.4% .. 202 
- As of balance sheet
total 
0.8% 1.3 
0.0% 
0.2% 0.3% 
0.9% 
11% 
202 
- As of depreciation 1) 133% 616 0% 4% 10% 32% .. 202 
Limits (IL/MVE) by
ownership    type 
 
 
   
 
- Family 1,9% 2.6 0.0% 0.3% 0.7% 2.8% 11% 49 
- State 1.0% 1.4 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 1.4% 8% 43 
- Other 2.0% 3.2 0.1% 0.4% 0.6% 1.8% 13% 25 
- Widely held 1.5% 3.1 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 1.1% 20% 85 
       
1) One of the companies had minimal reported sales as the value of the company arises from non-consolidated 
holdings, which distorts the averages and maximums for sales and depreciation 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix between variables.  State-controlled 
companies are on average larger in size (0.322), more capital intensive 
(measured as depreciation, 0.301).  Power distance is negatively related to 
Independence and positively to CEO and COB duality.  State-dominated 
companies meet more often (0.232), as do larger companies or companies 
with more independent members (0.180)  
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Table 3 Correlations between variables 
  
This table reports the correlations between model variables.  Significance at the 5% level is 
denoted by * and 1% by **. 
 
 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Inv. Lim. per MVE (1) -0.016 0.080 0.061 -0.106 0.066 -0.082 0.231** -0.079 -0.083 0.140* 0.117 0.205** 
Voting rights (2)  0.482** 0.190** 0.224** -0.435** 0.037 0.088 -0.167* 0.000 0.084 0.105 0.136 
Family (3)   -0.213** -0.294** -0.195** 0.040 0.164** -0.034 -0.142* -0.110 -0.060 0.121 
State (4)    -0.195** -0.188** 0.073 0.029 -0.134 0.232** 0.301** 0.322** 0.195** 
Other (5)     -0.149** -0.200 -0.035 -0.134 0.045 -0.001 0.074 0.048 
Independent (6)      0.048 -0.111 -0.157* 0.180* -0.030 -0.020 -0.247** 
Female (7)       -0.010 0.067 -0.032 -0.026 0.105 0.052 
CEO COB (8)         -0.064 -0.073 -0.054 0.056 0.314** 
Management (9)         0.060 -0.009 -0.302** -0.152* 
Meetings (10)          0.191** 0.258** 0.066 
Depreciation (11)           0.113 0.089 
Size (12)            0.215** 
Power distance (13)             
             
 
      
 
 
 
5. Analysis and discussion 
 
The first hypothesis concerned the influence of ownership on board decision 
control. The basic assumption was that ownership dominance is related to 
higher management decision rights as dominant owners can exert control 
over management directly, bypassing the board.  However, tests provided no 
support to the hypothesis, as concentration of voting rights was not 
connected to ownership rights, (t=- 0.225).  The test was repeated using 
dividend rights instead of voting rights but this did not change the results. 
In addition, the relationship of type of dominant owner was also tested by 
including family-controlled, state-controlled and companies controlled by 
other clearly identifiable owner in the model.  None of the tests related to 
type of owner provided any support to the first hypothesis (FAMILY, t = 
0.768, STATE, t = 0.426, OTHER, t = -0.417).    Thus, based on the 
ownership-related tests, no support for hypothesis 1 was found, and a 
conclusion can be made that ownership dominance has no material impact 
on how the boards define the boundaries of power with the management.  
This result is related to  the horizontal agency problem (Shliefer and Vishny 
1997), indicating that boards in the largest companies in Europe provide a 
reasonable protection against excessive powers of large shareholders in 
corporate decision-making. 
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The second main hypothesis concerned the characteristics of the board.  It 
was assumed that board characteristics are relevant to the way they act.  This 
hypothesis was tested using two indicators, INDEPENDENCE and 
FEMALE, the latter representing the diversity of board structure.   A 
significant positive relationship was found between INDEPENDENCE and 
the dependent variable (t = 2.157), indicating that more independent boards 
allow large freedom of action to the management.  This may be due to 
information gap between external board members and the management.  In 
line with Harris and Raviv (2010) it may be sensible for independent 
members to allocate more decision rights and leave immaterial or operative 
decisions to better informed management.    
FEMALE as an indicator of diversity was weakly negatively related to 
decision rights (t = -1.778), which may be connected to Nielsen and Huse’s 
(2010) findings that the more different female directors values are from 
those of male directors, the more influence they have on board decision-
making.  This study does not investigate director values, but considering the 
strong male dominance of European boards, these results at least indicate 
that proportion of female directors is related to how boards act by limiting 
freedom of action of male-dominated managements.   
Meeting frequency provided an additional test regarding board decision 
control and demonstrated that the more active the board is the tighter the 
controls over management.  The test results were significant on 5% level (t = 
-2.369).  With cross-sectional data no claims on causality can be made; if 
boards meet frequently as a consequence of low limits for decision control, 
or if active boards consider that their duty of representation requires such 
nuanced control.  The result can be considered logical, active boards are 
more informed and thus have a stronger role in decision-making. 
Management influence was tested through the dual role of CEO and 
chairman.   As expected the top executive in the board increased 
management powers, reflecting smaller information gap and higher trust 
between board and the management (t = 2.460).  This result can also be 
interpreted as existence of vertical agency problem, CEO influence reducing 
board decision control.  However, proportion of operative directors in the 
board had no similar influence (t = 0.588), which is interesting, as vertical 
agency problems in decision control seems to be primarily related to 
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CEO/COB duality rather than management representation in board.  
Additionally, if same person acts in leadership role for both operative 
management as well as the infrequently meeting board, the functioning of 
the two teams must differ.  If boards led by CEO were to exercise tight 
decision control, would that change the role of board into de-facto 
management.  It is evident that duality of leadership poses questions of 
authority and control that other directors need to tackle in order to remain 
relevant representatives of shareholder interests. 
Control variables provided expected results.  It was assumed that the larger 
the company the more difficult it is for the board to have the necessary 
knowledge to make business decisions.  Using natural logarithm of balance 
sheet as a proxy, size had a weak positive connection to decision control (t 
=1.652).  This also may reflect information gap, as matters to be decided in 
very large companies become so diverse that board knowledge is not 
sufficient for operative decisions, leaving only procedural tasks for the 
directors.  From shareholder representation perspective this raises a 
concern if very big companies have become too large to govern, and if boards 
in such companies are unable to represent shareholder interests.  Real power 
may have moved deeper into the organization. 
The second company-specific control variable was amount of depreciation 
as a percentage of sales.  Basic assumption was that investment decisions as 
the proxy for decision control would be larger in companies with plenty of 
fixed assets and thus higher investment needs.  Relationship was positive as 
expected and strongly significant (t = 2.210).  
Finally, the impact of culture was tested by using one of the key Hofstedt 
values, POWER DISTANCE.  Although this indicator has clear theoretical 
and practical weaknesses (see McSweeney 20021), it proved to be significant 
on 5 % level (t = 2.179) and robust to variations in the model.  We can 
question why international companies with international managements, 
international boards and international owners would be impacted by 
cultural factors related to its country of listing, but the results indicate that 
the remaining national links are relevant, and the wider the power distance 
in the country of listing the more power the management has. Only 23 % of 
                                                          
1 McSweeney basically says that it is not plausible to argue that nation-states have cultures, 
considering e.g. the heterogeneity of people living in any territory forming a country  
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European board members were of different nationality than their company, 
which may explain the strong cultural affiliation.   On the other hand, an 
alternative test was made by analyzing if UK companies would behave 
differently from their continental counterparties, as UK is usually 
considered closest to US and furthest away from European governance.  
Such tests provided inconclusive, indicating that culture is a better indicator 
of behavioral differences in Europe than nationality, which has been 
commonly used as an independent variable in governance studies (see e.g. 
LaPorta et al. 1998). 
Table 3  Regression results 
 
OLS regression results for the investment limit as a proportion of market value of equity as the dependent variable, companies 
excluding financial sector (N=202).  T-values are shown in brackets below co-efficients, *, ** and *** denote significance at 10*, 5 % 
and 1* level.   
   
Variable Coefficient/(t-value)  
   
Intercept -0.042  
 (-1.645)  
PCT of voting rights -0.003 
 (-0,255)  
Family 0.005  
 (0.768)  
State 0.003  
 (0.426)  
Other -0.003 
 (-0.417)  
PCT Independent 0.023**  
 (2.157)  
PCT Female -0.029*  
 (-1.778)  
PCT CEO_COB 0.080**  
 (2.460)  
PCT Management 0.008  
 (0.588)  
Number of meetings -0.002**  
 (-2.369)  
Ln of BS in Euros 0.002*  
 (1,652)  
Depreciation PCT 0.065**   
 (2.210)   
Power distance 0.001**   
 (2.179)   
Observations 202   
Adjusted ܴଶ 0.106   
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In order to test the robustness of test results, numerous other analysis were 
run specifically regarding board variables and control variables. Diversity of 
boards was investigated through various measures, either considering 
gender and nationality separately or as a combined variable.  Besides 
CEO/COB duality, share or management members in boards was also tested.  
Also, in addition to power distance, other Hofstede cultural variables were 
also used as independent variables  Finally, in order to further test the 
robustness of the results, the limitations related to  financial sector were 
released, either including all such companies or continuing the exclude only 
banks from the sample.  The results of additional tests were in line with the 
main results, although generally on a lower level of significance, and thus 
they have not been separately reported. 
There are limitations to the test results.  The dependent variable was defined 
as a percentage of market value of equity.  It is not known how such limits 
are determined, if boards use due consideration in determining them, or if 
other methods have been used. Anyhow, considering the wide variance in 
limits set, it seems evident that boards have used their own judgment and 
deliberately determined such limits.  Thus decision limits can be considered 
as a reliable proxy for division of process power between boards and 
managements.  Another limitation is related to the cross-sectional nature of 
data, which prohibits any claims on causality.  Repeating this study in a few 
years could provide insight on the dynamism of power relationships within 
companies.  Additionally, even if most of the coding was quite clear (e.g. 
foreign or female board members), categories may include very different 
types of owners or board members, and it is by no means evident that e.g. all 
family-controlled companies would behave in a similar way, neither that 
widely held companies are similar to each other.   
Final limitation arises from the geographical sample.  As empirical material 
consists of large European companies, the results may not be universal.  For 
example, several studies indicate that ownership concentration is higher in 
continental Europe than in US or UK, although extant research provides 
conflicting results.   Becht and Mayer (2001) find out that 50 % of the 
continental European companies have a dominant shareholder, while the 
same relationship in US and UK is only 3 %, but Holderness (2009) argues 
that ownership structures are more similar across the Atlantic than 
previously thought, as large block-holders control on average 39 % of his 
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sample of large publicly listed US firms.  Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2003) 
find that one third of S&P 500 companies have a founding family as a 
significant owner, with an average stake of 19 %, which is comparable to the 
22 % family dominance in the comparable Europe-level EuroSTOXX 600 
sample.  Based on limited sampling, disclosure of board rules is less frequent 
in US than in Europe, but it would be interesting to test the validity of the 
results in US circumstances.   
 
6. Conclusions 
 
 
Board rules have been neglected as a source of information in corporate 
governance research, even though they provide fruitful insights on how 
boards act.  This may, at least partly, have been due to availability of 
information, which has improved especially in Europe, where more than half 
of large listed companies today voluntarily disclose the matters under board 
decision control.   Board rules give factual information on the depth and 
width of the matters boards consider so material that they, as 
representatives of shareholders, wish to retain decision control rights.     
In order to investigate the division of power between directors and 
management, a corporate power function was defined.  It was argued that 
total power in corporations consists of shareholder powers, which are fixed 
in the short term, a combination of board and management powers, the 
formal split of which is determined by board rules, power of external actors 
and unknowns.  In order to operationalize the core research questions 
related to division of process power between board and management, 
investment limits as a proportion of market value of equity were used as a 
proxy of decision rights. 
A unique database on board rules of 600 largest European companies by 
market capitalization was collected as the basis of empirical analysis.  The 
results indicate that the classical horizontal agency problem between 
dominant and minority shareholders is quite irrelevant to the way boards 
exert decision control, highlighting the need to see board as an independent 
actor with a distinct role in corporate governance.  Neither voting rights nor 
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type of dominant owners had any impact on how powers are split between 
board and management.  On the other hand, evidence on remaining vertical 
agency was found, as the duality of CEO/Chairman of the Board roles was 
connected to reduced board powers.  In additional tests, independent boards 
proved to be less stringent controllers of management, which can be seen 
either as a proof of relevance of information gap in decision-making or 
independence leading to more efficient decision-making structures, 
directors being able to concentrate on most material issues.  Statistically 
significant evidence was also found for a negative connection between 
number of board meetings and management decision rights.   
 
This study has practical relevance for regulators, shareholders and boards.  
Lack of evidence on horizontal agency problem supports current regulation 
as an effective means of mitigating excessive dominant owner influence.  On 
the other hand, CEO/COB duality was connected with more limited board 
decision control, and if regulators wish to ensure that vertical agency 
problem does not negatively impact board’s powers as representatives of 
shareholders, combination of these two roles is problematic.  Finally, 
empirical results on decision control provide understanding for current and 
future boards on the relevance of their internal rules, and as they have 
largely been omitted in extant research, this information will provide 
material for further studies attempting to penetrate the acts and processes 
of governance 
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Abstract 
 
Creditors have no formal role in corporate governance, but they have 
major influence in situations of distress.  Distress is an abnormal 
situation where creditor governance replaces standard shareholder-
centered governance and where classical relationships between 
shareholders, board and management no longer hold.   Creditor 
governance is a means of solving conflict of interest between holders 
of debt and holders of equity.   This is what governance theory 
understands as the third agency problem. 
This paper focuses on what happens to governance in the gray area 
when distress is evident but formal power still remains in the hands 
of corporate bodies.   Creditor interests replace owner interests in a 
stepwise manner as their risk increases in proportion to total 
enterprise value.   This has implications to the intermediate role of 
the board in the corporate governance triangle between shareholders 
and management.  In simple terms, boards become representatives 
of creditors instead of owners, if they restrict the acts of management 
in order to protect creditors from risk of moral hazard. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Third agency problem, incomplete contracting, 
creditor governance, financial distress 
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1. Introduction 
 
Classical literature on corporate governance focuses on vertical and 
horizontal agency problems, the issues between owners and managers 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976) or between large and small shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  However, law and economy literature identifies 
also a third one, between the company and its debt holders, or between 
shareholders and “non-shareholders such as bondholders, labor, other 
creditors and even the state” (Hopt 2011).  The widely quoted definition of 
corporate governance by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) states that governance 
is a mechanism that “deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”.  
Even though the definition includes both equity owners and creditors, 
corporate governance literature has overwhelmingly focused on the first 
(Roberts and Sufi 2009b).  However, in situations of distress, economic risk 
shifts from the owners to creditors, leading to revolutions in roles of 
governance, changing who is principal and who acts as an agent.  Creditor 
governance appears when decision control shifts from the corporate bodies 
to debtholders, whereas in stages of normalcy, power lies in the hands of 
shareholders, board and management.  
Legalistic view on governance dominates the research on creditor 
governance.  Most of the literature considers creditor influence as starting 
from default (Nini, Smith, & Sufi, 2012).  However, there are actually three 
formal waypoints: covenant violations, restructuring and bankruptcy, each 
having distinct features that influence corporate governance.  In addition to 
legalistic view, decision control can also be seen from an economic 
viewpoint, highlighting the transfer of real power and not only formal power.   
Rational economic actors don’t react just on legal events, their acts can 
rather be seen as a continuum of stages from normalcy to bankruptcy, where 
they consider potential future stages and react accordingly.    
Theory of creditor governance is based on financial contracting theory, or 
more specifically, theory of incomplete contracts (see eg. Tirole 1999 or 
Grossman & Hart, 1983).  Incomplete contracting theory shares the basis 
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with agency theory, seeing contracts as a means of controlling the agency 
problem between creditors and owners.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) saw 
creditors rather as allies to owners, debt providing additional control over 
management, as repayments and interest reduced management ability to 
use corporate resources for private benefit.  However, the two theories seem 
to lead to opposite conclusions, if financial contracts are a means to solve 
conflicts of interests between shareholders and creditors (Smith and Warren 
1979), or if they are a means to help owners by providing an essentially free 
controlling service against usury by management (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). 
From theoretical point of view an interesting and partly neglected question 
is how transfer in power takes place and how it manifests itself in corporate 
governance.  The transfer of decision control is not clear cut.  There is a grey 
area where owner-dominated and creditor-dominated governance overlap 
(Nini, Smith and Sufi 2012).  Gray area is relevant for governance as 
companies have an interest to react to distress already in anticipation of 
covenant violations, preventing them from falling under creditor control.  
This gray are is the subject of this study. 
The empirical part of this paper studies the connection between corporate 
decision control and financial distress.  It is based on 600 largest European 
companies by market capitalization and combines financial data on distress 
with governance attributes and decision rules.  The basic assumption is that 
the way decision rights are divided between the board and the management 
provides us information on decision control, and decision control is the key 
to understanding governance, how boards and managements interact in 
order to represent the interests of shareholders, or in situations of distress, 
the interests of creditors. 
The theoretical contribution of this article relates both to corporate 
governance as well as to financial contracting theory.  It argues that creditor 
control impacts governance in several steps as level of distress in a company 
increases.  Financial distress also impacts the roles of corporate actors, 
changing the role of the board from representatives of owners to creditor 
representatives.  Potential moral hazard by the owners is mitigated by acts 
of board, limiting management decision rights in the interests of creditors.  
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Basically in distress, creditors become principals instead of owners, ensuring 
that board decision control is serving the largest financial interest. 
The empirical results show that management decision rights increase when 
shareholders’ part of enterprise value decreases, indicating a problem of 
moral hazard, assuming that higher limits are connected with increased risk-
taking.  In the case the value of ownership is small, an increasing part of 
potential losses from risk decisions belongs to creditors while all benefits 
accrue to shareholders.  Although the evidence is not very strong, empirical 
analysis also provides support for the change of directors’ role from 
representatives of shareholders to representatives of creditors, however on 
a very high level of financial distress.  Lack of stronger evidence may be due 
to the quality of sample companies, consisting of 600 most valuable 
companies in Europe, all of them having high market value of equity.   
This paper does not take a stand on preferences for governance structure in 
companies under distress.  There seems to be little academic literature 
focusing on this problem and no coherent view has emerged on what 
changes to governance should be made in such situations (Fich and Slezak 
2008).  Anyhow, results of this study can be used both by practitioners as 
well as standard-setters to further consider the role of creditors in corporate 
governance. 
 
2. Corporate governance, creditors and incomplete 
contracting 
 
 
In this chapter, we discuss the key concepts of creditor’s role in corporate 
governance, financial distress, financial contracting, and covenants.  
However, prior to that we need to start with a description of board decision 
rules – what they are and why they matter.   
Corporate governance can be seen as a mechanism of decision control, 
consisting of formal rules and informal practices that determine how 
material decisions in a company are made.   Law and economics literature 
focuses predominantly in the formal rules and regulations, and how to 
prevent governance failures from  misbehavior (e.g. Hopt 2011, La Porta et 
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al. 2000).  However, overwhelming majority of governance does not involve 
such misbehavior but rather consists of daily monitoring and decision-
making by the board (Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach 2013). These are the 
decisions that lead to execution of strategy, change firm’s risk profile and 
eventually result in returns to its investors. 
Decision control has several layers (Aguilera et al. 2008), most general of 
them provided by the society in legislation, usually called hard law, such as 
company and security market laws.  The next layer consists of stock 
exchange rules and corporate governance codes, which are de-facto binding 
to companies and which constitute soft law.  The third layer consists of 
company specific rules, determined by the company itself and tailored to its 
specific circumstances.  Articles of Association define the powers of 
shareholders, in principle having full control based on ownership rights, but 
in practice shareholders formally delegate majority of decision powers to 
board through these Articles.  Boards have a specific self-regulating role in 
governance, as they unilaterally define the rules of decision-making within a 
company, determining how decision power is divided between board itself 
and management.  Although the responsibility for drafting and/or approving 
rules is not always explicitly expressed in rules, there was no evidence in any of 
the material of investigated 600 companies that such rules would be subject to 
shareholder acceptance or even presentation in shareholder meetings.  Rather, 
several rules included even a specific date when boards had approved them.  
Even if hard and soft law together with Articles can be seen as the formal 
basis of governance, board rules actually define the praxis on which most 
corporate decisions are based.  These rules have been largely overlooked in 
academic literature, even though they provide first-hand information on 
how boards act.    
 
2.1 Creditors in corporate governance 
 
Creditors are not absent in the classical treatises of corporate governance.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) defined corporate governance as a means for the 
suppliers of funds to ensure that they get a return on their investment, 
without explicitly separating equity investors from debt investors.  In a less 
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quoted part of their seminal paper, Jensen and Meckling (1976) define 
agency costs of debt as opportunity costs due to restrictions on investments 
set by debtholders, monitoring and bonding cots of bondholders and 
bankruptcy and reorganization costs.  Today, the governance aspect of 
company-creditor relationship is often called the third agency problem (e.g. 
Hopt 2011), in addition to the vertical problem between shareholders and 
managers and horizontal problem between large and small shareholders. 
Huse (2007) divides corporate stakeholders into three groups, equity 
holders, economic stakeholders and environmental stakeholders, arguing 
that the first group has voting power, second has market power and third 
political power.  However, if we see corporate governance as a mechanism 
of decision control, ability to influence how material decisions with 
economic impact within a corporation are made, the boundary becomes 
more diffuse.  Although shareholders have formal power, real power is 
exercised through their elected representatives, board of directors, and other 
economic actors may have indirect or even direct power on decision-making 
due to their economic interest.  This paper concerns the specific situation of 
financial distress, where economic interests of creditors surpass those of 
shareholders, with consequences on how governance process functions.  It 
is evident that considering incomplete contracting and various innovations 
in financial instruments, the boundaries of decision-making power are not 
clear-cut. 
Theoretical literature on creditor governance does not seem to be well 
developed.  Much of the literature is empirical, focusing on the role of 
covenants in regulating the incomplete contracts problem between creditors 
and a company (see e.g. Nini, Smith and Sufi 2012, Baird and Rasmussen 
2006).  Most of governance literature is focused on the shareholder 
perspective, even if other contractual claimants also have financial risk 
related to the performance of a company.  The classical view sees 
shareholders as residual risk takers, but in effect, considering the hierarchy 
of claims, in financial distress there are several layers of residual risk takers, 
and the agency problem changes its form depending on to whom the residual 
risk has been transferred.  This transition of residual risk and how that is 
reflected in corporate governance, and more specifically in board decision 
control, is the subject of this paper. 
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2.2.  Financial distress 
 
There is little research on governance under distress (Fich and Slezak 2008). 
In situations of financial health, general governance rules apply and 
creditors have only potential power, while in distress the normal relations 
between corporate actors break down and creditor control increasingly takes 
over other means of corporate governance.  
How do we define situation of distress?   We can separate at least four 
different levels, three of which are clearly observable and the fourth 
(financial weakness) which happens by stealth.    The four levels of financial 
distress can be called financial weakness (Level 1), covenant violation (Level 
2), restructuring (Level 3) and bankruptcy (Level 4), each one increasing 
further the power of creditors.  In addition to these stages, we need to 
remember that creditor governance is an abnormal situation, and most of 
the time companies are solvent and decision control remains tightly in the 
hands of corporate bodies1.   
 
Chart 1 Creditors, level of distress and corporate governance 
                                                          
1 It also needs to be remembered, that the most simple solution to distress is recapitalization 
of a company, prior to entering any of the stages of creditor control. 
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Chart 1 illustrates the relationship between financial distress, creditor 
governance and decision control.  The first level, financial weakness, is most 
diffuse, as it is impossible to define exactly.   It is evident that creditors have 
implicit influence on corporate decision-making already prior to covenant 
violations, even if governance is still firmly in hands of corporate bodies.    
Even though legal restrictions usually prohibit creditors directly influencing 
corporate decisions, there is at least anecdotal evidence that creditors 
provide management advice on how to avoid covenant violations or what 
should be done to receive a waiver after violations have taken place (Baird 
and Rasmussen 2006, Day and Taylor 1998). Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012) 
note the same issue “the nature of behind-the-scenes negotiations makes it 
difficult to document the informal role of creditors on corporate 
governance”.   Potential threat of creditor governance impacts the way 
board, management and shareholders act, and creates situations where 
classical relationships in governance change.  The phenomenon how 
decision control moves from corporate bodies to creditors is the main focus 
of this study. 
The first formal point leading to changes in decision control is covenant 
violation (Nini, Smith and Sufi 2012), which provides creditors several 
alternatives, most drastic being acceleration of loan repayment, although 
more common are renegotiating of terms of contract by enforcing 
restrictions on corporate decision-making or requiring a higher return to 
creditors as a compensation of increased risk1 (Roberts and Sufi 2009c).  
This renegotiation process is related to incomplete contracting theory, to 
which we return later.   
Prior to bankruptcy, companies usually need to pass another milestone.  A 
standard legal procedure either leading to or preventing bankruptcy is 
restructuring, in US commonly called Chapter 11.  The general intent of 
restructuring is to allow viable companies survive, although outcomes for 
owners and various classes of debt holders may be drastic.  Even if 
                                                          
1 This is naturally a simplification of the complexities of real situations, where details of 
contracting may create complex and controversial negotiations over their interpretation.  A 
separate question excluded from this article concerns the ability of the company to influence 
their financial reporting in a way that covenant violations can be hidden or at least 
postponed.   
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restructuring usually involves court-appointed specialists, de-facto control 
is in the hands of debtor in possession lenders1 (Ayotte and Morrison 2009), 
usually being the senior (secured) lenders, and the main governance 
problem becomes actually the one  between senior and junior creditors, as 
they may have different interests if companies should be liquidated or 
allowed to be restructured. 
For situations of distress, the most dramatic event concerns bankruptcy, a 
situation where borrower is unable to pay his debts and creditors use their 
rights to take possession and liquidate company assets.  Early literature on 
creditor role on governance (see e.g. Hart and Moore 1988) considered 
normalcy and bankruptcy almost as the only two alternatives of owner and 
creditor governance, with little attention to creditor influence between these 
two stages. 
 
2.3.  Financial contracting 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) are usually credited with defining a firm as “a 
nexus of contracts”, but interestingly enough, formal contract have little role 
determining the relationships between owners and board and between 
board and management.   The first is based on unilateral delegation of 
decision rights to board, which act as shareholders’ representative, and the 
second primarily on rules of the board in which board one-sidedly 
determines which powers it retains and which it delegates to management, 
actual employment contract focusing on compensation and incentives .  On 
the other hand, creditor rights are not based on representation and 
delegation but rather on a contract between the company and creditors.   
Financial contracting theory, in simplified terms, can be described “as the 
theory on what kinds of deals are made between financiers and those who 
need financing” (Hart 2001).  This view basically excludes shareholding, in 
which return is based on residual rights rather than contracting. A core 
characteristic of financial contracting theory is that contracts are bound to 
                                                          
1 DIP (Debtor in possession) lenders have the first right to company assets, either as they are 
financing the restructuring or company assets are pledged as their collateral. 
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be incomplete (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1988), as future 
stages are impossible to forecast ex ante at the moment of writing a contract.  
An essential element of any financial contract is a mechanism of how to react 
to unexpected outcomes, either by renegotiation of by using the powers 
granted by the contract (Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 2010). 
Financial contracting theory arises from the same basis as corporate 
governance theory (Roberts and Sufi 2009b), both assuming a conflict 
between principals and agents. The self-interested motivational basis of 
financial contracting theory is strongly influenced by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), although stealing and shirking by the management from owners is 
replaced by stealing by management and owners from creditors1.    In the 
subsequent literature, Hart and Moore (1988) considered the clear-cut 
situation of missed payments as critical moment of change in control2, while 
Aghion and Bolton (1992) included the ability of creditors to influence 
decision control through contractual means, such as covenants. Only in late 
2000’s has the picture become more nuanced, with increasing number of 
studies analyzing creditors’ various impacts on corporate governance 
(Roberts and Sufi 2009b). 
Contracts are the basic means for resolving owner/creditor agency 
problems, although incomplete contracting theory states that it is impossible 
to write an agreement that covers all potential future stages.  Incomplete 
contracts need to include mechanisms of renegotiation, and ultimately 
mechanisms for transferring control rights.  Tirole (1999) argues that the 
basis for incomplete contracting is contracting costs, as it would be 
prohibitively expensive (or practically impossible) to prepare for all future 
stages.   Such changes in circumstances can be caused either by internal or 
external reasons, acts of management or changes in environment.  Literature 
(see e.g. Smith and Warner 1979, Roberts and Sufi 2009a) usually focuses 
on internal causes, how to prevent management acting against the interests 
of creditors, for example by increasing investments or returning capital to 
                                                          
1 “The primary conflict of interest in the model is the ability of managers to steal all cash flow 
with the exception of physical assets. As a result, the only threat the lender has over firm 
behavior is liquidation following payment default, which lowers future cash flow to the 
manager” – Hart and Moore (1998). 
2 Ayotte and Morrison (2009) demonstrate that creditors have full decision control in legal 
restructuring; in their sample of 153 firms, creditors providing debtor in possession (DIP) 
financing commonly replace key management and set detailed financial and operational 
restrictions, eliminating any remaining decision control owners or management might have 
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shareholders and thus changing the split of financial risk between 
debtholders and owners1.   
Two core concepts of contracting theory are hidden knowledge and moral 
hazard (Tirole 1999).  Although Tirole defines hidden knowledge as 
something that appears after contracts have been signed, and which 
management is aware of but creditors not, it also bears a resemblance to 
theory of information gap.   Information gap assumes that as management 
has better information on company than creditors, contract must include 
clauses that compensate for this deficiency.  Moral hazard concerns 
situations where one party, normally the management, acts against the 
interests of creditors while being fully aware of the negative consequences to 
their claims.   
In order to mitigate the problem of hidden information, creditors may have 
legal rights to receive preferential information.  If we consider debt as 
financial investment, preferential information disclosure can be seen as an 
anomaly, conflicting with founding principal of financial markets, equal 
treatment of investors2.       For example in US SEC has exempted banks and 
rating agencies from the regulation FD (Fair Disclosure)3, which other actors 
in financial markets obey.  Companies are allowed to disclose banks 
preferential information, such as budgets, business plans or investment 
plans, which can include information that is not publicly available (Li, 
Saunders, and Shao 2014).  In principle, this provides creditors additional 
protection by giving them information advantage over other providers of 
finance and it has monetary value to them in financial contracting.   It can 
be argued that such exemption is in the interests of a company, by reducing 
information gap it allows creditors to provide finance on more preferential 
terms (Doblas-Madrid and Minetti 2013).   
                                                          
1 Of course any new decision or new development in the market changes the risk profile of a 
company.  Thus in a dynamic world, complete contracting is a practical impossibility. 
2 Recent examples of limiting the rights of large investors requiring preferential information 
from equity analysts (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/business/17-brokerage-firms-
agree-to-end-analysis-previews.html), or discussion on miniscule timing differences in 
information disclosure, or even physical location of computers due to automatic trading all 
highlight the high level of sophistication market watchdogs exert on market participants in 
order to ensure their equal treatment, 
(http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542004312). 
3 Rating agency formal exception was removed in 2010, but they still can receive preferential 
information through confidentiality agreements, in line with banks 
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From creditor agency perspective, preferential disclosure has also other 
impacts.  Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) argue that the primary role of 
disclosure is to reduce the cost of capital.  In equity markets, the 
phenomenon is based on adverse selection, as less disclosure weakens the 
liquidity of shares, leading to lower valuation, and likewise, in credit markets 
weak disclosure reduces the number of potential financiers for a company1.    
 
2.4.  Covenants 
 
Existence of covenants is usually explained by agency theory and contracting 
costs (Taylor 2013).  By reducing the freedom of action of the management 
in situations of distress, covenants mitigate the third agency problem 
between the company and its debtholders.  They can be seen as a mechanism 
of corporate governance, as a first formal step of shifting formal power from 
the hands of corporate bodies to creditors (Baird and Rasmussen 2006).  
Covenants entered accounting literature quite recently, only in 1990’s 
(Roberts and Sufi 2009b), although related literature in finance has existed 
since Smith & Warner (1979). 
In line with incomplete contracting theory, covenants provide the standard 
mechanism of responding to uncertain stages in the contractual relationship 
between creditors and a company.   Covenants can be split into three 
categories (Day and Taylor 1998), affirmative (or positive), negative and 
financial covenants.  Affirmative covenants consist of matters like proper 
legal standing of a company, respect of laws and regulations or reporting 
timelines.  Negative covenants ensure the identity of the company by 
limiting structural changes such as acquisitions or divestments that may 
change the credit profile of the company.   Compliance with positive and 
negative covenants is within the authority of a company, as they can only be 
broken through acts and agreements that can be controlled by the company. 
                                                          
1 Consider the role of road shows, presenting the investment case to a large number of equity 
or debt investors.  Such presentations are not only marketing, but they also represent 
attempts of reducing the information gap by improving disclosure to a large number of 
potential providers of finance. 
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The third category of covenants, financial covenants are economically most 
significant, attempting to solve the problem of incomplete contracts.   For 
creditors, financial covenants limit uncertainty regarding uncontrollable 
future stages (Day and Taylor 1998, Nini, Smith and Sufi 2012).   From the 
company perspective, financial covenants always include an element of risk 
as outcomes of external events and internal business decisions may cause 
unanticipated transfer of control rights to creditors.   
Violation of covenants may lead to several alternative outcomes, the most 
drastic being acceleration, i.e. immediate requirement of repayment of debts 
subject to violation. The other options are based on renegotiation, which can 
lead both to higher interest costs as well as increased restrictions to 
company’s freedom of action, transferring a part of decision control to 
debtors.  Such restrictions may be soft, consisting of more frequent and 
deeper monitoring, or hard, consisting of limits of investments, dividends or 
other material decisions (Roberts and Sufi 2009a, Day and Taylor 1998). 
Common consequences of covenant violations can be considered to be 
against the interests of shareholders (e.g. dividend restrictions), boards (e.g. 
reduced decision control) and management (e.g. increased frequency of CEO 
change). 
Empirical literature on debt covenants can be divided first into US and non-
US covenants and secondarily into public and private debt covenants 
(Taylor, 2013)1.  Although technical definitions seem to differ across 
countries, most common financial covenants are related either to balance 
sheet strength, such as gearing, or cash flow, such as Net Debt to EBITDA 
(Moir and Sudarsanam 2007). What is striking in the literature surveyed by 
Taylor (2013) is the focus on accounting based information and negligence 
of market based data, an anomaly to which Myers paid attention already in 
1977.   
Debt holders’ possibility for exit is different from equity-holders.  Selling 
shares is basically always possible for an owner of a publicly listed firm, 
market liquidity allowing.  Refusing to renew debt or use covenants for 
accelerated repayment is one-sided action, which does not require a buyer 
for the debt.  It is way more forceful as a means to influence the management 
                                                          
1 This paper assumes that national differences in loan documentation are not material for 
very large European companies relying on international banks in their lending.   
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than the exit of a single shareholder, considering also that such action 
usually provides equal rights to all creditors1.  
Using a large US dataset, Nini, Smith and Sufi (2012) show that covenant 
violations lead to clear decrease in firm risk, improved profitability and 
increase in CEO turnover.  The investment levels and acquisition activity 
decline materially after credit events, proving that the decision power had 
drifted to debt providers.    As Chava and Roberts (2008) note, consequences 
of covenant violations are not necessary bad for the shareholders.  Indeed, 
Nini, Smith and Sufi also show that immediately following covenant 
violation, cash flow improved and costs declined in comparison to period 
prior to violation.  This can be interpreted as a remedy to failure of normal 
governance, creditor imposed governance compensating for the 
inadequacies of management and board decision control.     
What is a proper usage of covenants?  Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) find 
support for variations in covenant use related to conditions in financial 
markets, use of capital covenants decreasing during 1996 to 2007 but re-
increasing during the financial crisis of 2008-2010, which may reflect the 
fluctuation of relative power of debtholders, ability to enforce tighter 
covenants during economic downturns.  It is evident that some covenants 
are not properly designed at the optimum where creditors should have 
formal decision control.  In case thresholds are too high, covenants may lead 
to decreased investment and other risk-taking, leading to indirect wealth 
loss to shareholders. On the other hand, in case their levels are too low, they 
bypass the critical point where creditor risk exceeds   ownership interest.  
Considering the conservative nature of banking, the first risk seems more 
likely.   
From finance theory we know that going concern value of a company is 
normally higher than its liquidation value.  This creates creditors an 
incentive to act prior to liquidation of assets, to retain maximum value for 
debtholders.  There is a point of discontinuity, where creditors can, in order 
to protect their investment, sell the assets at liquidation value, even if going 
                                                          
1 Pari passu and cross default clauses in credit agreements are intended to guarantee equal 
treatment of all creditors even in situations where some creditors may have better terms or 
preferential information over other creditors 
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concern would provide more value to other parties in company’s financing 
structure.   
A classical question of finance theory is why firms do not borrow as much as 
they can (Myers 1977).  While Modigliani and Miller showed that the value 
of the company, in simplified circumstances, is independent of its financing 
structure (see e.g. Tirole 2006), the return to shareholders is not.  Due to the 
leverage effect of debt (and including its tax shield), as long as the return on 
assets exceeds debt costs, it is normally beneficial for shareholders to 
increase debt in proportion to equity1.    When going concern value of the 
equity in a corporation is very low, it is rational for the owners to increase 
the risk asymptotically as all income from successful risk-taking belongs to 
them, while most costs of failure fall on the debt-holders.  This question is 
the essence of creditor governance, how to limit the potential moral hazard 
of owners. 
The outcomes from covenant violation are potentially so drastic that rational 
corporate bodies react already to a threat thereof.  Nini, Smith and Sufi 
(2012) discuss creditor influence in the murky area around covenant 
violations, and argue that creditors provide active “behind the scenes” advice 
to companies approaching distress.  Anecdotal evidence of informal 
influence can also be found in Day and Taylor (1998) and Baird and 
Rasmussen (2006). Additionally, Roberts and Sufi (2009b) find that 90 % 
of loans are renegotiated prior to their maturity, and that renegotiation is 
based rather on change in business plans or external environment than 
financial distress, highlighting the versatile relationship between companies 
and their creditors.   Renegotiation process essentially provides a mark-to-
market valuation method for private corporate debt. 
However, if creditors have no formal means of enforcing their views on 
corporates in the gray area of financial distress, how can we observe it and 
prove its existence?  In the empirical part of this paper, data on management 
decision limits is analyzed in order to find out if boards increase decision 
control as financial distress increases, influencing corporate decisions to the 
benefit of creditor interests.   
                                                          
1 Myers (1977) discusses practical reasons, such as firms retaining borrowing capacity, 
management protecting their jobs from excessive risk taking or wealth loss caused by 
suboptimal investment policy under restrictions set by providers of risky debt. 
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3. Creditors and corporate governance  
 
In this chapter, we define a model of creditor governance in financial 
distress.  It is self-evident that when firms default, decision control shifts 
from owners to creditors, and management decision rights are severely 
curtailed.  However, the change from owner-centered to creditor governance 
includes several steps that have unique governance characteristics and 
where the roles of various actors may change.  There are several interesting 
phenomena that require further understanding.  First is how risk profiles of 
various actors impact corporate governance and second is the changing role 
of the board.  Additionally, we can ask, in line with financial contracting 
theory, “at what precise moment do creditors exercise control?” (Roberts 
and Sufi 2009a). 
In an antecedent to this study, Nini Smith and Sufi (2012) illustrate the 
changes in governance through a simple chart, through which they illustrate 
the difference between the classical view, where default defines the critical 
point between creditor and shareholder interests, and more nuanced view 
which includes a gray area of mixed influence where total firm value exceeds 
def 
ault value but the company is still under distress.   Similarly, Dichev and 
Skinner (2002) note ‘‘that private lenders set debt covenants tightly and use 
them as ‘trip wires’ for borrowers, that technical violations occur relatively 
often, and that violations are not necessarily associated with financial 
distress.’’  
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Chart 2 Nini-Smith-Sufi model of creditor influence on governance 
In order to develop further the Nini Smith and Sufi model, we can analyze 
the interests of various actors with a somewhat unconventional definition of 
enterprise value that separates senior (secured) creditors from junior 
(unsecured) creditors1.  Let’s assume the following: 
ܶܧܸ    =  ܯܸܧ + ܦ௦ +  ܦ௃ where2 
 
ܶܧܸ    =  Total enterprise value 
ܯܸܧ    =   Market value of equity 
ܦ௦   =   value of secured debt 
ܦ௃   =   value of unsecured debt 
 
and we can further define four different points on the total enterprise value 
(TEV) line of values 
 
ܶܧ̴ܸீை஼   =  Total enterprise value as a going 
concern 
ܶܧ̴ܸிூ஽ =  Total enterprise value where a threat 
of creditor influence on decision control impacts corporate decision control, 
but where a company is still in compliance with its financial covenants (FID 
= Financial distress) 
 
                                                          
1 There is actually a third class of creditors which usually is forgotten in financial literature – 
trade and other non-interest bearing creditors.  However, their position is similar to junior 
creditors, so ܦ௝  can be considered to include also trade creditors 
2 Normally TEV = MVE + IBD, where IBD (Interest bearing debt) excludes trade and other non-
interest bearing creditors 
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ܶܧ̴ܸ஼ை௏    =  covenant (COV) value of the 
enterprise, which for simplicity is defined as a point in where market value 
of debt is 100 % and ܯܸܧ  is clearly higher than zero, but where a financial 
covenant is violated 1 
 
ܶܧ̴ܸ௅ூொ  =   Total enterprise value in liquidation 
(LIQ) 
 
There are at least three basic game-theoretic situations that influence 
corporate governance2: 
 
First, the situation where ܶܧ̴ܸீை஼  > ܶܧ̴ܸிூ஽  represents normality in 
governance, where standard theory applies, decision control is within 
corporate bodies and shareholders, board and management each have a 
clearly defined role.  This is the area what most studies in corporate 
governance focus on. 
 
Second, the situation where ܶܧ̴ܸ஼ை௏ < ܶܧ̴ܸீை஼  <  ܶܧ̴ܸிூ஽  represents the 
gray area of creditor governance, where creditor interests influence 
corporate decision control and impact the principal-agent role of the board, 
but where formal power still lies in the hands of the board. 
 
Third, the situation where ܶܧ̴ܸீை஼  <  ܶܧ̴ܸ஼ை௏ , which means that the 
company is in violation of its credit covenants, and which has further five 
basic variations 
 
a) ܶܧ̴ܸீை஼  > ܶܧ̴ܸ௅ூொ  > ܦ௦  i.e. both the going concern value of the 
company and the liquidation value are above secured lenders’ 
claims,  restricting their  interest of accelerating debt repayment 
and potentially pushing the company into liquidation.   
 
b) ܶܧ̴ܸீை஼ ൏ ܶܧ̴ܸ௅ூொ  > ܦ௦  i.e. senior creditors are still able to 
recover all of their claim, but continuing business will reduce its 
                                                          
1 In practice financial covenants use accounting values rather than market values, even if from 
theoretical perspectives market values would be more relevant 
2 In real life, the situation are naturally more complicated, as the position of other parties, 
such as employees and tax authorities may be preferential, depending on legislation 
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value, endangering the future recovery of ܦ௦ .  It would be rational 
for senior creditors to accelerate the loans, causing losses to 
junior creditors.   
 
c) ܶܧ̴ܸ௅ூொ  < ܦ௦ but ܶܧ̴ܸீை஼   > ܦ௦ , i.e. the situation where if the 
company were liquidated, secured lenders would suffer losses, 
but in case company continues operating, its value would still 
remain above security value.  This situation still allows for  
renegotiation, but creates a need for intensive monitoring by 
creditors 
 
d) ܶܧ̴ܸ௅ூொ  < ܦ௦ ,and ܶܧ̴ܸீை஼   < ܦ௦, but ܶܧ̴ܸீை஼  > ܶܧ̴ܸ௅ூொ ,i.e. senior 
creditors will suffer a loss in any case, but it is still rational for 
them to continue the business as it may provide them with higher 
value than liquidation 
 
e) ܶܧ̴ܸ௅ூொ  > ܶܧ̴ܸ஼ைீ, otherwise as in d), which means that it is 
rational for senior creditors to liquidate the assets of the 
company, in order to restrict further future losses. 
 
 
In order to further illustrate the issues related to corporate governance, Nini 
Smith and Sufi (2012) chart can be redrawn to include a key governance 
indicator, decision control within a firm, creating a model that combines 
financial contracting theory with corporate governance.   In this model, the 
horizontal axis is basically the same as in Nini, Smith and Sufi, although it is 
expressed differently, as the relationship of market value of equity to total 
enterprise value (MVE/TEV).  MVE/TEV as a market based measurement 
does not seem to appear in prior governance literature, although it is useful 
in analyzing the differing interests of shareholders and creditors specifically 
in situations of financial distress.  For example, in case market value of 
equity is only a small fraction of book value of equity, ownership approaches 
option value and creditors become de-facto residual risk takers in any major 
risk decision while benefits accrue to shareholders.   An additional benefit 
for this definition is that we can widen the gray area between shareholder 
and creditor governance and make it more nuanced for our analysis, as 
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MVE/TEV indicates financial distress already prior to violation of 
covenants.  In comparison to accounting-based covenants, such as gearing 
or equity ratio, which may provide misleading information of the risk 
position of shareholders and creditors, market based indicator is always up-
to-date with investor assessment of the future cash-generating ability of a 
company1.    
Chart 3 illustrates the relationship of management risk authority and total 
enterprise value.  On the X-axis is total enterprise value, which is a sum of 
total debt and market value of equity.  This can also be seen to represent the 
proportion of total enterprise value held by shareholders (MVE/TEV), as 
market value of equity decreases in line with total enterprise value, assuming 
debt remains constant, and actually becomes negative when nominal value 
of debt is larger than remaining enterprise value2.  On the Y-axis is the 
management risk authority defined as the decision limit for investments 
delegated by the board to the management.  Total enterprise value is divided 
into four segments, normality, where firm is healthy and creditors have no 
influence on decision rights, a stage of financial distress where covenants are 
not broken but where decision rights start to decline as creditor interests 
increasingly are considered in company risk decisions, area where financial 
covenants are broken but company is still solvent, where creditors have a 
major influence on risk decisions, and finally, area where firm goes in 
reorganization or bankruptcy.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 There are numerous financial indicators for the probability of default, most famous being 
Altman’s Z-score, which is a combination of various indicators of financial weakness (Altman 
2000).  An interesting variable was created by (Cao et al. 2013), which they call “distance to 
default”, where they attempt to combine market-based variables (market value of equity) 
with accounting variables (dividends).  The risk indicator (EV/MVE) used in this study can be 
considered a simplified version of Cao et al (2013) “distance to default”.   
2 This can also be explained as a situation where market value of debt is below its book value, 
and where creditor risk becomes ownership risk as any changes in total enterprise value are 
directly reflected in the value of debt. 
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Chart 3 Management decision rights in different stages of distress 
The shape in Chart 3 is humped due to various influences.  First, the chart 
rises from right to left reflecting a positive relationship between increased 
market-based gearing and management decision rights.  This can be due to 
several factors.  From governance perspective, it is assumed that high 
MVE/TEV is associated with low decision authority for the management, as 
lower leverage indicates limited risk preference of shareholders.  On the 
other hand, when MVE/TEV becomes low, a large proportion of the financial 
risk is transferred to creditors, as probability that an uncertain stage in the 
future will lead to a credit event increases.  Consequently, such values should 
be associated with higher risk limits, reflecting moral hazard of shareholders 
as higher risk leads to increased volatility of earnings, the option type 
benefits of which belong to shareholders while losses fall on creditors. 
Thus we can present our first hypothesis: 
H1: Decision power of the management is negatively related to 
shareholders’ share of total enterprise value 
However, the gray area is what happens in financial distress.  At certain point 
in the continuum of split of enterprise value between owners and creditors, 
boards increasingly consider the interests of creditors and start to restrict 
the freedom of management.  This may not be in the interests of 
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shareholders, for whom it might be rational to increase risk asymptotically 
as market value of equity approaches zero and the ownership has only option 
value.  In such a situation, upside from risk decisions belongs to owners but 
downside to creditors, which may create a situation of moral hazard. 
In chart 4, we further illustrate risk profiles of creditors and owners.  For the 
sake of simplicity, a company is assumed to represent only shareholder 
interests, an assumption that will be released later.  Thus chart 4 
demonstrates the agency problem between creditors and owners, which is 
the core of financial contracting theory.  Dotted line represents the risk 
preference of owners, which evidently is very flat and declining while the 
firm is financially healthy, as strong balance sheet, here understood as 
market value based gearing, represents a low appetite for risk.  On the other 
hand, dotted line starts to rise asymptotically as we get closer to market value 
approaching zero, where balance of financial risk changes from owners to 
creditors, representing a situation of moral hazard.  From creditors’ 
perspective (constant line), the stronger the company the more risk appetite 
creditors have, and in the right hand side of the chart creditor risk appetite 
exceeds owners’ risk appetite.  However, the crossing of the two lines, where 
owners risk appetite falls under creditors’ risk appetite, is the point where 
financial covenants ideally should be placed.
 
Chart 4  Risk profiles of owners and creditors 
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Combining the risk preferences and decision rights we get our second 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: Power of management is curtailed at a level where the risk preference 
of creditors falls below the risk preference of owners 
 
There are several studies documenting creditor influence on decision control 
already prior to bankruptcy.   Chava and Roberts (2008) and Nini, Smith 
and Sufi (2012) find that firms’ investments are reduced after covenant 
violations, under the threat of acceleration of debt payments.   Nini et al. 
(2009) find that covenant violations often lead to reduced dividends to 
shareholders and explicit investment restrictions in credit agreements.  
Covenant violations have also a contracting cost element.  Roberts and Sufi 
(2009b) show that violations lead to reduced access to credit markets and 
increases in interest costs.   
Covenants provide the first shift in formal power, but we need to remember 
that not all credit agreements are optimal.  Creditors may receive effective 
decision rights too early, curtailing risk decisions while they still may be in 
shareholder interests without hurting creditor rights.   Nini, Smith and Sufi 
(2012) find out that at least in American environment, financial covenants 
are set at a level where companies still are in a reasonable health “The 
median firm in our sample that is a first-time covenant violator has a 
market-to-book ratio above one, positive operating cash flow, and enough 
liquidity to easily cover their current liabilities”  The rationale for the debt-
holders to require financial covenants on levels where there is substantial 
shareholder value remaining may be the same as the interests of 
blockholders.  In the case a blockholder attempts to sell its share, it may 
result in decline in value of its holdings, and similarly in case a single debt-
holder requires for early repayment of her debts due to covenant violation, 
this normally leads to cross default, acceleration of all debts.  Cross default 
is a standard clause in credit agreements, protecting individual creditors 
from preferential treatment of other creditors which may have been able to 
negotiate tighter covenants or other credit terms.  In simple terms, cross 
default allows all creditors to require repayment if any one of them has 
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received that right. Evidently, cross default clauses increase creditor 
influence, as the outcome of breakage of a single covenant can be drastic for 
the total external financing of a company.  
Next we can turn to the relationship of governance characteristics and 
creditor control.     First, there is evidence of weak governance being related 
to bankruptcy.  Daily and Dalton (1994) observe a connection between 
insider influence and bankruptcy, duality of management structures and 
insider directorships being more frequent with bankrupt firms than with 
surviving firms.  Fich and Slezak (2008), also analyzing governance 
attributes and bankruptcy, finding that non-independent directors and large 
boards are associated with likelihood of bankruptcy.   
Several papers study the relationship of governance characteristics and 
covenant violations.  Chava and Robers (2009) and Chava, Kumar and 
Warge (2010) find that relatively more severe agency problems are related 
to limited shareholder rights or management entrenchment reduces the 
trust of creditors in situations of distress, leading to harsher restrictions on 
investments.  Day, Mather, and Taylor (2011) study the relationship of board 
characteristics and creditor monitoring.  They find that creditor monitoring 
is negatively related to board independence and financial expertise, but 
positively related to blockholder presence in board.    
Cao et al (2013) study the impact of governance structures on default risk, 
and find that smaller boards reduce default risk after regulatory failures in 
reporting. They consider this to be an outcome of reduced information 
asymmetry in comparison to larger boards.  Additionally, they find both 
board independence as well as gender diversity as factors reducing credit 
risk.  All of these can be considered trust enhancing measures, and thus they 
should also be visible in the material on decision control.  
A corollary to research on distress can be found in studies on credit pricing.  
Armstrong et al. (2010) provide a survey of studies that find a link between 
board independence, accounting and auditor quality, and cost of debt.  
Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) find higher ratings and lower yields for firms 
with greater board independence and institutional ownership.  Lower cost 
of debt reflects the amount of trust creditors have on board’s monitoring 
ability, and independent boards should thus allow for higher decision rights 
for management. 
 230 
So we can establish two more hypotheses related to governance 
characteristics and creditor governance: 
H3: Increased board independence and monitoring is associated with 
creditor trust, and thus higher management risk limits 
 
H4: Duality of leadership is positively associated with management risk 
limits 
 
In addition, there are two control variables.  It is assumed that the activity 
of board is negatively related to decision limits as active directors have more 
resources to control management decisions than passive directors.  
Secondly, it is assumed that size of the company is positively associated with 
risk limits, larger companies delegating more powers to management than 
smaller firms. 
 
Now we can turn the hypotheses into an empirical model to be tested: 
 
ெܲ ൌ ߚ ൅ ݔଵܱܹܰܧܴܸܣܮܷܧ ൅ݔଶܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ ൅ ݔଷܱܹܰܧܴܸܣܮܷܧ
כ ܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ ൅ݔସܤܱܣܴܦܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ
൅ ݔହܱܹܰܧܴܵܪܫܲ ൅ݔ଺ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮܸܣܴܫܣܤܮܧܵ൅א 
Where  
ெܲ  Power of management, measured as natural logarithm of 
delegated investment decision rights 
ܱܹܰܧܴܸܣܮܷܧ is a proxy of shareholders’ relative economic interest. It is 
calculated as a proportion of Market Value of Equity (MVE) to 
Total Enterprise Value (TEV), where TEV = MVE + net 
interest bearing debt1 
ܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ   This is a dummy factor that represents a threshold that 
changes ownership based governance to creditor governance.  
It receives a value of 1 in case financial risk to creditors is high, 
otherwise zero.  NET DEBT to EBITDA is used as a proxy of 
                                                          
1 This definition works in reverse to normal measures of leverage.  A high MVE/TEV reflects a 
situation of low creditor risk as most of enterprise value is with shareholders and a low 
MVE/TEV represents a situation of distress, where most of enterprise value consists of debt 
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financial risk, and various values between 3 and 10 are tested 
as thresholds of high risk 
ܱܹܰܧܴ כ ܦܫܴܵܶܧܵܵ  is an interaction variable between OWNER VALUE 
AND DISTRESS, representing the situations where 
shareholders’ economic interest is low and creditor risk is 
high, leading to reversal of board role from representatives of 
shareholders to representatives of creditors. 
ܤܱܣܴܦܥܪܣܴܣܥܶܧܴܫܵܶܫܥܵ  include the following variables: 
- ܫܰܦܧܲܧܰܦܧܰܥܧ   Percentage of independent members 
in board.  
- ܨܧܯܣܮܧ   Percentage of female board members 
- ܤܱܣܴܦܯܧܧܶܫܰܩܵ  Number of annual meetings of the  
board 
- ܥܧܱȀܥܱܤ   Dual CEO and chairman of the board, 
as a  percentage of board members 
ܦܱܯܫܰܣܰܥܧ Share of voting right held by the largest 
shareholder 
ܵܫܼܧ  Natural logarithm of sales  
 
4. Data, analysis and discussion 
 
Data for the analysis comes from several sources.  The empirical material 
consist of 600 largest European companies by market capitalization, which 
formed EuroSTOXX 600 as of 25.7.2012.  There are pros and cons related to 
this material.  First, due to the large size of the companies, the amount and 
quality of their disclosure is high.  325 (54 %) of the companies disclosed 
their board rules, and 244 (76%) of those included numerical investment 
limits for board decision control.  The sample is wide enough to include 17 
industries and 15 countries, so it provides a representative sample of 
European corporate sector.  However, the data has also limitations.  The 
sample consists of companies with high market valuations, thus generally 
the firms are in good shape and relatively few companies are in financial 
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distress. The full database also includes 109 (18%) companies from the 
financial sector (banks, insurance companies, financial services), which are 
difficult to compare, and thus they were excluded from the analysis,  leaving 
a final sample of 202 non-financial companies that had disclosed numerical 
authorized investment limits for management.     
Financial material is from ORBIS database, and it has been collected for the 
year that ends on or between 31.12.2011 and 30.12.2012. Relevant currency 
conversions were made at the foreign exchange rates current at the date of 
financial reporting.  Data on ownership and board structure was hand 
collected either from the latest annual report for the same period, or 
supplemented by additional information provided on company website.  
Information on management decision rights was collected from company 
disclosures on board rules or other similar documents1 
 
 
4.1.  Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 provides the definitions for the variables.  The distress variables were 
tested on several levels, so the table provides only an example of their 
definition.  
Table 1  Variable definitions 
    
Variable Definition 
Ln inv lim (1) Natural logarithm of investment decision limit delegated 
by the board to the management, converted into EUR 
PCT of voting rights (2) Per cent of voting rights of the largest shareholder 
MVE/TEV (3) Relationship of market value of equity to total 
capitalization, TEV is calculated as a sum of market value 
of equity and net interest bearing debts as of the latest 
reporting date 
                                                          
1 Matters Reserved to the Board, Board rules, Board charter or other explicit disclosure, such 
as Document de Référence 
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Distress (4) Dummy variable for companies which have a high net 
debt to EBITDA for the latest financial year 
MVE/EV * Distress (5) Interaction variable, calculated as 3 * 4 
Number of meetings (6) Number of board meetings during last financial year 
PCTIndependent (7) Percentage of board members independent both from 
the company and largest shareholders 
CEO_COB (8) CEO’s having simultaneously also the role of Chairman 
of the Board, as a percentage of board members 
Ln_sales_EUR (9) Natural logarithm of company sales, converted into EUR 
   
Natural logarithm of investment authority delegated by board to 
management under written board rules (Ln inv lim) is the dependent 
variable in the model1 representing the risk to creditors on a company.  The 
basic assumption is that decision limits provide a signal to management of a 
preferred risk level, as determined by the board.  The rationale of using 
management decision rights as a proxy for governance is manifold.  First, 
board is considered to be instrument of representation for the shareholders, 
ensuring alignment of interests of management and shareholders.  Decision 
control is they key mechanism of governance, as other acts boards consider 
important (choosing a CEO, determining strategy) actually take place very 
seldom, so the boundary between board decision control and management 
decision rights defines day-to-day governance.    
Table 2 presents the industry and country breakdown of the sample.  
Frequency of disclosure varies somewhat between countries, France and 
Italy having the highest disclosure rate while the Nordic countries have the 
lowest.  42 % of the companies can be considered widely held, with an 
institutional shareholder as the largest shareholder, usually with an 
ownership share of less than 10 %.  Based on the recent evidence 
(Holderness 2007) this is not very much different from US, even if 
traditionally ownership concentration has been considered higher in Europe 
than on the other side of Atlantic.  This study takes a different view from the 
law and economics literature (LaPorta et al 2008), which considers 
countries as important variables.  Considering the free movement of capital 
                                                          
1 In case several investment limits have been defined, the lowest has been used.  In a few 
cases where boards have determined a separate acquisition limit but no investment limit, 
acquisition limit has been used. 
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and de-facto harmonization of regulation, there are strong reasons to 
consider European Economic Area as one investment market for large listed 
companies. 
 
Table 2  Breakdown of finals sample by industry and by country (N=202)  
 
Countries are BE = Belgium, CH = Switzerland, DE = Germany, DK = Denmark, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = 
France, GB = Great Britain, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, LU = Luxembourg, NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, PT = 
Portugal, SE = Sweden 
 
Table 3 presents the key descriptive statistics of the variables.  Median 
investment limit of sample companies was 29.9 MEUR, minimum being 0.1 
MEUR and maximum 3.89 BEUR, naturally reflecting the size of the 
company. In order to correct for this evident relationship, a natural 
logarithm of sales is included as a control variable in the empirical model.   
The median sales were 5.9 billion euros, median market value of equity 5.2 
billion and median enterprise value 6.8 billion, representing median 
EV/Sales valuation of 1.2, which seems realistic for large listed companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GB IE IT LU NL NO PT SE N
2 3 2 7
1 7 1 1 10
2 2 4 2 2 2 1 15
3 4 1 2 10
1 1 1 3 2 1 3 12
1 4 1 3 2 1 12
4 5 1 1 10 9 3 7 1 41
4 4 1 1 1 1 12
1 3 2 2 1 1 10
1 3 2 2 2 1 11
1 2 1 4 3 2 1 14
1 3 3 1 1 9
1 1 6 1 1 10
1 1 1 2 1 1 7
3 6 9
Utilities 2 2 4 1 4 13
6 20 19 1 4 1 56 44 1 17 1 19 3 2 8 202N
Industry
Country
Telecommunications
Travel and leisure
Media
Oil & gas
Personal & household goods
Real estate
Retail
Technology
Basic resources
Chemicals
Construction & materials
Food & beverages
Healthcare
Industrial goods and services
Automobiles & parts
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics         
        
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum 25 % Median 75 % Maximum 
LN_INV_LIM 3,5 1,768 2,1 2,3 3,4 4,8 8,0 
PCT_of_voting_rights 26 % 21 % 2 % 9 % 20 % 36 % 90 % 
Number_of_members 11,3 3,6 3,0 9,0 11,0 13,0 22,0 
No_of_meetings 8,5 3,1 3,0 6,0 8,0 10,0 22,0 
Sales_EUR (MEUR) 15 503 23 859 … 1 846 5 954 17 871 166 728 
MVE_EUR (MEUR) 11 917 19 553 821 2 556 5 217 11 574 146 696 
EV_EUR (MEUR) 16 154 24 067 670 3 109 6 837 15 392 158 480 
INV_LIM_EUR (MEUR) 124,7 301,3 0,1 10,0 29,9 119,7 3088,8 
PCTIndependent 60 % 22 % 11 % 44 % 57 % 73 % 100 % 
LN_SALES_EUR (Millions)  15,6 1,6 6,9 14,4 15,6 16,7 18,9 
MVE/TEV 0,781 0,246 0,103 0,631 0,820 0,943 1,552 
NET_DEBT_EBITDA_LAST 1,692 2,847 -11,061 0,309 1,150 2,275 20,408 
        
 
Table 4 provides the two-tailed Pearson correlations for the variables.  
Investment limit is positively correlated with sales (0.531), as can be 
expected.  Concentration of ownership is negatively correlated with share of 
independent directors (-0.435) indicating that widely held companies are 
more likely to choose independent directors.  The interaction variable 
between distress and MVE/TEV is highly correlated due to the way the 
variable is calculated.  Interestingly, Distress is negatively correlated with 
size (-0.356), indicating that larger companies are less risky for creditors.   
Table 4 Correlations between variables 
  
This table reports the correlations between model variables.  Variables are defined in Table 2.  
Significance at the 5% level is denoted by * and 1% by **. 
 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ln Inv Limit (1) 0.079 -0.187** 0.067 0.047 -0.019 -0.008 0.209** 0.531** 
Voting rights(2)  -0.002 0.055 0.055 0.000 -0.435** 0.088 -0.041 
MVE/TEV (3)   -0.236** -0.192** -0,.224** 0.066 -0.015 -0.102 
Distress (4)    0.950** 0.100 -0.045 -0.034 -0.356** 
4 * 5 (5)     0.068 -0.042 -0.049 -0.408** 
Meetings (6)         0.180* -0.073 0.217** 
Independent (7)        -0.111 0.022 
CEO COB (8)        0.087 
Size (9)         
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4.3.  Regression results 
 
In order to study the relationship of corporate risk preferences and third 
agency problem, a model was created in Chapter 3 above, where 
management decision rights were used as a proxy for the risk profile of a 
company.  It was first assumed that the lower the ownership value in relation 
to total enterprise value the higher the company risk profile would be, 
indicating a potential moral hazard problem between owners and creditors.  
On the other hand, it was assumed that board as an intermediary actor with 
large delegated authority will restrict risk-taking for the benefit of creditors 
when company is in financial distress, protecting their own reputation and 
effectively changing their role from representatives of shareholders to 
representatives of creditors, increasingly considering creditor claims over 
shareholder value.  Additional assumptions were made of the relevance of 
board characteristics impacting company risk-taking.  
Table 4 presents the results of regression tests.  The test were run on three 
different levels of complexity.  Model one includes only the distress variables 
and size as control variable.  The second model includes also ownership 
concentration and the third model adds also board characteristics into the 
model.  Although the signs of relationships between independent and 
dependent variable remain the same through variations of the model, only 
inclusion of both ownership variables and board variables provided 
significant results and thus it can be concluded that the impact of distress on 
governance cannot be understood separately from ownership and board 
characteristics.   The outcomes of the third model are discussed next. 
The relationship between relative ownership value (MVE/TEV) and risk-
taking was negative and significant on 10 % level, supporting the assumption 
of first hypothesis.  Thus boards allow for higher risk taking by the 
management while financial risk of economic outcomes increasingly shifts 
from owners to creditors, indicating a potential moral hazard problem.  The 
second hypothesis stated that directors will increasingly consider their own 
reputation when firm is under financial distress and start to restrict 
management decision rights protect the company from bankruptcy and thus 
benefiting also creditors.  This hypothesis received limited support from the 
tests, which showed that the combined effect of lower MVE/TEV and 
 237 
financial distress lead to reversal of decision rights, in line with the humped 
structure illustrated in Chart 3.  The interaction variable was significant on 
10 % level (t = 1.803).  However, this result needs to be interpreted with 
caution, as the tests were run on various levels of distress, measured as net 
debt to EBITDA, and the results became significant only for companies 
exceeding a multiple of 9, which can be considered very high.  This may be 
explained by the high quality of sample companies, consisting of 202 of the 
600 largest companies in Europe by market capitalization, the market value 
of each being high.  Moir and Sudarnasam (2007) found that large 
companies have less covenant restrictions than smaller companies, so our 
sample may include abnormally few situations of creditor governance.  Also, 
the number of companies fulfilling the distress criterion was low, only 16 of 
the 202 companies, reducing the reliability of the results.  It is evident that 
more tests with an increasingly varied company sample is needed before 
stronger conclusions can be made. 
The variables related to board characteristics provided results in line with 
hypotheses three and four.  The proportion of independent directors was 
positively associated with risk limits (t = 1.764), supporting the assumption 
that independence allows for higher risks, independent directors providing 
additional comfort for the creditors.  The duality of leadership was strongly 
and positively related to risk limits (t = 2.724), which may be problematic to 
creditors as concentration of powers in single hands reduces the ability of 
directors controlling top management.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 238 
Table 4  Regression results 
 
 
OLS regression results for the natural logarithm of investment limit as the dependent variable, companies excluding 
financial sector (N=202).  T-values are shown in brackets below co-efficients.  *, ** and *** denote significance at 
10*, 5 % and 1* level.   
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
Intercept 
-7.298*** 
(-6.050) 
-7.523*** 
(-6.216) 
-7.767*** 
(-6.452)  
Pct of voting rights 
 0.751 
(1.583) 
1.034** 
(2.054)  
MVE/TEV (Risk split) 
-0.467 
(-1.092) 
-0.472 
(-1.106) 
-0.778* 
(-1.887)  
Distress (Net debt / EBITDA >9) 
-0.151 
(-0.079) 
-0.195 
(-0.102) 
0.111 
(0.061)  
MVE/TEV * Distress 
6.824* 
(1.667) 
6.821* 
(1.673) 
6.978* 
(1.803)  
Independent 
  0.877* 
(1.764)  
CEO_COB 
  4.427*** 
(2.724)  
Number of meetings 
  -0.127*** 
(-3.868)  
Size (Ln of Sales) 
0.711*** 
(10.191) 
0.713*** 
(10.260) 
0.762*** 
(11.186)  
 
  
(-2.369)  
 
  
 
Observations 202 202 202   
Adjusted ܴଶ 0.357 0.361 0.423   
 
 
The two control variables, number of meetings and company size both 
provided expected results.  A more active board has a strong negative 
association with risk limits (t = - 3.868), which seems natural as more 
meeting time allows for smaller decisions to be brought to boardroom.  Of 
course the relationship may also be inverse, lower limits requiring more 
board meetings as there is more to decide.   This may be not only an 
indication of active boards being tighter monitors, but it may also indicate 
increased monitoring in situations of distress, which is in line with the 
second hypothesis.  In addition, the relationship between company size and 
decision limits was positive as expected and very strong (t = 11.186), boards 
in larger companies delegating bigger decisions to management than their 
peers in smaller firms. 
 
      
4.3  Discussion of results 
 
The role of creditors in theories of corporate governance is not very well 
defined.  Although classical treatises note a potential agency problem 
between a company and its creditors, most of the literature focuses on the 
 239 
issues related to shareholder primacy.  The fundamental right for 
shareholders to receive a higher compensation is based on their higher risk 
as residual risk takers in a company after all contractual commitments have 
been fulfilled.   
However, the situation is not clear-cut, as the role of residual risk-taker 
changes in situations of distress.  Formal power may still lay in the hands of 
corporate bodies, while the majority of financial risk is transferred to 
creditors, which creates a need for creditor influence in corporate 
governance.  There are formal steps, such as covenant violations, re-
organization and bankruptcy that effectively give creditors formal decision-
making powers, but their real powers arise already prior to that.  Board of 
directors has a special role in this transfer of real powers, as shareholders’ 
interests may lead to a situation of moral hazard, benefits of increasing risk 
belonging to them but losses from failures falling on creditors as new 
residual risk takers.  In this situation, the role of board increasingly is based 
on stakeholder approach, directors representing the interests of largest 
residual claimants, even if they have been elected by shareholders.  The 
analysis of how boards allocate decision rights to management in various 
stages of financial distress provides us novel information on changing role 
of the board. 
We started our discussion by questioning why management decision limits 
would have anything to do with creditor governance.   In the analysis above, 
a clear relationship between decision control and risk split between 
shareholders and creditors was found, indicating owners’ moral hazard in 
situations where a major part of negative outcomes of risk decisions fall on 
creditors while benefits accrue to shareholders.  Owners have an interest to 
increase risk asymptotically when their ownership value approaches option 
value, in line with Chart 4 above.  On the other hand, creditors have the 
interest of reducing company risk-taking when owner interests are small, 
creating a rationale of financial covenants restricting company decision-
making powers in situations approaching distress.  The hypothesis of the 
role of board received only limited support, although there is no reason to 
reject the hypothesis that director interests in situations of distress change 
them from representatives of shareholders to representatives of creditors.  It 
was argued that this change takes place by stealth, directors having the 
interests to consider creditor interests already prior to formal power shifting 
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to creditors through covenant violations of even more severe situations of 
distress.  As a conclusion, boards with a role distinct from shareholders and 
management can be seen as a partial solution to the third agency problem 
between creditors and the company. 
The results also support the findings of Armstrong et al (2010), who argue 
that outside directors have reputational capital to loose, which aligns their 
interests with creditors in situations of distress.  Carcello and Neal (2003) 
provide further indirect evidence of changing nature of directors by showing 
that independent directors support independent audit, even when it is 
detrimental to shareholders and beneficial to creditors. 
From creditor perspective, requirement of independent majorities is a two-
edged sword.  On the one hand, independent directors reduce the ability of 
dominant shareholders to make excessive risk decisions, but on the other 
hand independent directors allow for higher risk-taking, potentially leading 
to increased credit risks.  The duality of leadership increased the risk limits, 
which may also be a problem for creditors, as plenty of powers are in the 
hands of a single individual. 
Concepts like financial distress and decision control both imply a restriction, 
a potential to pull rather than push.  Anyhow, it is actually difficult to 
determine if the limits have only a pull impact, or if boards can use them to 
push management for more active risk taking.  Basically this means that we 
cannot for certain determine the causality between risk taking and decision 
limits, if limits provide management with an ex ante signal of preferred risk 
levels, or are limits driven by management, and board intervenes only if ex 
post outcomes are not acceptable.    
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper started by defining the core concepts related to the third agency 
problem between creditors and a company, financial distress, financial 
contracting, and covenants.  It was shown that various stages of distress lead 
to different game-theoretic outcomes, each having implications for 
corporate governance.  It was also noted that the two alternative approaches 
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to creditor governance, financial contracting theory and agency theory have 
compatible behavioral assumptions and thus form a coherent basis for 
research. 
A model combining decision control and split of financial risk was built to 
study the relationship of governance and financial distress.  The results 
based on a sample of 202 of the 600 largest European companies by market 
capitalization were in line with the main hypotheses, showing the connection 
of governance and creditor control.  Increased management decision rights 
were associated with higher proportion of creditor risk until a critical level 
was reached, where limited support was found for the hypothesis boards 
turning into representatives of creditors and restricting management actions 
so that they would not contribute to potential moral hazard of owners.  
Additionally, it was shown that board characteristics had expected influence 
on decision control, independence and leadership duality allowing for higher 
limits, although reasons were interpreted to be different, while more active 
boards were associated with tighter decision control. 
From theoretical perspective, this paper combines agency-based governance 
theory with financial contracting theory, or more specifically incomplete 
contracting theory.  It showed that legalistic view on creditor control needs 
to be supplemented with economic view, which considers behavioral 
motivation of various actors in governance.   In financial distress creditor 
control arrives by stealth, through anticipation of what needs to be done in 
order to avoid negative consequences of creditor control. 
Financial distress changes the basic setup of agency relationships in 
governance.  Most important is the potential changing role of the board, 
from representatives of shareholders to representatives of creditors, limiting 
the acts of management unfavorable to creditors.  Board decision control can 
limit the potential moral hazard by the owners, whose self-interest would 
motivate to increase firm risk asymptotically in case their share of market-
based enterprise value becomes low.  This study leaves it open for future 
research how governance should be organized in situations of distress.  It is 
anyhow evident, that one of the primary outcomes of creditor control is 
board and creditor co-operation, in order to find ways for companies to 
survive, even though that may lead to decisions which are not in the interests 
of shareholders. 
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